GREAT BRITAIN

Field Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke, KG, GCB, OM, GCVO, DSO (July 23, 1883 - June 17, 1963) was a career soldier, Chief of the Imperial General Staff during the Second World War and promoted to Field Marshal in 1944. In retirement he served as Lord High Constable of England during the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953.

Background and early life

Born in 1883 at Bagnères-de-Bigorre to a prominent Northern Irish family, Alan Brooke was educated in France where he lived to age 16, and at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. During World War I he served with the Royal Artillery in France, ending the conflict as a Lieutenant-Colonel and with a reputation as an outstanding planner of operations. Between the wars he was a lecturer at the Staff College, Camberley and the Imperial Defence College, where he knew most of those who became leading British commanders of the Second World War.

World War II

Following the outbreak of World War II, Brooke commanded the II Corps of the British Expeditionary Force and played a leading role in the evacuation of Allied troops from Dunkirk. In July 1940 he was appointed to command United Kingdom Home Forces to take charge of anti-invasion preparations and in December 1941 was appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff; he later also became Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, holding both posts until retirement in 1946. He died in 1963.

For most of the Second World War, Brooke was the foremost military adviser to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, the War Cabinet, and to Britain's allies. As CIGS, Brooke was the functional head of the Army, and as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, he was responsible for the overall strategic direction of the war effort. The post of CIGS was less rewarding than command in an important theatre of war, but the CIGS chose the generals who commanded those theatres and decided what men and munitions they should have. Offered command of British forces in the Middle East in 1941, Brooke declined, believing he now knew better than any other general how to deal with Prime Minister Churchill, who too often seemed vulnerable to unwise advice from unqualified people.

In 1942, Brooke joined the western Allies' ultimate command, the US-British Combined Chiefs of Staff, in Washington D.C..

He was later bitterly disappointed to be passed over for command of the Allied invasion of Western Europe, in favour of US General Dwight D. Eisenhower.[citation needed]

Honours

Brooke was created Baron Alanbrooke, of Brookeborough, County Fermanagh, in 1945, and Viscount Alanbrooke in 1946.

He won the Distinguished Service Order in World War I,

He was appointed KCB in 1940,

He became a Knight of the Garter,

A member of the Order of Merit in 1946,

The GCB in 1953,

And GCVO in 1953.

He also served as Chancellor of the Queen's University of Belfast from 1949 until his death.

Coat of Arms

His Coat of Arms as issued to him by the College of Arms is: "Or, a cross engrailed per pale Gules and Sable, in dexter chief a crescent for difference."

War diaries

Lord Alanbrooke's gravestone.

Alanbrooke's war diaries were first published in heavily censored form in 1957.[1]

The publication in 2001 of Alanbrooke's uncensored War Diaries attracted attention for their insight into the day-to-day running of the British war effort and their, at times, forthright criticism of Winston Churchill and other leading figures of the time. These record for example both his bitter disappointment when Churchill agreed in 1943 that General Dwight D. Eisenhower should command the Allied Expeditionary Force, a post Alanbrooke believed he had earned and been promised, and his later judgement that, because of the US contribution in men and munitions, the supreme command had to be exercised by an American general.

Finally

He is buried in his home village of Hartley Wintney, Hampshire, which is where the last heir to the Alanbrooke viscountcy also still lives.

An interesting sidebar to Alanbrooke's post-war life is that such a key figure in twentieth century British life should have ended up in the gardener's cottage of his former home and also to have probated such a small amount given his illustrious career & post-war, post-army directorships. This may be careful tax planning or a symbol of how the former Chiefs of Staff of WW2 are condemned to obscurity by a certain cult of personality.

At his death in 1963, Alanbrooke's estate was probated at £50,580 (about £700,000 in 2006).

Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG, GCB, DSO, PC (17 November 1887–24 March 1976), often referred to as "Monty", was a British Army officer. He successfully commanded Allied forces at the Battle of El Alamein, a major turning point in World War II, and troops under his command were largely responsible for the expulsion of Axis forces from North Africa[citation needed]. He was later a prominent commander in Italy and North-West Europe, where he was in command of all Allied ground forces during Operation Overlord until after the Battle of Normandy.

Early life

Montgomery was born in Kennington, London in 1887, the fourth child of nine, to an Anglo-Irish Anglican priest, Revd. Henry Montgomery. The Montgomery family came from Moville, County Donegal, near Londonderry, and maintained their home, New Park, there. Montgomery considered himself Irish and a County Donegal man.[1] In 1889, the family moved with his father when he was made Bishop of Tasmania. His father was kind, but ineffectual in the house, and often away on missionary work. His mother was a martinet, who allowed her husband 10 shillings a week from his salary and beat her children. Montgomery said that he had an unhappy childhood, often clashing with his mother and becoming the black sheep of the family to such an extent that he declined to go to his mother's funeral. His father died at Molville in 1932.

In 1901, Bishop Montgomery became secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and the family returned to London. Montgomery went to St Paul's School and then the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, from which he was almost expelled for setting fire to a fellow cadet during a fight with pokers. He joined the 1st Battalion, The Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 1908, first seeing service in India until 1913.

First World War

The First World War began in August 1914 and Montgomery moved to France with his regiment that month. He saw service during the retreat from Mons, during which half the men in his battalion became casualties or prisoners. At Meteren, near the Belgian border at Bailleul on 13 October 1914, during an allied counter-offensive, he was shot through the right lung by a sniper and was injured seriously enough for his grave to be dug in preparation for his death. He was awarded the DSO for gallant leadership.

After recovering in early 1915, he was promoted to a brigade-major training Kitchener's New Army and returned to the Western Front in early 1916 as an operations staff officer during the battles of the Somme, Arras, and Passchendaele. During this time he came under the command of General Sir Herbert Plumer, in charge of training for the 9th Corps. Through his training, rehearsal, and integration of the infantry with artillery and engineers, Plumer's troops were able to achieve their objectives with a minimum of casualties.

Montgomery served at the battles of the Lys and Chemin-des-Dames before finishing the war as General Staff Officer 1 and effectively chief of staff of the 47th (2nd London) Division, with the temporary rank of lieutenant-colonel. A photograph of 1918 shows the then unknown Lt-Col Montgomery standing in front of Winston Churchill at a parade.

Between the Wars

After the war Montgomery commanded a battalion in the British Army of the Rhine, before reverting to his regular rank of captain. He wrote up his experiences in a series of training pamphlets and manuals. He then attended the army's Staff College at Camberley, before being appointed brigade-major in the 17th Infantry Brigade at the end of 1920. The brigade was stationed in County Cork during the Anglo-Irish War. A cousin of Montgomery's had been assassinated by the IRA in 1920 (see the Cairo Gang) and he was a half-Irish Protestant. However, though he was effective, he did not employ methods as brutal as those of his contemporary in Cork, Arthur Percival. On his arrival he urged units of his brigade that their "behaviour must be beyond reproach" although later he stated that it "never bothered me a bit how many houses were burnt" (a reference to the government policy of burning the homes of suspected republicans and sympathisers). IRA officer Tom Barry said that he "behaved with great correctness". Montgomery increasingly came to see the conflict as one that could not be won, and withdrawal of British forces as the only feasible solution. In 1923, after the establishment of the Irish Free State and during the Irish Civil War, Montgomery wrote to Percival that in order "to win a war of that sort you must be ruthless" and 20th century democratic Britain would not do that, and so "the only way therefore was to give them [the Irish] some form of self-government and let them squash the rebellion themselves".

In 1923 Montgomery was posted to the Territorial 49th Division, eschewing the usual amounts of drill for tactical training. He returned to the 1st Royal Warwickshires in 1925 as a company commander and captain, before becoming an instructor at the Staff College, Camberley and a major (brevet lieutenant-colonel). He met and married Elizabeth Carver, a widow, in 1927 and a son was born in August 1928. He became lieutenant-colonel of the 1st Battalion of The Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 1931, and saw service in Palestine, Egypt, and India. He was promoted to full colonel and became an instructor at the Indian Army Staff College in Quetta, India. As was usual, Montgomery maintained links with the Royal Warwickshires, taking up the honorary position of Colonel-of-the-Regiment in 1947. As throughout his career, Montgomery stirred up the resentment of his superiors for his arrogance and dictatorial ways, and also for his disregard of convention when it obstructed military effectiveness. For example, he set up a battalion brothel, regularly inspected by the medical officer, for the 'horizontal refreshment' of his soldiers rather than forcing them to take chances in unregulated establishments. He became commanding officer of the 9th Infantry Brigade in 1937, but the year also saw tragedy for him. His marriage had been a very happy and loving one, but his wife was bitten by an insect while on holiday in Burnham-on-Sea. The bite became infected, and his wife died in his arms from septicaemia following an amputation. The loss devastated Brigadier Montgomery, but he insisted on throwing himself back into his work immediately after the funeral.

In 1938, he organised an amphibious combined operations landing exercise that impressed the new commander-in-chief, Southern Command, General Wavell. He was promoted to major-general and took command of the 8th Infantry Division in Palestine. There he quashed an Arab revolt before returning in July 1939 to Britain, suffering a serious illness on the way, to command of the 3rd (Iron) Infantry Division.

Second World War

Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939. The 3rd Division was deployed to Belgium as part of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Montgomery predicted a disaster similar to that in 1914, and so spent the Phony War training his troops for tactical retreat rather than offensive operations. During this time, Montgomery faced serious trouble from his superiors after again taking a very pragmatic attitude towards the sexual health of his soldiers. His training paid off when the Germans began their invasion of the Low Countries on 10 May 1940 and the 3rd Division advanced to the River Dijle and then withdrew to Dunkirk with great professionalism, returning to Britain intact with minimal casualties. During Operation Dynamo — the evacuation of 330,000 BEF and French troops to Britain — Montgomery assumed command of the II Corps.

On his return Montgomery antagonised the War Office with trenchant criticisms of the command of the BEF and was briefly relegated to divisional command and only made CB. In July 1940 he was promoted to lieutenant-general, placed in command of V Corps and started a long-running feud with the new commander-in-chief, Southern Command, Claude Auchinleck. In April 1941 he became commander of XII Corps and in December 1941 renamed the South-Eastern Command the South-Eastern Army to promote offensive spirit. During this time he developed and rehearsed his ideas and trained his soldiers, culminating in Exercise Tiger in May 1942, a combined forces exercise involving 100,000 troops.

North Africa and Italy

See also Western Desert Campaign and North African Campaign.

Montgomery in North Africa, November 1942. His aide (shown behind him looking through binoculars) was killed in action in 1945.

In 1942 a new field commander was required in the Middle East, where Auchinleck was commander-in-chief. He had stabilised the allied position at Alamein, but after a visit in August 1942, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, replaced him with Alexander, and was persuaded by Alan Brooke to appoint Montgomery commander of the British Eighth Army in the North African campaign after Churchill's own preferred candidate, William Gott, was killed flying back to Cairo.

Montgomery's peremptory assumption of command of the Eighth Army was deeply resented by Auchinleck and his departing staff, but transformed the Eighth Army. Taking command two days earlier than authorised on 13 August 1942, Montgomery ordered immediate reinforcement of the vital heights of Alam Halfa, joined the army and air headquarters together in a single operating unit, and ordered all contingency plans for retreat to be destroyed. Both Brooke and Alexander were astonished by the transformation in atmosphere when they visited on 19 August.

Montgomery also managed to transform the morale of the Eighth Army quickly, though at the expense of denigrating Auchinleck. Montgomery made a concerted effort to appear before troops as often as possible, frequently visiting various units and making himself known to the men. A criticism of the 8th Army up until this point had been that the constituent units tended to fight their own separate battles. Montgomery was determined that the Army should fight its battles in a unified, focused manner according to a detailed plan.

German commander Erwin Rommel attempted to encircle the Eighth Army at the Battle of Alam Halfa from 31 August 1942. ULTRA decryption had confirmed Montgomery's initial decision to defend the area, and Rommel was halted with very little gain. After this engagement, Montgomery was criticised for not attacking the retreating German forces; however, in Montgomery's judgement, the 8th Army could not defeat the Germans in mobile, fluid mechanised battles and choosing to engage in such a battle, therefore, would play to German strength.

The reconquest of North Africa was essential for airfields to support Malta and for Operation Torch. Ignoring Churchill's demands for quick action Montgomery prepared meticulously for the new offensive. He was determined not to fight until he thought there had been sufficient preparation for a decisive victory, and put into action his beliefs with the gathering of resources, detailed planning, the training of troops, especially in night fighting and in the use of over 300 of the latest American-built Sherman tanks, 90 M7 Priests, and visiting every single unit involved in the offensive.

Infantry advance during the Battle of El Alamein. In fact, this image was staged by the photographer Len Chetwyn, and shows Australians storming their own cookhouse.

The Battle of El Alamein began on 23 October 1942, and ended 12 days later with the first large-scale, decisive allied land victory of the war. Montgomery correctly predicted both the length of the battle and the number of casualties (13,500).

Montgomery was knighted and promoted to full general. The Eighth Army's subsequent advance as the Germans retreated hundreds of miles towards their bases in Tunisia used the logistical and firepower advantages of the British Army while avoiding unnecessary risks. It also gave the Allies an indication that the tide of war had genuinely turned in North Africa. Montgomery kept the initiative, applying superior strength when it suited him, forcing Rommel out of each successive defensive position. On 6 March 1943 Rommel's attack on the over-extended 8th Army at Medenine (Operation Capri) with the largest concentration of German armour in North Africa was successfully repulsed. At the Mareth Line, 20 to 27 March, when Montgomery encountered fiercer frontal opposition than he had anticipated, he switched his major effort into an outflanking inland pincer, backed by low-flying RAF fighter-bomber support.

This campaign demonstrated the battle-winning ingredients of morale (sickness and absenteeism was virtually eliminated in the Eighth Army), co-operation of all arms including the air forces, first-class logistical back-up and clear-cut orders.

The next major Allied attack was the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky). It was in Sicily that Montgomery's famous tensions with US commanders really began. Montgomery managed to recast plans for the Allied invasion, in general making the plan more cautious. Inter-allied tensions grew as the American commanders Patton and Bradley, took umbrage at what they perceived as Montgomery's attitudes and boastfulness. They resented him, while accepting his skills as a general.

Montgomery continued to command Eighth Army during the landings on the mainland of Italy itself. Montgomery abhorred the lack of coordination, the dispersion of effort, and the strategic muddle and opportunism and was glad to leave the "dog's breakfast" on December 23.

Normandy

Montgomery returned to Britain to take command of the 21st Army Group which consisted of all Allied ground forces that would take part in Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy. Preliminary planning for the invasion had been taking place for two years, most recently by COSSAC staff (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander). Montgomery quickly concluded that the COSSAC plan was too limited, and strongly advocated expanding the plan from a three-division to a five-division assault. As with his takeover of the Eighth Army, Montgomery travelled frequently to his units, raising morale and ensuring training was progressing. On 7 April and 15 May he presented his strategy for the invasion at St Paul's School. He envisaged a ninety day battle, ending when all the forces reached the Seine, pivoting on an Allied-held Caen, with British and Canadian armies forming a shoulder and the U.S. armies wheeling on the right.

During the hard fought two and a half month Battle of Normandy that followed, Montgomery was not able to follow the original campaign plan, but in a series of improvised offensives the Allied armies under his command inflicted one of the biggest defeats of the war on the German army in the west. The campaign that Montgomery fought was essentially attritional until the middle of July with the occupation of the Cotentin Peninsula and a series of offensives in the east, which secured Caen and attracted the bulk of German armour there. An American breakout was achieved with Operation Cobra and the encirclement of German forces in the Falaise pocket at the cost of British sacrifice with the diversionary Operation Goodwood.

Advance to the Rhine

Montgomery talking to General Maczek, commanding officer of Polish 1st Armoured Division, 1945.

The increasing preponderance of American troops in the European theatre (from two out of five divisions at D-Day to 72 out of 85 in 1945) made it a political impossibility for the Ground Forces Commander to be British. After the end of the Normandy campaign, General Eisenhower himself took over Ground Forces Command while continuing as Supreme Commander, with Montgomery continuing to command the 21st Army Group, now consisting mainly of British and Canadian units. Montgomery bitterly resented this change, even though it had been agreed before the D-Day invasion. Winston Churchill had Montgomery promoted to field marshal by way of compensation.

Montgomery was able to persuade Eisenhower to adopt his strategy of a single thrust to the Ruhr with Operation Market Garden in September 1944. It was the most uncharacteristic of Montgomery's battles: the offensive was bold and poorly planned. It ended in failure with the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Montgomery's preoccupation with the push to the Ruhr had also distracted him from the essential task of clearing the Scheldt during the capture of Antwerp, and so after Arnhem, Montgomery's group were instructed to concentrate on doing this so that the port of Antwerp could be opened.

When the surprise attack on the Ardennes took place on 16 December 1944, starting the Battle of the Bulge, the front of the U.S. 12th Army Group was split, with the bulk of the U.S. First Army on the northern shoulder of the German 'bulge'. The Army Group commander, General Omar Bradley, was located south of the penetration at Luxembourg and command of the U.S. First Army became problematic. Montgomery was the nearest commander on the ground and on 20 December, Eisenhower (who was in Versailles) transferred Courtney Hodges' U.S. First Army and William Simpson's U.S. Ninth Army to his 21st Army Group, despite Bradley's vehement objections on nationalistic grounds.[2] Montgomery grasped the situation quickly, visiting all divisional, corps, and army field commanders himself and instituting his 'Phantom' network of liaison officers. He grouped the British XXX Corps as a strategic reserve and reorganised the U.S. defence of the northern shoulder, shortening and strengthening the line and ordering the evacuation of St Vith. The German commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel said

The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.[3]

Montgomery and Soviet generals Zhukov, Sokolovsky and Rokossovsky at the Brandenburg Gate 12 July 1945.

Eisenhower had then wanted Montgomery to go on the offensive on 1 January to meet Patton's army that had started advancing from the south on 19 December and in doing so, trap the Germans. However, Montgomery refused to commit infantry he considered underprepared into a snowstorm and for a strategically unimportant piece of land. He did not launch the attack until 3 January, by which point the German forces had been able to escape. A large part of American military opinion thought that he should not have held back, though it was characteristic of him not to want to throw troops away owing to inadequate preparation. After the battle the U.S. First Army was restored to the 12th Army Group; the U.S. Ninth Army remained under 21st Army Group until it crossed the Rhine.

Montgomery's 21st Army Group advanced to the Rhine with operations Veritable and Grenade in February 1945. After a meticulously-planned Rhine crossing on 24 March and the subsequent encirclement of the German Army Group B in the Ruhr, Montgomery's role was initially to guard the flank of the American advance. This was altered, however, to forestall any chance of a Red Army advance into Denmark, and the 21st Army Group occupied Hamburg and Rostock and sealed off the Danish peninsula.

On 4 May 1945, on Lüneburg Heath, Montgomery accepted the surrender of German forces in northern Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. Characteristically, this was done plainly in a tent without any ceremony.

Later life

Montgomery as CIGS with Wavell and Auchinleck.

After the war, Montgomery was created 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein in 1946. He was Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1946 until 1948, but was largely a failure as it required the strategic and political skills he did not possess. He was then supreme commander or chairman of the western union's commanders-in-chief committee. He was an effective inspector-general and mounted good exercises, but out of his depth politically, and was pleased to become Eisenhower's deputy in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces from 1951 until his retirement in 1958. His mother died in 1949; Montgomery did not attend the funeral, claiming he was "too busy".

Montgomery was chairman of the governing body of St John's School, Leatherhead, Surrey from 1951 to 1966 and a generous supporter.

In 1953, the Hamilton Board of Education in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, wrote to Montgomery and asked permission to name a new school in the city's east end after him. Viscount Montgomery Elementary was billed as "the most modern school in North America" and the largest single-storey school in Hamilton, when the sod was turned on 14 March 1951. The school officially opened on 18 April 1953, with Montgomery in attendance among almost 10,000 well-wishers. At the opening, he gave the motto "Gardez Bien" from his own family's coat of arms.

Montgomery referred to the school as his "beloved school" and visited on five separate occasions, the last being in 1960. On his last visit, he said to "his" students:

Let's make Viscount Montgomery School the best in Hamilton, the best in Ontario, the best in Canada. I don't associate myself with anything that is not good. It is up to you to see that everything about this school is good. It is up to the students to not only be their best in school but in their behaviour outside of Viscount. Education is not just something that will help you pass your exams and get you a job, it is to develop your brain to teach you to marshal facts and do things.

Before retirement, Montgomery's outspoken views on some subjects, such as race, were often officially suppressed. After retirement these outspoken views became public and his reputation suffered. His memoirs were broadly judged to be self-serving and arrogant. He criticised many of his wartime comrades in harsh terms, including Eisenhower (whom he accused, among other things, of prolonging the war by a year through poor leadership — allegations which ended their friendship). He applauded apartheid and Chinese communism under Mao Zedong, and argued against the legalisation of homosexuality in the United Kingdom, arguing that the Sexual Offences Act 1967 was a "charter for buggery" and that "this sort of thing may be tolerated by the French, but we're British — thank God."

Perhaps at least in part because of these controversies, Montgomery was never raised to an earldom. (Unlike his wartime contemporaries Harold Alexander, Louis Mountbatten and even Archibald Wavell.) An official task he insisted on performing in his later years was bearing the Sword of State during the State Opening of Parliament. His increasing frailty, however, raised concerns about his ability to stand for long periods whilst carrying the heavy weapon. Ultimately, those fears were borne out when he collapsed in mid-ceremony in 1968 and did not perform this function again.

A favourite pastime of the British press during these years was to photograph Montgomery cashing his old age pension cheque at the local social security office. Because of his eminence, many assumed Montgomery was wealthy and did not need the money. In fact, he had always been a man of modest means and it caused him great anguish that many believed he was taking taxpayer money he did not need.

Another blow was a break-in at his home. Despite making a heartbreaking televised appeal for the return of his possessions, many of which bore only sentimental value, the items were never recovered.

Montgomery died in 1976 at his home in Alton, Hampshire, and was interred in the nearby Holy Cross Churchyard, Binsted after a state funeral at St George's Chapel, Windsor. His portrait (by Frank O. Salisbury, 1945) hangs in the National Portrait Gallery

Field Marshal Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis, KG, OM, GCB, GCSI, GCMG, GCVO, DSO, MC, LL.D, PC (10 December 1891 - 16 June 1969) was a British military commander and field marshal, notably during the Second World War as the commander of the 15th Army Group. He later served as the last British Governor General of Canada.

Early Life and Career

The third son of the 4th Earl of Caledon and the former Lady Elizabeth Graham-Toler, a daughter of the 3rd Earl of Norbury, he was born in London and educated at Harrow School and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Military career

He was commissioned into the Irish Guards in 1911. During the First World War, Alexander's battalion formed a part of the original British Expeditionary Force (BEF), in which he was a 22-year-old lieutenant and platoon commander. Alexander became the youngest lieutenant-colonel in the British Army during the war, and when the Great War ended he was in temporary command of a brigade. He served on the Western Front and was wounded twice in four years of fighting. He received the Military Cross in 1915, the Distinguished Service Order in 1916, and the Legion of Honour, and by 1918 was an acting brigadier. Rudyard Kipling, who wrote a history of the Irish Guards in which his own son fought and was killed, noted that, "It is undeniable that Colonel Alexander had the gift of handling the men on the lines to which they most readily responded . . . his subordinates loved him, even when he fell upon them blisteringly for their shortcomings; and his men were all his own."

In 1919 - 1920 Alexander led the Baltic German Landeswehr in the Latvian War of Independence, commanding units loyal to the Republic of Latvia in the successful drive to eject the Bolsheviks from Latgale. He later served in Turkey and Gibraltar before returning to England and the Staff College, Camberley and the Imperial Defence College. On 14 October 1931, he married Lady Margaret Bingham, second daughter of the 5th Earl of Lucan. In 1937 he was promoted to major-general. He joined the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), as commander of the 1st Infantry Division, in France in 1939.

He was instrumental in leading the retreat of the BEF to Dunkirk, and was the last British soldier to leave. For the rest of 1940 and 1941 he held commands equivalent to corps and then army in mainland Britain, before being sent to Burma, commanding what was later to be the Fourteenth Army at the beginning of that campaign. In August 1942 Winston Churchill sent him, as Commander-in-Chief Middle East, and under him Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery as General Officer Commanding Eighth Army, to North Africa to replace General Claude Auchinleck who had held both positions. He presided over Montgomery's victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein. After the Anglo-American forces from Torch and the Eighth Army met in Tunisia in January 1943, he became deputy to Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean.

Alexander was very popular with both US and British officers, and was Eisenhower's preference for the ground command of D-Day, but Field Marshal Alan Brooke applied pressure to keep him in Italy, considering him unfit for the assignment. Alexander remained in Italy as commander of the 15th Army Group, with the US Fifth Army and British Eighth Army under his command.

Montgomery, who was both a long-time friend and subordinate of Alexander in Sicily and Italy, said of him, "Alexander....is not a strong commander...the higher art of war is quite beyond him." He advised his US counterparts, Mark Clark and George S. Patton, to ignore any orders from Alexander with which they did not agree.

In 1943 the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, proposed to make the Irish aristocrat Alexander a Knight in the Most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick. The Commonwealth Office advised against it and Alexander was made a Viscount in the Peerage of the United Kingdom instead.

His forces captured Rome in June 1944, thereby achieving one of the strategic goals of the Italian campaign. However, US Fifth Army forces at Anzio, under Clark's orders, failed to follow their original breakout plan that would have trapped the German forces escaping northwards. At the end of 1944 Alexander was promoted to field marshal, his promotion being backdated to the fall of Rome, on 4 June 1944, so that he would once again become senior to Montgomery, who had been made a field marshal earlier in the year, on 1 September 1944, after the end of the Battle of Normandy.

Alexander received the German surrender in Italy on 29 April 1945.

Sir Harold Alexander was created Viscount Alexander of Tunis, of Errigal in the County of Donegal, in 1946 for his leadership in North Africa and Italy. In December 1946 he was made a Knight of the Garter and was created Baron Rideau, of Ottawa and of Castle Derg in the County of Tyrone, and Earl Alexander of Tunis in 1952.

Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell, 1st Earl Wavell, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, CMG, MC, PC (May 5, 1883 – May 24, 1950) was a British field marshal and the commander of British Army forces in the Middle East during World War II. He led British forces to victory over the Italians, only to be defeated by the German army. He was the penultimate Viceroy of India from 1943-47.

Life

Wavell was born in Colchester but spent much of his childhood in India. Wavell's father was a major-general in the British Army and Wavell followed his father's career choice.

Wavell attended Winchester College and Sandhurst. He joined the Black Watch in 1900 and fought in the second Boer War. In 1903, he was transferred to India and fought in the Bazar Valley campaign of 1908. In 1911, Wavell spent a year as a military observer with the Russian Army.

Wavell was working as a staff officer when World War I began. He was transferred to a combat unit and was wounded in the Battle of Ypres in 1915, losing an eye. Following his recovery, he was assigned as a liaison-officer to the Russian Army in 1916, this time in the field in Turkey. In 1918, he was transferred to Sir Edmund Allenby's staff in Palestine.

Wavell was given a number of assignments between the world wars. In 1937, he was transferred back to Palestine, where there was a growing uprising. In August 1939, he was named as the head of Middle East Command and was in that post when World War II began.

The Middle Eastern theatre was quiet for the first few months of the war until Italy's declaration of war in June 1940. The Italian forces in North Africa greatly outnumbered the British. Wavell however was able to not only defend against the Italian attacks but to defeat the Italians and occupy their colonies in Ethiopia and Somaliland. By February 1941, the British appeared to be on the verge of overrunning the last Italian forces in Libya, which would have ended all Axis control in Africa.

Wavell meets Lt. General Quinan, commander of British and Indian Army forces in Iraq in April 1941.

But at this same time the Germans and Italians were attacking Greece. Wavell was ordered to halt his advance into Libya and send troops to Greece. He disagreed with this decision but followed his orders. The result was a disaster. The Germans had an opportunity to reinforce the Italians in North Africa, the British were unable to set up an adequate defense on the Greek mainland and were forced to withdraw to Crete with heavy losses, and a pro-Axis faction took over the government of Iraq leading to the brief Anglo-Iraqi War.

Wavell was replaced as Commander of British forces in the Middle East by Sir Claude Auchinleck in July 1941. He was then transferred to India, where he served as Commander-in-Chief. He once again had the misfortune of being placed in charge of an undermanned theatre which became a warzone when the Japanese declared war on the United Kingdom in December 1941. He was made Commander-in-Chief of ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command, but was forced to evacuate his headquarters from Java following the break-up of ABDA.

Wavell, despite his abilities, did not have the resources to defend the territory he was responsible for and was unable to prevent the Japanese from capturing Singapore, Malaya, and Burma.

Wavell as Viceroy of India (centre), with the C-in-C of the Indian Army Auchinleck (right) and Montgomery.

Wavell was again replaced in his military post by Auchinleck, who by this point had also experienced setbacks in North Africa. In 1943, Wavell was created a viscount and was named Viceroy of India. His mandate there was to maintain the status quo in India during the war and he remained in this post until he was replaced by Lord Mountbatten of Burma in 1947. Wavell is generally considered the best Viceroy and Governor General of India, for not only he had done all his homework before he became viceroy, but he is also considered one of those British personalities who touched Indian souls and understood them. His understanding of the Indian situation and the ignoring of his requests and proposals by Winston Churchill had made him quite frustrated. He was relieved to see Clement Attlee replace Churchill as Prime Minister in July 1945; however, he was unhappy with Attlee's slowness to make decisions. He had himself requested several times to be removed from his post, but his requests were turned down by London. However, had Wavell not been there, the communal tension and civic strife could have been prolonged and more bloody. Wavell was against the Partition of India, as he knew this would lead to bloodshed which neither Indians nor the British would be able to control. He wanted to be prepared for anything and had worked on preparations for a situation in which India were to be partitioned. When it was decided that the British policy was to partition India, it was Wavell who laid the foundations for the work of Border Commission chairman Sir Cyril Radcliffe; this work eventually became the Radcliffe Line.

Wavell returned to England and was made High Steward of Colchester in 1947. He died in 1950.

Wavell was well-known to be a great lover of poetry. He made the selections for an anthology of great poetry, Other Men's Flowers, which was published in 1944; the last poem in the anthology he wrote himself. He had a great memory for poetry and often quoted it at length. He is depicted in Evelyn Waugh's novel "Officers and Gentlemen", part of the Sword of Honour trilogy, reciting poetry in public.

Wavell Heights, a suburb in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, was named after him in 1941, after a request by the Brisbane City Council to rename an area previously known as West Nundah.

Field Marshal John Standish Surtees Prendergast Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort VC GCB CBE DSO and two Bars MVO MC (commonly known as Lord Gort) (10 July 1886 - 31 March 1946) was a British soldier who served in both World War I and II, rising to the rank of field marshal and receiving the Victoria Cross.

Early days

He was born in London and grew up in County Durham and the Isle of Wight. He was educated at Malvern Link Preparatory School and Harrow School and then entered the Royal Military Academy in January 1904, having succeeded his father to the family title in 1902. He was commissioned in the Grenadier Guards in July 1905 where he took to his duties with exceptional zeal.

On the death of King Edward VII in 1910 Lieutenant Gort was in command of the Grenadier NCOs detailed to bear the coffin and attend the catafalque. He was made a Member of the Royal Victorian Order for his services. Later that year he went moose hunting in Canada and accidentally shot his Indian guide, prompting an immediate return.

On 22 February 1911 he married Corinna Vereker, a second cousin, at the Guards Chapel, Wellington Barracks. They had three children, Charles in 1912, Joscelyn in 1913, and Jacqueline in 1914. They divorced in 1925.

On 3 September 1913 he was appointed ADC to General Francis Lloyd, GO Commanding London District.

First World War

By 1914 he had reached the rank of captain. He fought on the Western Front, was mentioned in despatches nine times, and won a Military Cross and Distinguished Service Order and two bars.

He was awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions on 27 September 1918 at the Canal du Nord, near Flesquieres, France. Lieutenant-Colonel Gort led his battalion under very heavy fire and although wounded, when the battalion was held up he went across open ground to obtain assistance from a tank and personally led it to the best advantage. He was again wounded, but after lying on a stretcher for a while insisted on getting up and directing the further attack which resulted in the capture of over 200 prisoners, two batteries of field-guns and numerous machine-guns. He refused to leave the field until the success signal had gone up on the final objective. Gort's batman, Guardsman Ransome, was killed while helping Gort to safety.

Inter-war years

After attending a short course at the Staff College, Camberley in 1919, Gort returned in 1921 as an instructor.

He took up sailing in 1922 and was a keen yatchsman until the next war intervened, joining the Royal Yacht Squadron in 1922 and participating in the 1925 Fastnet race. In 1924 he rewrote the Infantry Training Manual.

He was promoted to colonel in 1925, and in January 1927 went to Shanghai, returning in August to give a first hand account of the Chinese situation to the King and the Prince of Wales. He went on to command the Guards Brigade for two years from 1930 before overseeing training in India and then returning to the Staff College in 1936 as Commander.

In 1932 he took up flying, buying the de Haviland Moth aeroplane Henrietta and being elected chairman of the Household Brigade Flying Club.

He was made a full general in 1937, unusually being promoted directly from major-general and never holding the rank of lieutenant-general, and was then the surprise choice to be Chief of the Imperial General Staff. At this office he advocated the primacy of building a land army and defending France and the Low Countries over Imperial defence after France had said she would not be able on her own to defend herself against a German attack. The First Sea Lord Sir Roger Backhouse argued that this Continental commitment might not be limited. Gort replied by saying 'Lord Kitchener had clearly pointed out that no great country can wage a "little" war'.

Second World War

At the outbreak of war he was given command of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France, arriving on 19 September 1939. Following the Phony War, the 1940 German breakthrough in the Ardennes split the Allied forces. Communications between the BEF and the French effectively broke down, and on 25 May Gort took the unilateral decision to ignore his orders for a southward attack by his forces. Gort's command position was difficult, serving under French High, theatre, and army group command while also being responsible to London. Withdrawing northwards, the BEF together with many French soldiers were evacuated during the Battle of Dunkirk. The disposition of the BEF was attacked, in hindsight and at the time, as too conventional – chiefly due to lack of any kind of defensive works. Gort is credited by some as reacting efficiently to the ensuing crisis. Gort's decision to withdraw the BEF from likely capture is credited by many in helping Britain remain in the war and preventing British morale from collapsing due to the defeats of 1940. Others hold a more critical view of Gort’s leadership in 1940, seeing his decision to not follow orders to join the French in organizing a large scale counterattack as defeatist and undermining to the overall Allied reaction.

Gort served in various positions for the duration of the war. On the day of his return, 1 June 1940, he was made an ADC General to King George VI. On 25 June he went by flying boat, with Duff Cooper, to Rabat, Morocco, to rally anti-Nazi French cabinet ministers, but was instead arrested by Vichy gendarmerie. He was quickly released, and he returned to Britain.

Gort was given the post of Inspector of Training and the Home Guard, and with nothing constructive to do visited Iceland, Orkney, and Shetland. He went on to serve as Governor of Gibraltar (1941 - 1942). He pushed ahead with extending the airfield into land reclaimed from the sea, against the advice of the British government, but was later thanked by the War Cabinet for his foresight when the airfield proved vital to the British Mediterranean campaign. As Governor of Malta (1942 - 1944) his courage and leadership during the siege was recognized by the Maltese giving him the Sword of Honour. The King gave Gort his Field Marshal's baton on 20 June 1943 at Malta. On 29 September, Gort, together with Generals Eisenhower and Alexander, witnessed Marshal Badoglio signing the Italian surrender in Valetta Harbor.

He ended the war as High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan. During a meeting in November 1945 with Field Marshals Brooke and Montgomery Gort collapsed and was flown to London where the diagnosis was cancer.

In February 1946, he was created a Viscount in the Peerage of the United Kingdom under the same title as his existing Viscountcy in the Peerage of Ireland. Upon his death on 31 March 1946 without a son, the Irish viscountcy of Gort passed to a cousin and the British creation became extinct.

He was the father-in-law of Major William Sidney, 1st Viscount De L'Isle VC, and first cousin-once-removed to General Sir Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton. Gort was present when his son-in-law received the VC from Alexander on 3 March 1944 in Italy (the VC ribbon was cut from one of Gort's uniforms).

Field Marshal Sir Claude John Eyre Auchinleck, GCB, GCIE, CSI, DSO, OBE (June 21, 1884 - March 23, 1981), nicknamed The Auk, was a British army commander during World War II.

Early life and career

Born in Aldershot, he grew up in impoverished circumstances, but was able through hard work and scholarships to graduate from Wellington College and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. In 1904 he joined the 62nd Punjab regiment of the Indian Army. During World War I, he served in the Middle East in Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Claude Auchinleck was a career soldier who spent much of his military career in India, where he developed a love of the country and an affinity for the ordinary soldiers under his command.

World War II

Norway

Early in World War II Auchinleck was given command of the Allied forces in Norway in May 1940, a military operation that was doomed to fail. After the fall of Norway, in July 1940 he became briefly General Officer Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command, and then Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army.

North Africa

Following the see-saw of Allied and Axis successes and reverses in North Africa, Auchinleck was appointed to succeed General (later Field Marshal) Sir Archibald Wavell as C-in-C of the Allied Forces in the Middle East in July 1941; Wavell took up Auchinleck's post as C-in-C of the Indian Army, swapping jobs with him.

General Auchinleck as C-in-C Middle East was based in Cairo, with responsibility not just for North Africa but also for Persia and the Middle East; the Eighth Army confronting the German Afrika Corps and the Italian Army was commanded successively by Generals Sir Alan Cunningham and Sir Neil Ritchie. The first major offensive by Eighth Army, Operation Crusader in November 1941 resulted in the defeat of much of the British armour and the breakdown of Cunningham. Auchinleck relieved Cunningham, and ordered the battle to continue. Despite heavy losses, the Afrika Korps were driven back to El Agheila. Auchinleck then appointed Ritchie to command Eighth Army. While Auchinleck resumed overall strategic direction of the Middle East theatre, he continued to dictate operational matters to Ritchie. In January of 1942 Afrika Korps struck at British forces, driving the British back to the Gazala positions near Tobruk. Rommel's attack at Gazala of May 25, 1942 was a significant defeat for the British. Eighth Army retreated into Egypt; Tobruk (which was of great political significance to Winston Churchill but of limited military importance to Auchinleck) fell on 21 June. Once more Auchinleck stepped in to take direct command of the Eighth Army. An attempt to stand at Mersa Matruh failed, and the rout continued back to Alamein. The German/Italian advance was finally halted at the First Battle of El Alamein by the Eighth army. But attempts by Auchinleck to destroy Afrika Korps in a succession of poorly planned attacks during July and early August 1942 were failures.

"The Auk", as he was known to some, appointed a number of senior commanders who were unsuitable for their positions, and command arrangements were often characterised by bitter personality clashes. Auchinleck was an Indian Army officer and was criticised as apparently having little direct experience or understanding of British and Dominion troops.

Auchinleck's desire for the Eighth Army to fight in mobile 'Brigade Groups' rather than Divisions was resisted by many subordinates. His controversial chief of staff, Dorman-Smith, was regarded with considerable distrust by many of the senior commanders in Eighth Army. By July 1942 Auchinleck had lost the confidence of Dominion commanders and relations with his British commanders had become strained.

Like his foe Rommel (and his predecessor Wavell and successor Montgomery), Auchinleck was subjected to constant political interference, having to weather a barrage of hectoring telegrams and instructions from Prime Minister Churchill throughout late 1941 and the spring and summer of 1942. Churchill constantly sought an offensive from Auchinleck, and was (understandably) downcast at the military reverses in Egypt and Cyrenaica. Churchill was desperate for some sort of British victory before the planned Allied landings in North Africa, Operation Torch, scheduled for November 1942. He badgered Auchinleck immediately after the Eighth Army had all but exhausted itself after the first battle of El Alamein. Churchill and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Alan Brooke, flew to Cairo in August 1942, to meet Auchinleck, but it is now obvious that Churchill and Brooke had already lost confidence in Auchinleck.

He was replaced as C-in-C Middle East by General Harold Alexander (later Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis) and as GOC Eighth Army by Lieutenant-General William Gott, who was killed in Egypt before taking up command. On Gott's death, Lieutenant-General (later Field Marshal Viscount) Bernard Montgomery was appointed commander of the Eighth Army. Auchinleck's reputation (along with that of many other officers) subsequently suffered at the hands of Montgomery and others.

India

Churchill offered Auchinleck command of Allied Forces in Persia and the Middle East (this having been hived off Alexander's command), but the Auk declined this post, possibly as it was held by his Indian Army friend and colleague General Sir Edward Quinan. Instead he returned to India, where he spent almost a year "unemployed" before in 1943 becoming again Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Wavell meanwhile having been appointed Viceroy. Auchinleck retained this post after the end of the war.

Post-war life

Auchinleck as C-in-C of the Indian Army, with the then Viceroy Wavell and Montgomery.

Much against his own convictions, Auchinleck helped prepare the future Indian and Pakistani armies prior to Partition scheduled for August 1947. In 1946 he was promoted to field marshal but he refused to accept a peerage, lest he be thought associated with a policy (i.e. Partition) that he thought fundamentally dishonourable. Having disagreed sharply with Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, he resigned as C-in-C and retired in 1947. In 1948 the Auk returned to Britain, his wife having left him for Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse in 1946.

Although a somewhat dour character, he was known as a generous and welcoming host. Despite being a general for longer than almost any other soldier, he was never pompous, and hated all forms of display and affectation. Above all, he was a soldier of the utmost integrity. In retirement, the Auk moved to Marrakesh, where he lived quietly in a modest flat for many years, befriended and cared for by Corporal Malcolm James Millward, a serving soldier, and his wife, Malika, up until the death of Sir Claude in 1981.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Charles Frederick Algernon Portal, 1st Viscount Portal of Hungerford KG GCB OM DSO & Bar MC (May 21, 1893 - April 22, 1971) was a senior Royal Air Force officer and an advocate of strategic bombing. He was the British Chief of the Air Staff during most of World

War II.

Early life and career

Charles Portal was born 21 May 1893 in Hungerford, England, and was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, although he did not finish his degree.

At the beginning of World War I, Portal joined the British Army and served as a dispatch rider in the motorcycle section of Royal Engineers on the western front. In December 1914 he was given command of all riders in the 1st Corps Headquarters Signals Company.

In 1915 Portal transferred to the Royal Flying Corps, serving first as an observer and eventually a flying officer. He reached the rank of lieutenant colonel and earned the Military Cross. In April 1918 he became an officer in the new Royal Air Force, following the Royal Flying Corps' merger with the Royal Naval Air Service.

After the war, he took over No. 7 Squadron RAF and concentrated on improving bombing accuracy. In 1934 he was appointed commander of British forces in Aden, where he tried to control the local tribesmen by air power. In January 1935 he was promoted to Air Commodore and in July 1937 to Air Vice-Marshal.

World War II

By 1939 Portal was a member of the air council and Director of Organization in the Air Ministry. Just prior to outbreak of World War II, he was ordered to establish 30 new air bases in Britain. At the outbreak of the war in September he was made Acting Air Marshal and in April 1940 commander-in-chief of RAF Bomber Command.

Portal advocated strategic area bombing against German industrial areas instead of bombing of specific factories or plants. He gave the first order to bomb Berlin on 25 August 1940. The result was that Hermann Göring ordered the Luftwaffe to bomb London instead of British airfields. The Blitz had begun. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was impressed with Portal's strategy and Portal was knighted in July 1940.

In October 1940, Portal was appointed as Chief of the Air Staff with the rank of Air Chief Marshal and became involved with the controversy over the Big Wing that resulted in Hugh Dowding's removal as the head of Fighter Command. He concentrated on improving bomber navigation systems and bombing aids and increasing the power of the bombs themselves.

In August 1941 he received a report of the relative inefficiency of RAF daytime raids and proposed area bombing by night. To implement his directive he replaced the chief of bomber command, Air Chief Marshal Richard Peirse, with Arthur Harris.

The Yalta Conference. Portal is shown standing behind Churchill.

Portal accompanied Churchill to all the conferences and made a good impression on Americans. In January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff selected him to coordinate the bomber forces of both the United States and Britain in a combined bomber offensive over Germany. The forces were transferred to General Eisenhower for the duration of Operation Overlord; but when their control reverted to the Combined Chiefs, Portal still advocated area bombing of German cities instead of specific targets.

In June 1944 Portal was promoted to Marshal of the Royal Air Force and in February 1945 he was one of the senior commanders present at the Yalta Conference. In early 1944 Portal's view of strategic bombing changed; he felt that bombers should play a more auxiliary role in Allied offensive. In this he disagreed with Sir Arthur Harris, an advocate of heavy-duty strategic bombing, who forced Portal to back down. In March 1945 Churchill gave the final order to stop area bombing.

Retirement

In 1945, after the war's end, Portal retired from the RAF and in August was created Baron Portal of Hungerford, of Hungerford in the County of Berks, and a year later Viscount Portal of Hungerford, with the same territorial designation. From 1946-1951 he was Controller of Atomic Energy.

He was elected Chairman of British Aluminium and in 1958/9 he fought in the City of London's "Aluminium War" against a hostile takeover bid by Sir Ivan Stedeford, Chairman & CEO of Tube Investments. T.I. along with its ally Reynolds Metals of the US, won the takeover battle, and in the process, rewrote the way the City of London conducted its business in relation to shareholders and investors. Stedeford replaced Portal as Chairman of British Aluminium.

In 1960 Portal was elected chairman of the British Aircraft Corporation.

Lord Portal of Hungerford died on 22 April 1971. His Viscountcy became extinct, but his Barony, which had been created with a special remainder, passed to his daughter Rosemary.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers Pound, RN (August 29, 1877 - October 21, 1943) was a British naval officer who served as First Sea Lord, professional head of the Royal Navy from June 1939 to September 1943.

Contents [show]

Early life

Pound was born on the Isle of Wight. His father was a barrister. His mother was an American, a difficult woman with whom he had a strained relationship.

Naval career

In 1891, Pound entered the navy as a cadet. He advanced rapidly, and by 1916 was a captain in command of the battleship HMS Colossus. He led her at the Battle of Jutland with notable success, sinking two German cruisers, beating off two destroyers and eluding five torpedoes.

Interwar career

Pound was posted to naval planning after the war, becoming director of the planning division in 1922. During Roger Keyes' tenure as commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet in the late 1920s, Pound was his chief of staff.

He became Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet in 1936, serving until 1939.

First Sea Lord

On July 31st, 1939, Sir Dudley Pound was appointed First Sea Lord. His health was doubtful even at this time, but other experienced admirals were in even poorer health. A naval medical officer was aware of an incipient brain tumour, but did not inform the Admiralty about it. He also suffered from hip degeneration, which kept him from sleeping, causing him to doze off at meetings.

There are sharply divided opinions of Pound from this time. His staff at the Admiralty found him easy to work with. However admirals and captains at sea accused him of "back seat driving" and other errors, and he had some serious clashes with John Tovey, the commander of the Home Fleet. Churchill, with whom he worked from September, 1939 found him fairly easy to dominate.

Perhaps his greatest achievement was the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic. His most criticized decision was the ordering of the dispersal of Arctic Convoy PQ-17.

By 1943, it was clear that Pound's health was declining, and he resigned in September, 1943, dying on October 21, 1943.

Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Browne Cunningham, 1st Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope KT GCB OM DSO RN (7 January 1883 - 12 June 1963), familiarly known as "ABC", was a famous British admiral of World War II, winning distinction in Mediterranean battles such as the Attack on Taranto, and the Battle of Cape Matapan in 1940 and 1941, then serving as First Sea Lord from 1943 to 1946. He was the older brother of General Alan Cunningham.

Cunningham joined the Royal Navy as a cadet aboard the training ship HMS Britannia in 1897. He was a highly decorated officer during the First World War.

Cunningham was Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean from 1939 to 1942, and in 1943. In this role, he successfully negotiated, after the French surrender, with the French Admiral Rene-Emile Godfroy for the demilitarisation and internment of a French squadron at Alexandria. He had been under orders to prevent the French ships leaving port and to complete negotiations on the 3rd July. The deadline was overrun but Cunningham and Godfroy, who had been on good terms, came to an agreement on the 4th July.

Cunningham was also involved in many significant naval encounters, most notably an aircraft carrier launched attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, destroying one Italian battleship and seriously damaging two others. The success of this attack may have been inspiration for the larger scale Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour later in the war. Cunningham was made Allied naval commander Expeditionary Force under General Eisenhower in 1942, and served as First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff from 1943-6.

He was made a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath in 1939, and a Knight of the Thistle in 1945. In the same year he was elevated to the House of Lords as Baron Cunningham of Hyndhope, of Kirkhope, county Selkirk. In 1946 he was admitted to the Order of Merit and advanced to a viscountcy as Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope. He acted as Lord High Steward at the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953. Upon his death without issue in 1963, both of these titles became extinct.

During the evacuation at the end of the Battle of Crete when Cunningham was determined that the "navy must not let the army down", when army generals feared he would lose too many ships, Cunningham famously said, "It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition". The 'never say die' attitude of Cunningham and the men under his command meant that of 22,000 men on Crete 16,500 were rescued at the loss of three cruisers and six destroyers.

UNITED STATES

General of the Army George Catlett Marshall, Jr., US Army (December 31, 1880 – October 16, 1959), was an American military leader, Secretary of State, and the third Secretary of Defense. Once dubbed the "organizer of victory" by Winston Churchill for his leadership of the Allied victory in World War II, Marshall supervised the U.S. Army during the war and was the chief military advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As Secretary of State he gave his name to the American post-war reconstruction effort in Europe, which became known as the Marshall Plan; he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for the Plan.

Early life

George C. Marshall, was born into a middle-class family in Pittsburgh area city of Uniontown, Pennsylvania. He was a scion of an old Virginia family and a distant relation of Chief Justice John Marshall. Marshall was a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute (where he was initiated into the Kappa Alpha Order), graduating in 1901.

World War I

In 1902 Marshall received a commission into the U.S. Army. Until World War I, he was posted to various positions in the US and the Philippines, and was trained in modern warfare. During the war, he had roles as a planner of both training and operations. He went to France in the summer of 1917 as the director of training and planning for the 1st Infantry Division. In mid-1918, he was promoted to American Expeditionary Forces headquarters, where he worked closely with his mentor General John J. Pershing and was a key planner of American operations. He was instrumental in the design and coordination of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, which contributed to the defeat of the German Army on the Western Front.

Between WWI and the Eve of World War II

In 1919, he became an aide-de-camp to General John J. Pershing. Between 1920 and 1924, while Pershing was Army Chief of Staff, Marshall worked in a number of positions in the US Army, focusing on training and teaching modern, mechanized warfare. Between WWI and World War II, he was a key planner and writer in the War Department, spent three years in China, and taught at the Army War College. In 1934, then-Col. Marshall directed the publication of Infantry in Battle. a book that codified the lessons of World War I. Infantry in Battle is still used as an officer's training manual in the Infantry Officer's Course, and was the training manual for most of the infantry officers and leaders of World War II.

World War II

Marshall with Secretary of War Henry Stimson

Marshall was promoted to Brigadier General in October 1936. Nominated by President Franklin Roosevelt to be Army Chief of Staff, Marshall was sworn in on September 1, 1939, the day German forces invaded Poland, precipitating World War II. He would hold this post until the end of the war in 1945.

As Chief of Staff, Marshall oversaw the largest military expansion in U. S. history, inheriting an outmoded, poorly equipped army of 200,000 men and, partly drawing from his experience teaching and developing techniques of modern warfare as an instructor at the Army War College, coordinated the large-scale expansion and modernization of the U. S. army into a force of over eight million soldiers by 1942 (a forty-fold increase within three years).

In 1944, he became the second U.S. General to be awarded 5-star rank, otherwise known as General of the Army, after John Pershing, who was awarded the rank in September 1919; although Pershing was promoted to General of the Armies. This position is the American equivalent in rank to Field Marshal. Marshall once joked that he was glad the U.S. never created a Field Marshal rank during World War II, since he would then have to be addressed as Marshal Marshall.

During World War II, Marshall was instrumental in getting the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps reorganized and ready for combat. Marshall wrote the document that would become the central strategy for all Allied operations in Europe, selected Dwight Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe, and designed Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy. His success in working with Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, along with his refusal to lobby for the position, ultimately resulted in his being passed over as the Supreme Allied Commander in charge of the D-Day invasion. At the time, the President told him: "I couldn't sleep nights, George, if you were out of Washington."

Throughout the remainder of the World War II, Marshall coordinated Allied operations in Europe and the Pacific. He was characterized as the organizer of Allied victory by Winston Churchill. Time Magazine named Marshall Man of the Year in 1944. Marshall resigned his post of Chief of Staff in 1945, but did not retire, as regulations stipulate that Generals of the Army remain on active duty for life.

In December 1945, Truman sent Marshall to China to broker a coalition government between the Communists under Mao Tse Tung and America's Nationalist allies under Chiang Kai-shek. Marshall had no leverage over the Communists but he threatened to withdraw American aid that was essential for the Nationalists. Both sides rejected his proposals and the Chinese Civil War escalated, with the Communists winning in 1948. Historians agree his mission was a failure and he returned in January 1947.[1] As Secretary of State in 1947-48 Marshall seems to have disagreed with the strong opinions in the Pentagon and State department that Chiang's success was vital to American interests, and instead insisted that U.S. troops not become involved. [2] May (2002) suggests that the reason was his first priority was to spend money on his Marshall Plan of aid to Europe.

Upon his return in early 1947, Marshall was named Secretary of State. He became the spokesman for the State Department's ambitious plans to rebuild Europe. On June 5, 1947 at a speech at Harvard University, he outlined the American plan. The European Recovery Plan, which became known as the Marshall Plan, helped Europe quickly rebuild and modernize its economy on American lines. The Soviet Union forbade its satellites to participate. Marshall was again named TIME's Man of the Year in 1948 and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953. As Secretary of State, Marshall strongly opposed recognizing the State of Israel telling President Truman, "If you (recognize the state of Israel) and if I were to vote in the election, I would vote against you."[1][2] In 1949, he resigned from the State Department and was named president of the American National Red Cross.

Secretary of Defense; attacked by McCarthy

When the early months of the Korean War showed how poorly prepared was the Defense Department, Truman fired Secretary Louis A. Johnson and named Marshall as Secretary of Defense in September 1950. His main role was to restore confidence. He served in that post for less than one year, retiring from politics for good in September 1951. In 1953, he represented America at the coronation of Elizabeth II.

On June 14, 1951, as the Korean war stalemated in heavy fighting between American and Chinese forces, Republican Senator Joe McCarthy attacked. He charged that Marshall was directly responsible for the "loss of China," as China turned from friend to enemy.[3] McCarthy said the only way to explain why the U.S. "fell from our position as the most powerful Nation on earth at the end of World War II to a position of declared weakness by our leadership" was because of "a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man."[4] McCarthy said that "If Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would dictate that part of his decisions would serve this country's interest." McCarthy argued that General Albert Coady Wedemeyer had prepared a wise plan that would keep China a valued ally, but that it had been sabotaged; "only in treason can we find why evil genius thwarted and frustrated it." [5] McCarthy suggested that Marshall was old and feeble and easily duped; he did not charge Marshall with treason. Specifically McCarthy alleged:

"When Marshall was sent to China with secret State Department orders, the Communists at that time were bottled up in two areas and were fighting a losing battle, but that because of those orders the situation was radically changed in favor of the Communists. Under those orders, as we know, Marshall embargoed all arms and ammunition to our allies in China. He forced the opening of the Nationalist-held Kalgan Mountain pass into Manchuria, to the end that the Chinese Communists gained access to the mountains of captured Japanese equipment. No need to tell the country about how Marshall tried to force Chiang Kai-shek to form a partnership government with the Communists."[6]

Public opinion became bitterly divided along party lines on Marshall's record. In 1952, Eisenhower while campaigning for president denounced the Truman administration's failures in Korea, campaigned alongside McCarthy, and refused to defend Marshall's policies.[7]

George Catlett Marshall, "The Organizer of Victory", died on Friday October 16, 1959. Marshall's achievements were on a grand scale. Like Eisenhower, he is recognized as a great American soldier despite never actually seeing combat. He is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

Dwight David "Ike" Eisenhower, born David Dwight Eisenhower (October 14, 1890 - March 28, 1969) was an American soldier and politician, who served as the thirty-fourth President of the United States (1953-1961). During World War II, he served as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, with responsibility for planning and supervising the successful invasion of France and Germany in 1944-45. In 1951, he became the first supreme commander of NATO.[1] As a Republican, he was elected the 34th U.S. President, serving for two terms. As President, he ended the Korean War, kept up the pressure on the Soviet Union during the Cold War, made nuclear weapons a higher defense priority, launched the Space Race, enlarged the Social Security program, and began the Interstate Highway System.

Early military career

Eisenhower enrolled at the Military Academy in June 1911. His parents were against militarism, but did not object to his entering West Point as they were strong proponents of education. Eisenhower was a strong athlete. In 1912, a spectacular Eisenhower touchdown won praise from the sports reporter of the New York Herald, and he even managed, with the help of a linebacker partner, to tackle the legendary Jim Thorpe. In the very next week, however, his promising sports career came to a quick and painful end — he injured his knee quite severely when he was tackled around the ankles.[11]

Eisenhower graduated in 1915. He served with the infantry until 1918 at various camps in Texas and Georgia. During World War I, Eisenhower became the #3 leader of the new tank corps and rose to brevet Lieutenant Colonel in the National Army. He spent the war training tank crews in Pennsylvania and never saw combat. After the war, Eisenhower reverted to his regular rank of captain (and was promoted to major a few days later) before assuming duties at Camp Meade, Maryland, where he remained until 1922. His interest in tank warfare was strengthened by many conversations with George S. Patton and other senior tank leaders; however their ideas on tank warfare were strongly discouraged by superiors.

Eisenhower became executive officer to General Fox Conner in the Panama Canal Zone, where he served until 1924. Under Conner's tutelage, he studied military history and theory (including Karl von Clausewitz's On War), and later cited Conner's enormous influence on his military thinking. In 1925-26, he attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and then served as a battalion commander at Fort Benning, Georgia until 1927.

The Eisenhowers by the Malecón in Manila, Philippines

During the late 1920s and early 1930s Eisenhower's career in the peacetime Army stagnated; many of his friends resigned for high paying business jobs. He was assigned to the American Battle Monuments Commission, directed by General John J. Pershing, then to the Army War College, and then served as executive officer to General George V. Mosely, Assistant Secretary of War, from 1929 to 1933. He then served as chief military aide to General Douglas MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff, until 1935, when he accompanied MacArthur to the Philippines, where he served as assistant military adviser to the Philippine government. It is sometimes said that this assignment provided valuable preparation for handling the egos of Winston Churchill, George S. Patton and Bernard Law Montgomery during World War II. Eisenhower was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1936 after sixteen years as a major. He also learned to fly, although he was never rated as a military pilot. He made a solo flight over the Philippines in 1937.

Eisenhower returned to the U.S. in 1939 and held a series of staff positions in Washington, D.C., California and Texas. In June 1941, he was appointed Chief of Staff to General Walter Krueger, Commander of the 3rd Army, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He was promoted to brigadier general in September 1941. Although his administrative abilities had been noticed, on the eve of the U.S. entry into World War II he had never held an active command and was far from being considered as a potential commander of major operations.

World War II

Eisenhower (seated, middle) with other American military officials, 1945. General Patton is seated second from the left.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Eisenhower was assigned to the General Staff in Washington, where he served until June 1942 with responsibility for creating the major war plans to defeat Japan and Germany. He was appointed Deputy Chief in charge of Pacific Defenses under the Chief of War Plans Division, General Leonard T. Gerow, and then succeeded Gerow as Chief of the War Plans Division. Then he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Operations Division under Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall. It was his close association with Marshall which finally brought Eisenhower to senior command positions. Marshall recognized his great organizational and administrative abilities.

In 1942, Eisenhower was appointed Commanding General, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) and was based in London. In November, he was also appointed Supreme Commander Allied (Expeditionary) Force of the North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA) through the new operational Headquarters A(E)FHQ. The word "expeditionary" was dropped soon after his appointment for security reasons. In February 1943, his authority was extended as commander of AFHQ across the Mediterranean basin to include the British 8th Army, commanded by General Bernard Law Montgomery. The 8th Army had advanced across the Western Desert from the east and was ready for the start of the Tunisia Campaign. Eisenhower gained his fourth star and gave up command of ETOUSA to be commander of NATOUSA. After the capitulation of Axis forces in North Africa, Eisenhower remained in command of the renamed Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO), keeping the operational title and continued in command of NATOUSA redesignated MTOUSA. In this position he oversaw the invasion of Sicily and the invasion of the Italian mainland.

Eisenhower speaks with U.S. paratroops of the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division on the evening of June 5, 1944.

In December 1943, it was announced that Eisenhower would be Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. In January 1944, he resumed command of ETOUSA and the following month was officially designated as the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), serving in a dual role until the end of hostilities in Europe in May 1945. In these positions he was charged with planning and carrying out the Allied assault on the coast of Normandy in June 1944 under the code name Operation Overlord, the liberation of western Europe and the invasion of Germany. A month after the Normandy D-Day landings on June 6, 1944, the invasion of southern France took place, and control of the forces which took part in the southern invasion passed from the AFHQ to the SHAEF. From then until the end of the War in Europe on May 8, 1945, Eisenhower through SHAEF had supreme command of all operational Allied forces2, and through his command of ETOUSA, administrative command of all U.S. forces, on the Western Front north of the Alps.

As recognition of his senior position in the Allied command, on December 20, 1944, he was promoted to General of the Army equivalent to the rank of Field Marshal in most European armies. In this and the previous high commands he held, Eisenhower showed his great talents for leadership and diplomacy. Although he had never seen action himself, he won the respect of front-line commanders. He dealt skillfully with difficult subordinates such as Omar Bradley and Patton, and allies such as Winston Churchill, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and General Charles de Gaulle. He had fundamental disagreements with Churchill and Montgomery over questions of strategy, but these rarely upset his relationships with them. He negotiated with Soviet Marshal Zhukov, and such was the confidence that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had in him, he sometimes worked directly with Stalin. During negotiation with the Soviets, he agreed that the Allied forces would halt before they reached Berlin, allowing the Russians to capture the capital first. He thus averted an estimated 100,000 American casualties. After the war his decision was sometimes criticized on the assumption that the Americans could have unified Germany in 1945. The Russians suffered 360,000 casualties in the street-by-street battle for Berlin.[13]

It was never a certainty that Overlord would succeed. The tenuousness surrounding the entire decision including the timing and the location of the Normandy invasion might be summarized by a short speech that Eisenhower wrote in advance, in case he might need it. In it, he took full responsibility for catastrophic failure, should that be the final result. Long after the successful landings on D-Day and the BBC broadcast of Eisenhower's brief speech concerning them, the never-used second speech was found in a shirt pocket by an aide. It read:

“ Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based on the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it is mine alone.

General of the Army Omar Nelson Bradley (February 12, 1893 – April 8, 1981) was one of the main U.S. Army field commanders in North Africa and Europe during World War II and a General of the Army of the United States Army. He was the last surviving five star officer of the United States. On May 5, 2000, the United States Postal Service issued the Distinguished Soldiers stamps in which Bradley was honored.

Early life and career

Bradley was born into a poor family near Clark, Missouri, the son of a schoolteacher. He attended Higbee Elementary School and graduated from Moberly High School. Bradley intended to enter the University of Missouri. Instead, he was advised to try for West Point. He placed first in his district placement exams and entered the academy in 1911.

Bradley lettered in baseball three times, including on the 1914 team, where every player remaining in the army became a general. He graduated from West Point in 1915 as part of a class that contained many future generals, and which military historians have called, "The class the stars fell on". There were ultimately 59 generals in the graduating class, with Bradley and Dwight Eisenhower attaining the highest rank of General of the Army.

He joined the 14th Infantry Regiment, but like many of his peers, did not see action in Europe. Instead, he held a variety of stateside assignments. He served on the U.S.-Mexico border in 1915. When war was declared, he was promoted to captain, but was posted to the Butte, Montana copper mines. Bradley joined the 19th Infantry Division in August 1918, which was scheduled for European deployment, but the influenza pandemic and the armistice prevented it.

Between the wars, he taught and studied. From 1920–24, he taught mathematics at West Point. He was promoted to major in 1924 and took the advanced infantry course at Fort Benning, Georgia. After a brief service in Hawaii he studied at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1928–29. From 1929, he taught at West Point again, taking a break to study at the Army War College in 1934. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1936 and worked at the War Department directly under Army Chief of Staff George Marshall from 1938. In February 1941, he was promoted to brigadier general and sent to command Fort Benning (the first from his class to become a general officer). In February 1942, he took command of the 82nd Infantry Division before being switched to the 28th Infantry Division in June.

World War II

Bradley did not receive a frontline command until early 1943 after Operation Torch. He had been given VIII Corps but instead was sent to North Africa to serve under George S. Patton. He became head of II Corps in April and directed them in the final battles of April and May. He then led his corps onto Sicily in July. In the approach to Normandy Bradley was chosen to command the substantial US First Army. During Operation Overlord he commanded three corps directed at the areas codenamed Utah and Omaha. Later in July he planned Operation Cobra, the beginning of the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. By August, Bradley's command, the newly created 12th Army Group, had swollen to over 900,000 men and ultimately consisted of four field armies. It was the largest group of American soldiers to ever serve under one field commander.

Lt Gen Omar Bradley (left), Commanding General, U.S. First Army, listens as Maj Gen J. Lawton Collins, Commanding General, US VII Corps, describes how the city of Cherbourg was taken. (c. June 1944)

Unlike some of the more colorful generals of World War II, Bradley was a polite and courteous man. First favorably brought to public attention by correspondent Ernie Pyle, he was informally known as "the soldier's general." Will Lang Jr. of Life magazine said "The thing I most admire about Omar Bradley is his gentleness. He was never known to issue an order to anybody of any rank without saying 'Please' first."

After the German attempt (Operation Lüttich) to split the US armies at Mortain, Bradley's force was the southern half of an attempt to encircle the German Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army in Normandy, trapping them in the Chambois pocket (or Falaise pocket) (Operation Totalise). Although only partially successful, the German forces still suffered huge losses during their retreat.

The American forces reached the 'Siegfried Line' or 'Westwall' in late September. The sheer scale of the advance had taken the Allied high command by surprise. They had expected the German Wehrmacht to make stands on the natural defensive lines provided by the French rivers, and consequently, logistics had become a severe issue as well.

At this time, the Allied high command under Eisenhower faced a decision on strategy. Bradley favored a strategy consisting of an advance into the Saarland, or possibly a two-thrust assault on both the Saarland and the Ruhr Area. Newly promoted to Field Marshal, Bernard Montgomery argued for a narrow thrust across the Lower Rhine, into the open country beyond and then to the northern flank into the Ruhr, thus avoiding the Siegfried Line. Montgomery's arguments and the eagerness of George Marshall and Henry Arnold to use the First Allied Airborne Army, ultimately carried the day, leading to Operation Market-Garden. The debate, while not fissuring the Allied command, nevertheless led to a serious rift between the two Army group commanders of the European Theater of Operations. Bradley bitterly protested to Eisenhower the priority of supplies given to Montgomery, but Eisenhower, mindful of British public opinion, held Bradley's protests in check.

Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall (center) and Army Air Forces Commander General Henry H. Arnold confer with Bradley on the beach at Normandy, France in 1944.

Bradley's Army Group now covered a very wide front in hilly country, from the Netherlands to Lorraine and, despite his being the largest Allied Army Group, there were difficulties in prosecuting a successful broad-front offensive in difficult country with a skilled enemy that was recovering his balance. Courtney Hodges' 1st Army hit difficulties in the Aachen Gap and the Battle of Hurtgen Forest cost 24,000 casualties. Further south, George Patton's 3rd Army lost momentum as German resistance stiffened around Metz's extensive defences. While Bradley focused on these two campaigns, the Germans had assembled troops and materiel for a surprise offensive.

Bradley's command took the initial brunt of what would become the Battle of the Bulge. In a move without precedent in modern warfare, the US 3rd Army under George Patton disengaged from their combat in the Saarland, moved 90 miles to the battlefront, and attacked the Germans' southern flank to break the encirclement at Bastogne.

Bradley used the advantage gained in March 1945—after Eisenhower authorized a difficult but successful Allied offensive (Operation Veritable and Operation Grenade) in February 1945—to break the German defenses and cross the Rhine into the industrial heartland of the Ruhr. Aggressive pursuit of the disintegrating German troops by Bradley's forces resulted in the capture of a bridge across the River Rhine at Remagen. Bradley and his subordinates quickly exploited the crossing, forming the southern arm of an enormous pincer movement encircling the German forces in the Ruhr from the north and south. Over 300,000 prisoners were taken. American forces then met up with the Soviet forces near the River Elbe in mid-April. By V-E Day, the 12th Army Group was a force of four armies (1st, 3rd, 9th, and 15th) that numbered over 1.3 million men.

General Omar N. Bradley

Bradley headed the Veterans Administration for two years after the war. He is credited with doing much to improve its health care system and with helping veterans receive their educational benefits under the G. I. Bill of Rights. He was made army chief of staff in 1948 and first official Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949. On September 22, 1950 he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army, the fifth—and last—man in the 20th century to achieve that rank. Also in 1950 he was made the first Chairman of the NATO Committee. He remained on the committee until August 1953 when he left active duty to take a number of positions in commercial life. One of those positions was Chairman of the Board of the Bulova Watch Company from 1958 to 1973 [1].

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley strongly rebuked General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, for his desire to expand the Korean War into China. Soon after Truman relieved MacArthur of command in April 1951, Bradley said in Congressional testimony, "Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

He published his memoirs in 1951 as A Soldier's Story (ISBN 0-375-75421-0) and took the opportunity to attack Field Marshal Montgomery's 1945 claims to have won the Battle of the Bulge. Bradley spent his last years at a special residence on the grounds of the William Beaumont Army Medical Center, part of the complex which supports Fort Bliss, Texas. He also served as a consultant during the making of the film Patton. One of his last public appearances was in connection with the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in January 1981. Upon Bradley's death, he was buried at Arlington National Cemetery. He was married to Esther Dora Bradley, who died in 2004.

General Bradley's headstone in Arlington Cemetery

Bradley is known for saying, "Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than about peace, more about killing than we know about living."

The U.S. Army's M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and M3 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicle are named after General Bradley.

Bradley had been criticized by some quarters in recent news reports. These reports claimed that when President Truman ordered the total racial desegregation of the United States Military in 1947, Bradley—along with other famous senior military officers—sought to selectively 'interpret' the order so as to maintain military racial segregation under other guises. General Bradley stated in his 1981 autobiography that he supported integration of the armed forces, but feared a loss of morale and effectiveness if the services were "instantly" integrated. Bradley supported a phased-in integration policy.

George Smith Patton Jr. (November 11, 1885 – December 21, 1945) was a leading U.S. Army general in World War II in campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, France and Germany, 1943-45. In World War I he was a senior commander of the new tank corps and saw action in France. After the war he was an advocate of armored warfare but was reassigned to the cavalry. In World War II he commanded major units of North Africa, Sicily, and the European Theater of Operations. The popular image of "Old Blood and Guts", contrasts with the historians' image of a brilliant military leader whose record was also marred by insubordination and some periods of apparent instability.

Early military career

During the Mexican Expedition of 1916, Patton was assigned to the 8th Cavalry Regiment[1] in Fort Bliss, Texas. He accompanied then-Brigadier General John J. Pershing as his aide during the Punitive Expedition in his pursuit of Pancho Villa after Villa's forces had crossed into New Mexico and raided the town of Columbus, looting and killing several Americans. During his service, Patton, accompanied by ten soldiers of the 6th Infantry Regiment, killed two Mexican leaders, including "General" Julio Cardenas, commander of Villa's personal bodyguard. For this action, as well as Patton's affinity for the Colt Peacemaker, Pershing titled Patton his "Bandito". Patton's success in this regard gained him a level of fame in the United States, and he was featured in newspapers across the nation.

World War I

At the onset of the USA's entry into World War I, General Pershing promoted Patton to the rank of captain. While in France, Patton requested that he be given a combat command and Pershing assigned him to the newly formed United States Tank Corps. Depending on the source, he either led the U.S. Tank Corps or was an observer at the Battle of Cambrai, where the first tanks were used as a significant force. As the U.S. Tank Corps did not take part in this battle the role of observer is the most likely. From his successes (and his organization of a training school for American tankers in Langres, France), Patton was promoted to major and then lieutenant colonel and was placed in charge of the U.S. Tank Corps, which was part of the American Expeditionary Force and then the First U.S. Army. He took part in the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, September 1918, and was wounded by machine gun fire as he sought assistance for tanks that were mired in the mud. The bullet passed through his upper thigh and for years afterwards, when Patton was inebriated at social events, he would drop his pants to show his wound and called himself a "half-assed general." While Patton was recuperating from his wounds, hostilities ended.

For his service in the Meuse-Argonne Operations, Patton received the Distinguished Service Medal and the Distinguished Service Cross, and was given a battlefield promotion to a full colonel. For his combat wounds, he was presented the Purple Heart.

The interwar years

While on duty in Washington, D.C. in 1919, Captain (he reverted from his wartime temporary rank of Colonel) Patton met and became close friends with Dwight D. Eisenhower, who would play an enormous role in Patton's future career. In the early 1920s, Patton petitioned the U.S. Congress to appropriate funding for an armored force, but had little luck. Patton also wrote professional articles on tank and armored car tactics, suggesting new methods for their use. He also continued working on improvements to tanks, coming up with innovations in radio communication and tank mounts. However, the lack of interest in armor created a poor atmosphere for promotion and career advancement so Patton transferred back to the horse cavalry.

In July 1932, Patton served under Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, as a major leading 600 troops, including the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, in an action to disperse the protesting veterans known as the "Bonus Army" in Washington, DC. MacArthur ordered the troops to advance on the protesters with tear gas and bayonets. At one point, when the protesters resisted with bricks and curses, Patton led the last mounted charge of the U.S. Cavalry. One of the veterans rousted by the cavalry was Joe Angelo, who had won the Distinguished Service Cross in 1918 for saving Patton's life.

Patton served in Hawaii before returning to Washington to once again ask Congress for funding for armored units. In the late 1930s, Patton was assigned command of Fort Myer, Virginia. Shortly after Germany's blitzkrieg attacks in Europe, Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee, the first Chief of the U.S. Army's newly created Armored Force was finally able to convince Congress of the need for armored divisions. This led to the activation of the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions in 1940. Col. Patton was given command of the 2nd Armored Brigade, US 2nd Armored Division in July 1940. He became the Asst. Division Commander the following October, and was promoted to Brigadier General on the second day of that month. Patton served as the acting Division Commander from November 1940 until April 1941. He was promoted to Major General on 4 April and made Commanding General of the 2nd Armored Division 7 days later.

World War II

During the buildup of the U.S. Army prior to its entry into World War II, Patton commanded the 2nd Armored Division which performed with mixed results in both the Louisiana Maneuvers and Carolinas Maneuvers in 1941. The 2nd Armored Division was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, until the unit, along with its commander, was ordered to the newly established Desert Training Center in Indio, California by the Chief of the Armored Force, Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers. Patton was subsequently appointed as the commander of the newly activated I Armored Corps by Devers, and was in this position when the corps was assigned to Operation Torch, the Invasion of North Africa.

On June 3, 1942, Patton believed the Japanese were on a course to invade the new ally Mexico. He believed the Japanese would use the beaches of Mexico to move north into California. For three days, Patton had his troops on high alert to move within minutes to meet the invading Japanese at the tip of the Gulf of California. [3] The Japanese invasion fleet eventually landed on Kiska Island on June 6.

North African campaign

In 1942, Major General Patton commanded the Western Task Force of the U.S. Army, which landed on the coast of Morocco in Operation Torch. Patton and his staff arrived in Morocco aboard the heavy cruiser USS Augusta, which came under fire from the French battleship Jean Bart while entering the harbor of Casablanca.

Following the defeat of the U.S. II Corps as part of British 1st Army, by the German Afrika Korps at the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in 1943, General Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower assessed the aftermath by sending Major General Omar Bradley to observe the conditions of the II Corp operations. As a result of his report, Patton was made Lieutenant General and placed in command of II Corps on March 6, 1943. Soon thereafter, Patton had Bradley reassigned to his Corps Command as deputy commander, and thus began a long wartime association between the two diverse personalities.

Tough in his training, he was generally unpopular with his troops. However, they preferred to serve with him nonetheless, because they thought he was their best chance to get home alive. Both British and US officers had noted the "softness" and lack of discipline in the II Corps under Lloyd Fredendall. Patton required all personnel to wear steel helmets, even physicians in the operating wards, and required his troops to wear the unpopular lace-up leggings and neckties. A system of fines was introduced to ensure all personnel shaved daily and observed other uniform requirements. While these measures did not make Patton popular, they did tend to restore a sense of discipline and unit pride that may have been missing earlier. In a play on his nickname, troops joked that it was "our blood and his guts".

The discipline paid off quickly; by mid-March, the counteroffensive was pushing the Germans east, along with the rest of British 1st Army, while the British Eighth Army commanded by General Bernard Law Montgomery in Tunisia was simultaneously pushing them west, effectively squeezing the Germans out of North Africa.

Sicily campaign

As a result of his accomplishments in North Africa, Patton was given command of the Seventh Army in preparation for the 1943 invasion of Sicily. The Seventh Army's mission was to protect the left (western) flank of the British Eighth Army as both advanced northwards towards Messina.

The Seventh Army repulsed several German counterattacks in the beachhead area before beginning its push north. Meanwhile, the Eighth Army stalled south of Mount Etna in the face of strong German defenses. The Army Group commander, Harold Alexander, exercised only the loosest control over his two commanders. Montgomery therefore took the initiative to meet with Patton in an attempt to work out a coordinated campaign.

Patton formed a provisional Corps under his Chief of Staff, and quickly pushed through western Sicily, liberating the capital, Palermo, and then swiftly turned east towards Messina. US forces liberated Messina in accordance with the plan jointly created by Montgomery and Patton. However the Italians and Germans had air and naval supremacy over their withdrawal routes and evacuated all of their soldiers and much of their heavy equipment across the straits of Messina onto the Italian mainland.

Slapping incident and removal from command

Patton's bloodthirsty speeches resulted in controversy when it was claimed one inspired the Biscari Massacre, in which American troops killed seventy-six prisoners of war.

Even worse was the "slapping incident" that nearly ended Patton's career in August 1943. While visiting hospitals and commending wounded soldiers, he slapped and verbally abused two privates who he thought were exhibiting cowardly behavior. The soldiers were suffering from "shell-shock," now known as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and had no visible wounds.

Newsmen decided to keep the incident quiet but the doctors used their own chain of command to inform Eisenhower. Eisenhower thought of sending him home in disgrace, as many newspapers demanded. But after consulting with George Marshall, Ike decided to keep Patton, but without a major command. Eisenhower ordered Patton to apologize to the individual soldiers and hospital staff who witnessed the incidents.

Eisenhower used Patton's "furlough" as a trick to mislead the Germans as to where the next attack would be, since they assumed Patton would lead the attack. During the 10 months Patton was relieved of duty, his prolonged stay in Sicily was interpreted by the Germans to be indicative of an upcoming invasion of southern France. Later, a stay in Cairo was interpreted as heralding an invasion through the Balkans. German intelligence misinterpreted what happened and made faulty plans as a result.

In the months before the June 1944 Normandy invasion, Patton gave public talks as commander of the fictional First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG), which was supposedly intending to invade France by way of Calais. This was part of a sophisticated Allied campaign of military disinformation, Operation Fortitude. The Germans misallocated their forces as a result, and were slow to respond to the actual landings at Normandy.

Normandy

Following the Normandy invasion, Patton was placed in command of the U.S. Third Army, which was on the extreme right (west) of the Allied land forces. Beginning at noon on August 1, 1944, he led this army during the late stages of Operation Cobra, the breakout from earlier slow fighting in the Normandy hedgerows. The Third Army simultaneously attacked west (into Brittany), south, east towards the Seine, and north, assisting in trapping several hundred thousand German soldiers in the Chambois pocket, between Falaise and Argentan, Orne.

Patton used Germany's own blitzkrieg tactics against them, covering 600 miles in just two weeks, from Avranches to Argentan. Patton's forces were part of the Allied forces that freed northern France, bypassing Paris. The city itself was liberated by the French 2nd Armored Division under French General Leclerc, insurgents who were fighting in the city, and the US 4th Infantry Division. The French 2nd Armored Division had recently been transferred from the 3rd Army, and many soldiers of that Division thought they were still part of 3rd Army. These early 3rd Army offensives showed the characteristic high mobility and aggressiveness of Patton's units.

Rather than engage in set-piece slugging matches, Patton preferred to bypass centers of resistance and use the mobility of US units to the fullest, defeating German defensive positions through maneuver rather than head-on fighting whenever possible. He was able to do this in part because of his systematic exploitation of ULTRA, a highly classified system that was very successful in reading German ENIGMA ciphers. Still, Patton was able to continue these tactics despite German radio silence during preparation for the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge).

Lorraine

General Patton's offensive, however, came to a screeching halt on August 31, 1944, as the Third Army literally ran out of gas near the Moselle River, just outside of Metz, France. Berragan (2003) argues it was due primarily to Patton's ambitions and his refusal to recognize that he was engaged in a secondary line of attack. Others suggest that General Lee, commander of the Zone of Communication, chose that time to move his headquarters to the more comfortable environs of Paris. Some 30 truck companies were diverted to that end, rather than providing support to the fighting armies.

Patton expected that the Theater Commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support successful advances. Although Eisenhower favored a "broad front" approach to the ground-war effort, knowing that a single thrust would have to drop off flank protection, and would quickly lose its punch. Still, within the constraints of a very large effort overall, Eisenhower gave Montgomery and his 21st Army Group a strong priority for supplies, to give him the chance to make the breakout that Montgomery claimed would end the war.

The combination of supply priority to Montgomery, and diversion of resources to moving the Communications zone, coupled with Patton's refusal to attack slowly, resulted in the 3d Army running out of gas in Alsace-Lorraine while exploiting German weakness.

Patton's experience suggested that a major US and allied advantage was in mobility. This led to greater number of US trucks, higher reliability of US tanks, better radio communications, all contributing to superior ability to operate at high tempo. Slow attacks were wasteful, and resulted in high losses; they also permitted the Germans to prepare multiple defensive positions, then withdraw from one to another after inflicting heavy casualties on US and allied forces. He refused to operate that way.

The time needed to resupply was just enough to allow the Germans to further fortify the fortress of Metz. In October and November, the Third Army was mired in a near-stalemate with the Germans, with heavy casualties on both sides. By November 23, however, Metz had finally fallen to the Americans, the first time the city had been taken since the Franco-Prussian War.

Ardennes offensive

In late 1944, the German army made a last-ditch offensive across Belgium, Luxembourg, and northeastern France in the Ardennes Offensive (better known as the Battle of the Bulge), nominally led by German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. On December 16, 1944, the German army massed 29 divisions (totaling some 250,000 men) at a weak point in the Allied lines and made massive headway towards the Meuse River during one of the worst winters in Europe in years. It was during the midst of this fighting that the weather had become bitterly cold and snowy, which halted tank operations for a spell.

Needing just one full day (24 hours) of good weather, Patton ordered the Third Army Chaplain to come up with a prayer beseeching God to grant this. The weather did clear soon after the prayer was recited, and Patton decorated the Chaplain with the Distinguished Service Medal on the spot. Following this, he continued ahead with dealing with the German offensive and von Rundstedt.

Patton turned the 3rd Army north abruptly (a notable tactical and logistical achievement), disengaging from the front line to relieve the surrounded and besieged 101st Airborne Division pocketed in Bastogne. By February, the Germans were in full retreat and Patton moved into the Saar Basin of Germany. The bulk of 3rd Army completed its crossing of the Rhine at Oppenheim on March 22, 1945.

Patton's son-in-law Johnny Waters was a German prisoner, and in late March, Patton used his army for a personal task, rescuing Waters. He planned to use 3,000 men, but two generals objected and Patton used two companies with 300 men and 15 tanks to raid the Hammelburg POW camp where Waters was held. The raid by Task Force Baum was a total failure, and only 35 of the 300 men returned--the rest were captured or killed. Waters was wounded and was left behind. Bradley was outraged at Patton's actions.

Patton was planning to take Prague, Czechoslovakia, when the forward movement of American forces was halted. His troops liberated Pilsen (May 6, 1945) and most of western Bohemia.

Brief June 1945 visit to California

Largely overlooked in history is the warm reception he received on June 9, 1945, when he and Lt. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle were honored with a parade through Los Angeles and a reception at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum before over 100,000 people that evening. The next day, Patton and Doolittle toured the metropolitan Los Angeles area. Patton spoke in front of the Burbank City Hall and at the Rose Bowl in Pasadena. He wore his helmet with a straight line of stars, chest full of medals, and two ivory handle trademark pistols. He punctuated his speech with some of the same profanity he had used with the troops. He spoke about conditions in Europe and the Russian allies to the adoring crowds. This may be the only time in America when the civilian people, en masse, heard and saw the famous warrior on the podium.

This was also the time when he turned over key Nazi historical documents that he had unilaterally gathered (such as the original 1935 Nuremberg Laws) to the Huntington Library, a world-class repository of historical original papers, books, and maps, near Pasadena. The existence of this trove of historical papers was kept secret for about 55 years, and only publicized generally in April 2006, in a Los Angeles Times in-depth story.The papers are now on permanent loan to the Skirball Cultural Center in Los Angeles.

Douglas MacArthur (January 26, 1880 - April 5, 1964), was an American general who played a prominent role in the Pacific theater of World War II. He was poised to command the invasion of Japan in November 1945 but was instead instructed to accept their surrender on September 2, 1945. MacArthur oversaw the occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1951 and is credited for making far-ranging democratic changes in that country. He led United Nations forces defending South Korea in 1950-51 against North Korea's invasion. MacArthur was relieved of command by President Harry S Truman in April 1951 for insubordination and failure to follow Presidential directives.

MacArthur was a ruthless commander and often forcefully made the enemy surrender. MacArthur fought in three major wars (World War I, World War II, Korean War) and was one of only five men ever to rise to the rank of General of the Army. MacArthur remains one of the most controversial figures in American history. While some have greatly admired MacArthur for what they consider his strategic and tactical brilliance, others have criticized his actions in command, his military judgment, and his challenges to President Truman in 1951.

World War I

During World War I MacArthur served in France, as chief of staff of the 42nd ("Rainbow") Division. Upon his promotion to Brigadier General he became the commander of the 84th Infantry Brigade. A few weeks before the war ended he became division commander. During the war, MacArthur received two Distinguished Service Crosses, seven Silver Stars, a Distinguished Service Medal, and two Purple Hearts. Douglas MacArthur made it his policy to 'lead... men from the front'. Because of this policy, and the fact that he usually refused to wear a gas mask while the rest of his men would, he had respiratory problems the rest of his life. Still, he was the most decorated officer of the war and General Menoher once said that he was the "greatest fighting man" in the army. However, because of his own personal risks, he was also taken to task at times by his superior officers, including General John "Black Jack" Pershing, the AEF Commander, who was very concerned about his best field commander. MacArthur, however, felt that he was being singled out because of his heroics and became hypersensitive to Pershing in later years because of his being "chewed out".

Inter-war years

As did many of the officers after the war, MacArthur had a difficult time finding a full-time position in the Army. This devastated him. However, he was permitted to retain his war-time rank unlike many others who reverted to their lesser permanent ranks. He used all of his father's connections as well as his own in his search for a suitable assignment. One offer included becoming military attaché to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. He kept his star after the war primarily because of the support of General Peyton March, the new Army chief of staff. In 1919 MacArthur became superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, which had become out of date in many respects and was much in need of reform. MacArthur ordered drastic changes in the tactical, athletic and disciplinary systems; he modernized the curriculum, adding liberal arts, government and economics courses.

In 1922, General of the Armies John Pershing became Army Chief of Staff and MacArthur found that his career was going to take a turn as he was expected to perform overseas duty. From 1922 to 1930, MacArthur served two tours of duty in the Philippines, the second as commander of the Philippine Department (1928-1930); he also served two tours as commander of corps areas in the states. In 1925 he was promoted to major general, the youngest officer of that rank at the time, and served on the court-martial that convicted Brigadier General Billy Mitchell. In 1928 he headed the U.S. Olympic Committee for the Amsterdam games.

He married Henrietta Louise Cromwell Brooks, a wealthy heiress, on February 14, 1922. She was the stepdaughter of Edward T. Stotesbury, a partner at J.P. Morgan & Co. She had two children from a previous marriage. They were divorced in 1929. {Her brother James H.R. Cromwell was the husband of Doris Duke}.

President Herbert Hoover appointed MacArthur Army Chief of Staff in November 1930, with the temporary rank of (four-star) General. He faced severe budget cuts, and at the same time a surge in enlistments because of unemployment. His most controversial actions came in 1932, when Hoover ordered him to disperse the 'Bonus Army' of veterans who were in the capital protesting against the government. MacArthur received negative publicity for using tear gas against the veterans as well as tanks, cavalry with sabers drawn, and infantry with fixed bayonets. According to MacArthur, the demonstration had been taken over by Communists and pacifists by the time of his action, with, he claimed, only 'one man in 10 being veterans'. Hundreds of veterans were injured including two killed, and veterans' families also numbered among the injured that included children as well.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt renewed his appointment as Chief of Staff during the hard times of the depression era. By the time MacArthur finished his tour as Chief of Staff in October 1935, the army ranked 16th in size among the world's armies, with 13,000 officers and 126,000 enlisted men. Despite bleak times, MacArthur's main programs included the development of new mobilization plans, the establishment of a mobile general headquarters air force, and a four-army reorganization which improved administrative efficiency. He supported the New Deal by enthusiastically operating the Civilian Conservation Corps (although, as an outspoken reactionary, he often had bitter disagreements with the New Dealers). He brought along many talented mid-career officers, including George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. However, MacArthur made enemies with many members of the Roosevelt administration and clashed with FDR at times due to his controversial personality and his strong opinions. Following his retirement as Chief of Staff, he reverted to his permanent grade of major general and undertook an offer to head to the Philippines.

When the Commonwealth of the Philippines achieved semi-independent status in 1935, with its own army, the President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon asked MacArthur to supervise the creation of a Philippine Army. As a general, MacArthur elected not to retire and remained on the active list as a major general and with Roosevelt's approval MacArthur accepted the assignment. MacArthur had been friends with Quezon when his father was Governor General. MacArthur had two conditions for taking the job: his salary was to be the same as the President's, and his housing had to be equal to that of the President. He felt justified in this since the house that the President was using had been the one Douglas had known as a child, Malacanang Palace. The Palace has been the home of the Spanish Governor General, the American Governor General and all Philippine Presidents to present day. In addition, MacArthur was given the rank of "Field Marshal of the Philippine Army" (and is the seniormost officered list on the rolls of officers in the Philippine Army today--he is also the only American military officer to hold the rank of field marshal).

It was decided to house MacArthur in a suite at the world famous Manila Hotel. The hotel was owned by the Philippine Government. It was on Manila Bay across the park from the Army & Navy Club, MacArthur's favorite haunt. It was conveniently near the U.S. Embassy. Government accountants decided that the best way to handle the cost of the suite was to make MacArthur a hotel employee entitled to housing. MacArthur was given the honorary title of "General Manager". MacArthur ignored the honorary status and took control of hotel management while he lived there. The MacArthur Suite still exists in the hotel.

Despite the fact that Manila was one of the cities most devastated by Japanese bombs in WWII this hotel survived intact. Pictures show the city almost leveled except for the Manila Hotel[citation needed]. MacArthur's suite was occupied by the highest ranking military officer in the islands. MacArthur gave the same order to American pilots when the Philippines were retaken. Legend has it that his suite and personal possessions that were left behind were still intact. MacArthur had tremendous respect for the tradition of "honor among warriors."[citation needed]

MacArthur heavily invested in Philippine mining and industry. Before the Philippine National Bank in New York City closed when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, MacArthur was able to sell all of his holdings and convert all of his pesos to dollars.

Among MacArthur's assistants as Military Advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines was Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Some years later, Eisenhower was asked if he knew MacArthur. He replied, "Know him? I studied dramatics under him for seven years!")

On April 30, 1937, MacArthur married his second wife, Jean Faircloth; they had one son, and remained together until his death.

When MacArthur retired from the U.S. Army in 1937, his rank for retirement purposes again became that of a general and he was made a Field Marshal of the Philippine Army, by President Quezon. In July, 1941 Roosevelt recalled him to active duty in the U.S. Army as a major general and named him commander of United States Armed Forces in the Far East promoting him to a lieutenant general the following day. In December, he became a four star general yet again when the Japanese attacked across a wide front in the Pacific.

World War II

After the United States entered World War II, MacArthur became Allied commander in the Philippines. He "courted controversy" on several occasions, especially when he over-ruled his air commander, General Lewis H. Brereton, who had requested permission to launch air attacks by the US Far East Air Force (FEAF) against Japanese bases on nearby Taiwan, in keeping with a plan conceived prewar. MacArthur refused, contrary to his express orders,[2][3] and instead ordered the planes moved, to protect them from Japanese raids; half were caught on the ground while being refueled and were destroyed,[4] the prelude to a Japanese invasion. Some discredit Brereton's account of these events, and Geoffrey Perret's biography, Old Soldiers Never Die, lays out the case for negligence on the part of mid-level officers who simply preferred the scenery at Clark Air Base. Others, such as biographer Alan Schom, claim that MacArthur secluded himself for several hours after being notified of the Pearl Harbor attack, and refused to meet with or authorize Brereton to disperse the U.S. planes.[5]

Despite MacArthur's defense of his decisions prior to the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and the public face put his retreat, criticism of MacArthur's actions would follow him throughout the war. For example, in 1945, U.S. President Harry S Truman, contemplating a final invasion of Japan, wrote:

Mr. Prima Donna, if you don't think Hobie is really beastly, you are not a beast. Brass Hat, Five Star MacArthur. He's worse than the Cabots and the Lodges—they at least talked with one another before they told God what to do. Mac tells God right off. It's a very great pity we have stuffed shirts like that in key positions. I don't see why in hell Roosevelt didn't order Wainwright home and let MacArthur be a martyr. We'd have had a real General and a fighting man if we had Wainwright and not a play actor and a bunco man such as we have now.[6]

MacArthur's headquarters during the Philippines campaign of 1941-42 was on the island fortress of Corregidor; his single trip to the front lines in Bataan led to the disparaging moniker and ditty, "Dugout Doug." Nevertheless, MacArthur's fortress was clearly marked, and was the target of Japanese air attacks, until Manuel Quezon cautioned MacArthur "not to subject himself to danger". In March 1942, as Japanese forces tightened their grip on the Philippines, MacArthur was ordered by President Roosevelt to relocate to Melbourne, Australia, after Quezon and his wife had already left. With his wife and four-year-old son, and a select group of advisers and subordinate military commanders, MacArthur at last fled the Philippines on PT 41 commanded by Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley, and successfully evaded an intense Japanese search for the escaping American general.

MacArthur reached Mindanao on March 13, and boarded a B-17 Flying Fortress bomber three days later; on 17 March, he arrived at Batchelor Airfield in Australia's Northern Territory, about 100km south of Darwin before flying to Alice Springs where he took the Ghan railway through the Australian outback to Adelaide. His famous speech, in which he said "I came out of Bataan and I shall return", was made at Terowie, South Australia on March 20. During this period, President Manuel L. Quezon decorated MacArthur with the Philippine Distinguished Conduct Star.

MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). To remove all ambiguity, the Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin put MacArthur in command of the Australian military, which — following the isolation of the Philippines — was numerically larger than MacArthur's American forces. The Allied forces under his command included a small number of personnel from the Netherlands East Indies and other countries. One of MacArthur's first tasks was to reassure Australians, who feared a Japanese invasion. The fighting at this time was predominantly in and around New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies. On July 20, 1942 SWPA headquarters was moved to Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, taking over the AMP Insurance Company building (later known as MacArthur Central).

Australian successes at the Battle of Milne Bay and the Kokoda Track campaign came in late 1942, the first victories by Allied land forces anywhere against the Japanese. When it was reported the US 32nd Division, an inexperienced National Guard unit, had proved incompetent in the Allied offensive against Buna and Gona, the major Japanese beachheads in north-east New Guinea, MacArthur told U.S. I Corps commander, Robert L. Eichelberger, to assume direct control of Allied operations:

Bob, I'm putting you in command at Buna. Relieve Harding ... I want you to remove all officers who won't fight. Relieve regimental and battalion commanders; if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions and corporals in charge of companies ... Bob, I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive ... And that goes for your chief of staff, too.

The Allied land forces commander, General Thomas Blamey, did not want the US 41st Division, another inexperienced National Guard unit, to reinforce the Gona assault, and requested instead that the Australian 21st Brigade be sent, as "he knew they would fight".Nevertheless, a regiment of the 41st Division was sent to Gona.

In March 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved MacArthur's grand strategy, known as Operation Cartwheel, which aimed to capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul by taking strategic points to use as forward bases. During 1944 this was modified to bypass Rabaul and let the forces there "wither on the vine", Initially, the majority of his land forces were Australian but increasing numbers of US Army forces arrived in the theater, including the Sixth Army (a.k.a. Alamo Force), and later the Eighth Army. In addition, he drew in significant numbers of submarines, deployed on so-called "guerrilla submarine" missions, and away from attacks on Japanese commerce.

MacArthur's use of air power during the New Guinea campaign is considered by many historians as the first harnessing of air power to influence land warfare. His advancement of land forces up the 1500 mile coast was sequenced specifically on terrain selected for its ability to be made into landing strips for the tactical support aircraft. By advancing in leaps always within the range of his fighter-bombers (typically P-38 Lightnings), he could maintain air superiority over his land operations, the first time a major military command had done so. This provided critical close air support (bombing of enemy positions) and also denied the enemy of sea and airborne resupply, effectively cutting the Japanese forces off as they were under attack. Modern land warfare is based on this concept, first perfected by MacArthur's chief of air forces, USAF Gen George Kenney. (ref: 1. Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur by Geoffrey Perret and 2. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964 - William Manchester)

Allied forces under MacArthur's command landed at Leyte Island , on October 20, 1944, fulfilling MacArthur's vow to return to the Philippines. They consolidated their hold on the archipelago in the Battle of Luzon after heavy fighting, and despite a massive Japanese naval counterattack in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. With the reconquest of the islands, MacArthur moved his headquarters to Manila, to plan the invasion of Japan in late 1945. The invasion was preempted by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in September, 1945 MacArthur received the formal Japanese surrender which ended World War II.

MacArthur was awarded and received the Medal of Honor, which is the highest military award, for his leadership in the South-west Pacific Theater. Philippine President Sergio Osmeña also decorated him with the Philippines' highest military award, the Medal of Valor.

Post-World War II Japan

MacArthur was ordered by Washington on August 29 to exercise authority through the Japanese government machinery, including the Emperor. Some believe MacArthur may have made his greatest contribution to history in the next five and a half years, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan.

However, some historians criticize his work to exonerate Emperor Showa and all members of the imperial family implicated in the war such as prince Chichibu, prince Asaka, prince Takeda and prince Higashikuni from criminal prosecutions.MacArthur not only exonerated Hirohito but he ignored the advice of many members of the imperial family and Japanese intellectuals who publicly asked for the abdication of the Emperor and the implementation of a regency. For example, prince Mikasa (Takahito), Hirohito's youngest brother, even stood up in a meeting of the private council, in February 1946, and urged his brother to take responsibility for defeat while the well-known poet Tatsuji Miyoshi wrote an essay in the magazine Shinchô titled "The Emperor should abdicate quickly".

According to historian Herbert Bix, "MacArthur and Bonner Fellers had worked out their own approach to occupying and reforming Japan." "MacArthur, in short, formulated no new policy toward the Emperor; he merely continued the one in effect during the last year of the Pacific war, then threw out its implications as circumstances changed." The plan, code-named "operation Blacklist", turned on separating Hirohito from the militarists, retaining him as a figurehead and using his image to bring about a transformation of the Japanese people.

According to Bix, "Mac Arthur's truly extraordinary measures to save Hirohito from trial as a war criminal had a lasting and profoundly distorting impact on Japanese understanding of the lost war" and "months before the Tokyo tribunal commenced, Mac Arthur's highest subordinates were working to attribute ultimate responsibility for Pearl Harbor to Hideki Tojo". Citing the debates between Truman, Eisenhower and Mac Arthur, Bix argues that "immediately on landing in Japan, Bonner Fellers went to work to protect Hirohito from the role he had played during and at the end of the war." and "allowed the major war criminal suspects to coordinate their stories so that the Emperor would be spared from indictment"

According to John Dower, "This successful campaign to absolve the Emperor of war responsibility knew no bounds. Hirohito was not merely presented as being innocent of any formal acts that might make him culpable to indictment as a war criminal. He was turned into an almost saintly figure who did not even bear moral responsibility for the war.

For his admirers, MacArthur's deeper feelings toward defeated Japan can be readily seen in the photos of the surrender ceremony itself where the flag of Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (1794-1858) was prominently displayed. A descendant of the Massachusetts Perry family and a cousin of the commodore, MacArthur must have seen himself as a second "opener" of Japan rather than the nation's conqueror. MacArthur and his GHQ staff helped a devastated Japan rebuild itself, institute a democratic government, and chart a course that made Japan one of the world's leading industrial powers. The U.S. during his time was firmly in control of Japan to oversee its reconstruction, and MacArthur was effectively the interim leader of Japan from 1945 until 1948. In 1946, MacArthur's staff drafted a new constitution that renounced war and reduced the emperor to a figurehead; this Constitution remains in use in Japan to this day. He also pushed the Japanese Diet into adopting a decentralization plan to break apart the large Japanese companies (zaibatsu) and foster the first Japanese labor unions.

These reconstruction plans alarmed many in the U.S. Defense and State Departments, believing they conflicted with the prospect of Japan (and its industrial capacity) as a bulwark against the spread of Communism in Asia. Some of MacArthur's reforms, such as his labor laws, were rescinded in 1948 when his unilateral control of Japan was ended by the increased involvement of the State Department. MacArthur handed over power to the newly-formed Japanese government in 1949, and remained in Japan until relieved by President Truman on April 11, 1951. Truman replaced SCAP leader MacArthur with General Matthew Ridgway of the U.S. Army. By 1952, Japan was a sovereign nation under the democratic constitution MacArthur had pushed for, which had been in effect since 1947. See also Constitution of Japan

In late 1945, Allied military commissions tried 4,000 Japanese officers for war crimes. About 3,000 were given prison terms and 920 executed; the charges included the Rape of Nanking, the Bataan Death March, and the sack of Manila. Critics claim that General Yamashita Tomoyuki, Japanese commander in the Philippines, had lost control of his soldiers and should not have been executed. In fact those responsible were under orders from Count Tereuchi. Ultimately, because he failed to resign his post, his command responsibility was found to impose liability for the actions of Japanese troops; this case has become a precedent known as the Yamashita Standard. The same standard was applied to the case of General Homma who was also tried and hanged for atrocities during the Death March in Bataan. In fact, General Homma was then leading troops to capture Corregidor. PBS once called the trials "hasty".[20]

At the end of the war MacArthur secretly granted immunity to the physicians of Unit 731 in exchange for providing America with their research on biological weapons. As a result, only one reference to Japanese experiments with "poisonous serums" on Chinese civilians was heard by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in August of 1946. This was actioned by David Sutton, assistant to the Chinese prosecutor.

Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King (November 23, 1878 – June 25, 1956) was Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (COMINCH-CNO) during World War II. As COMINCH, he directed the United States Navy's operations, planning, and administration and was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was the US Navy's second most senior officer after Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, and the second admiral to be promoted to five star rank. As COMINCH, he served under Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and, later, James Forrestal.

Career

King was born in Lorain, Ohio. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy from 1897 until 1901. During that period, he also served on the USS San Francisco during the Spanish American War. He commanded the USS Terry during the United States occupation of Veracruz in 1914.

Before World War I he served in the surface fleet. From 1919 to 1925, he held several posts associated with submarine operations.

In 1926, he took command of the aircraft tender USS Wright with additional duties as Senior Aide on the Staff of Commander Air Squadrons, Atlantic Fleet. In January 1927 he began flying lessons. He was designated Naval Aviator 3368 in May 1927, when he resumed command of Wright. He commanded Wright until 1929 (with a brief interlude commanding the salvage operations of USS S-4) when he was assigned command of the Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia. In June 1930, he became captain of the carrier USS Lexington which he commanded for the next two years. In 1932 he attended the Naval War College. In 1933, he was promoted to Rear Admiral, and, as a promoter of air warfare, was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. From 1936 until 1940, he commanded various aircraft forces. He was promoted to Vice Admiral in 1938.

In 1940, he served on the General Board. He was promoted to Admiral in February 1941 and appointed Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. On 30 December 1941 he became Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. On 18 March 1942, he was appointed Chief of Naval Operations, relieving Admiral Stark. He is the only person to hold this combined command. On 17 December 1944 he was promoted to the newly created rank of Fleet Admiral. He retired on December 15, 1945 but was recalled as an advisor to the Secretary of the Navy in 1950.

After retiring, King lived in Washington DC until ill-health forced him to stay in the Naval Hospital at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He died of a heart-attack on June 26, 1956 and was buried in the United States Naval Academy Cemetery at Annapolis, Maryland.

Chester William Nimitz (February 24, 1885 – February 20, 1966) was the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces for the United States and Allied forces during World War II. He was the United States' leading authority on submarines, as well as Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Navigation in 1939. He was his country's last surviving Fleet Admiral.

Military career

Early career

He joined the battleship Ohio (BB-12) at San Francisco, and cruised in her to the Far East. In September 1906, he was transferred to Baltimore (C-3); and, on 31 January 1907, after the two years at sea then required by law, he was commissioned as an Ensign. Remaining on Asiatic Station in 1907, he successively served in Panay, Decatur, and Denver.

While Nimitz was a young 22 year-old ensign in the Philippines in command of the destroyer Decatur, his ship ran aground on a mudbank. Nimitz was court-martialed and convicted of hazarding a Navy ship and received a letter of reprimand[citation needed]. This incident could have ended his career.

Nimitz returned to the United States in the fourth USS Ranger when that vessel was converted to a school ship, and in January 1909 began instruction in the First Submarine Flotilla. In May of that year he was given command of the flotilla, with additional duty in command of Plunger, later renamed A-1. He commanded Snapper (later renamed C-5) when that submarine was commissioned on February 2, 1910, and on November 18, 1910 assumed command of Narwhal (later renamed D-1). In the latter command he had additional duty from October 10, 1911, as Commander 3rd Submarine Division Atlantic Torpedo Fleet. In November 1911 he was ordered to the Boston Navy Yard, to assist in fitting out Skipjack and assumed command of that submarine, which had been renamed E-1, at her commissioning on February 14, 1912. On March 20, 1912 he rescued W. J. Walsh, Fireman, second class, from drowning.

After commanding the Atlantic Submarine Flotilla, from, May 1912 to March 1913, he supervised the building of diesel engines for tanker Maumee, under construction at the New London Ship and Engine Building Company, Groton, Connecticut.

World War I

In the summer of 1913, Nimitz studied engines at the diesel engine plants in Nuremberg, Germany, and Ghent, Belgium. Returning to the New York Navy Yard, he became Maumee's Executive Officer and Engineer on her commissioning October 23, 1916. On 10 August 1917 Nimitz became aide to Rear Admiral Samuel S. Robinson, Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. On February 6, 1918 he was appointed Chief of Staff and was awarded a Letter of Commendation for meritorious service as Chief of Staff to the Commander, U.S. Atlantic Submarine Fleet. On September 16, 1918, he reported to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and on October 25, 1918 was given additional duty as Senior Member, Board of Submarine Design.

Between the wars

From May 1919 to June 1920 he served as executive officer of South Carolina. He then commanded Chicago with additional duty in command of Submarine Division 14, based at Pearl Harbor. Returning to the United States in the summer of 1922, he studied at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, and in June 1923, became Aide and Assistant Chief of Staff to Commander Battle Fleet, and later to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. In August 1926 he went to the University of California, Berkeley to establish the Navy's first Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps Unit.

Nimitz lost part of one finger to an accident with a diesel engine, only saving the rest of it—and his career—when the machine jammed against his Annapolis ring[citation needed]. He also suffered a severe ear infection, becoming partially deaf. He compensated by becoming proficient at reading lips[citation needed].

In June 1929 he took command of Submarine Division 20. In June 1931 he assumed command of Rigel and the destroyers out of commission at San Diego, California. In October 1933 he took command of Augusta and cruised in her to the Far East, where in December she became flagship of the Asiatic Fleet. In April 1935, he returned home for three years as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, before becoming Commander, Cruiser Division 2, Battle Force. In September 1938 he took command of Battleship Division 1, Battle Force. On June 15, 1939 he was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

World War II

Ten days after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 he was selected Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), with the rank of Admiral, effective from December 31. Assuming command at the most critical period of the war in the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz, despite the losses from the attack on Pearl Harbor and the tragic shortage of ships, planes and supplies, successfully organized his forces to halt the Japanese advance.

On March 24, 1942, the newly-formed US-British Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive designating the Pacific theater an area of American strategic responsibility. Six days later the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) divided the theater into three areas: the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA, commanded by General Douglas MacArthur), and the South East Pacific Area. The JCS designated Nimitz as Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas CINCPOA, with operational control over all Allied units (air, land, and sea) in that area.

As rapidly as ships, men, and material became available, Nimitz shifted to the offensive and defeated the Japanese navy in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and in the Solomon Islands Campaign.

On October 7, 1943 he was designated Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Areas. By Act of Congress, approved December 14, 1944, the grade of Fleet Admiral of the United States Navy — the highest grade in the Navy — was established and the next day President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt appointed Admiral Nimitz to that rank. Nimitz took the oath of that office on December 19, 1944.

In the final phases in the war in the Pacific, he attacked the Mariana Islands invading Saipan, inflicting a decisive defeat on the Japanese Fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and capturing Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. His Fleet Forces isolated enemy-held bastions of the Central and Eastern Caroline Islands and secured in quick succession Peleliu, Angaur, and Ulithi. In the Philippines, his ships turned back powerful task forces of the Japanese Fleet, a historic victory in the multi-phased Battle for Leyte Gulf 24 to October 26, 1944. Fleet Admiral Nimitz culminated his long-range strategy by successful amphibious assaults on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In addition, Nimitz also persuaded the United States Army Air Forces to mine the Japanese ports and waterways by air with B-29 Superfortresses in a successful mission called Operation Starvation, which severely interrupted the Japanese logistics.

In January 1945, Nimitz moved the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet forward from Pearl Harbor to Guam for the remainder of the war. Mrs. Nimitz remained on the mainland of the USA for the duration of the war, and she did not join her husband at Hawaii or Guam.

On September 2, 1945 Nimitz signed for the United States when Japan formally surrendered on board the Missouri in Tokyo Bay. On October 5, 1945, which had been officially designated as "Nimitz Day" in Washington, DC, Admiral Nimitz was personally presented a Gold Star in lieu of the third Distinguished Service Medal by the President of the United States "for exceptionally meritorious service as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, from June 1944 to August 1945...."

Nimitz was known throughout World War II as the "Island Hopper" during the Pacific campaign.

William Frederick "Bull" Halsey, Jr. (October 30, 1882 – August 16, 1959) was the United States Navy Fleet Admiral who commanded the U.S. Third Fleet during much of the Pacific War against Japan.

Halsey was born in Elizabeth, New Jersey, on October 30, 1882, the son of Captain William F. Halsey, Sr. USN. He attended the Pingry School as a boy and later graduated in 1904 from the United States Naval Academy with several athletic honors. He spent his early service years in battleships and torpedo craft. The United States Navy was expanding at that time, and the Navy was short on officers; Halsey was one of the few who were promoted directly from Ensign to full Lieutenant, skipping the rank of Lieutenant (junior grade). Torpedoes and torpedo craft became a specialty for him, and he commanded the First Group of the Atlantic Fleet's Torpedo Flotilla in 1912 through 1913, and several torpedo boats and destroyers during the 1910s and 1920s. Lieutenant Commander Halsey's World War I service, including command of USS Shaw in 1918, was sufficiently distinctive to earn a Navy Cross.

Contents [show]

Inter-war years

From 1922 through 1925, Halsey served as Naval Attache in Berlin, Germany, and commanded USS Dale during a European cruise. During 1930–1932, Captain Halsey led two destroyer squadrons. He studied at the Naval War College in the mid-1930s. Prior to assuming command of an aircraft carrier, he received aviation instruction, taking the more difficult Naval Aviator rather than Aviation Observer program. He insisted on taking the full twelve week course, and was the last one of his class to graduate. He then commanded the carrier USS Saratoga and the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, Florida. Halsey was promoted to Rear Admiral in 1938, commanding Carrier Divisions for the next three years, and, as a Vice Admiral, also serving as Commander Aircraft Battle Force.

World War II

Vice Admiral Halsey was at sea in his flagship, USS Enterprise, during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Upon learning of the Japanese attack, he was overheard remarking that after this war the Japanese language would only be spoken in hell. Halsey's contempt for the Japanese was well displayed throughout the war to the officers and sailors under his command in very successful campaigns to boost morale. One such example was a sign that Halsey had hanging on the bulkhead of his flag quarters that said "Kill Japs Kill Japs Kill More Japs!". During the first six months of the war, his carrier task force took part in raids on enemy-held islands and in the Doolittle Raid on Japan. By this time he had acquired the nickname "Bull," after his slogan, "Hit hard, hit fast, hit often". Beached by an attack of psoriasis just before the June 1942 Battle of Midway, he lent his brilliant chief of staff, Captain Miles Browning, to his hand-picked successor, Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance, who under the overall command of Vice Admiral Fletcher led the American carrier forces to a brilliant victory against the superior Japanese Combined Fleet.

Halsey took command in the South Pacific Area in mid-October 1942, at a critical stage of the Guadalcanal Campaign. After Guadalcanal was secured in February 1943, Admiral Halsey's forces spent the rest of the year battling up the Solomon Islands Chain to Bougainville, then isolated the Japanese fortress at Rabaul by capturing positions in the Bismarck Archipelago.

Admiral Halsey left the South Pacific in May 1944, as the war surged toward the Philippines and Japan. From September 1944 to January 1945, he led the Third Fleet during campaigns to take the Palaus, Leyte and Luzon, and on many raids on Japanese bases.

Leyte Gulf

In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, he took the Third Fleet in pursuit of a force of Japanese carriers, leaving the Japanese surface fleet to engage a task force of destroyer escorts and light carriers. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was a complicated affair, in part because portions of the American fleet were uninformed about the other's areas of responsibility. (The mish-mash of signals is covered in detail in the novel War and Remembrance, by Herman Wouk.)

Despite aerial reconnaissance reports on the night of 24–25 October, Halsey or his staff failed to take note of the approaching Japanese center force via San Bernardino Strait. When the crisis erupted off Samar the next morning, the 3rd Fleet striking arm was headed north to engage Japanese carriers off Cape Engaño. In his absence, the Seventh Fleet lost an escort carrier and three destroyers (totaling 660 men) to Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's battleships and cruisers.

A message from Admiral Chester Nimitz asking for the location of Task Force 34 ("Turkey trots to water. Where is repeat where is Task Force 34? The world wonders"), the battleships that should have been covering the approaches to Leyte, led to ill-feeling due to a misunderstood piece of security padding (see "the world wonders"). Halsey recovered, though, by winning the battle though without the hammer-blow victory for which he had hoped.

After the Leyte Gulf engagement, the 3rd Fleet was confronted with another powerful enemy: "Halsey's Typhoon" in mid December. While conducting operations off the Philippines, the force remained on station rather than avoiding a major storm that sank three destroyers and inflicted damage on many other ships. Some 800 men were lost in addition to 146 aircraft. The storm is the central scene in Herman Wouk's The Caine Mutiny (and Halsey is an off-stage presence for much of the book). A smaller typhoon assailed the fleet a month later.

In January 1945, Halsey was routinely relieved by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance in command of the fleet (during this time called Fifth Fleet). Halsey resumed command of the Third Fleet from late May 1945 until the end of the war; he was present when Japan formally surrendered on the deck of his flagship, USS Missouri, on September 2, 1945.

Frank Jack Fletcher (April 29, 1885 – April 25, 1973) was an admiral in the United States Navy during World War I and World War II. Fletcher was the operational commander at the pivotal Battles of Coral Sea and of Midway. He was the nephew of Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher.

World War I and Post-War Period

Fletcher became Aide and Flag Lieutenant on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet in July 1914. After a year at this post, he returned to the Naval Academy for duty in the Executive Department. Upon the outbreak of World War I he served as Gunnery Officer of USS Kearsarge until September 1917, after which he assumed command of USS Margaret. He was assigned to USS Allen in February 1918 before taking command of USS Benham in May 1918. For distinguished service as Commanding Officer USS Benham, engaged in the important, exacting, and hazardous duty of patrolling European waters and protecting vitally important convoys, he was awarded the Navy Cross.

From October 1918 to February 1919 he assisted in fitting out USS Crane at San Francisco. He then became Commanding Officer of USS Gridley upon her commissioning. Returning to Washington, he was head of the Detail Section, Enlisted Personnel Division in the Bureau of Navigation from April 1919 until September 1922.

Interwar Service

He returned to the Asiatic Station, having consecutive command of the USS Whipple, USS Sacramento, USS Rainbow, and Submarine Base, Cavite. He served at the Washington Navy Yards from March 1925 to 1927; became Executive Officer of USS Colorado; and completed the Senior Course at the Naval War College, Newport in June 1930.

Fletcher became Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet in August 1931. In the summer of 1933 he was transferred to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Following this assignment he had duty from November 1933 to May 1936 as Aide to the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Claude A. Swanson. He assumed command of USS New Mexico, flagship of Battleship Division THREE in June 1936. In December 1937 he became a member of the Naval Examining Board, and became Assistant Chief of Bureau of Navigation in June 1938. Returning to the Pacific between September 1939 and December 1941 he became Commander Cruiser Division THREE; Commander Cruiser Division SIX; Commander Cruiser's Scouting Force; and Commander Cruiser Division FOUR.

World War II

In early January 1942, Rear Admiral Fletcher was given command of a US-Australian task force, with the carrier USS Yorktown (CV-5) as his flagship. After supporting the reinforcement of strategically vital South Pacific islands, his task force raided Japanese positions in the Central Pacific, New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. In May and June 1942, he was senior officer present during the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the Battle of Midway, in which the Japanese fleet was decisively repulsed. As the U.S. took the offensive in August 1942, Vice Admiral Fletcher commanded the invasion of Guadalcanal and Tulagi, and fought the carrier Battle of the Eastern Solomons later in the month. Fletcher's sinking of six enemy carriers made him the most successful admiral of the war. In spite of Fletcher's successes, he was criticized by some for his performance. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz thought that Fletcher, "could have done better" in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, in that he should have more aggressively pursued the Japanese warships on August 25, 1942 after the battle of August 24 was over.[1] The criticims of Fletcher's performance may have affected the decision by Admiral Ernest King to relieve Fletcher of his command after the U.S. carrier Saratoga was torpedoed and damaged by a Japanese submarine on August 31, 1942. Fletcher himself was slightly injured in the attack on Saratoga, suffering a gash to his head.

In November 1942, he became Commander, Thirteenth Naval District and Commander, Northwestern Sea Frontier. A year later, he was placed in charge of the Northern Pacific area, holding that position until after the end of World War II, when his forces occupied northern Japan. Vice Admiral Fletcher's final duty was as Chairman of the General Board, and he was advanced to the rank of Admiral upon retirement in May 1947.

Henry Harley "Hap" Arnold (June 25, 1886 – January 15, 1950) was an aviation pioneer and Chief of the United States Army Air Corps (from 1938), Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces (from 1941 until 1945) and the first and only General of the Air Force (in 1949). He is also the only person to achieve five-star rank in two American armed services.[1]

World War II

With U.S. participation in the Second World War inevitable, the division of authority between the Air Corps and General Headquarters Air Force was removed with a revision of Army Regulation 95-5 resulting in the creation of the United States Army Air Forces on June 20, 1941. Arnold was made Chief of the Army Air Forces and acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air with command authority over both the Air Corps and Air Force Combat Command (successor to GHQ Air Force). This also provided the air arm with a staff of its own, brought the entire organization under the command of one general (Arnold), and granted it near autonomy. It also by consensus postponed debate on separation of the Air Force into a service co-equal with the Army and Navy until after the war.

Arnold gave the new Air Staff as its first assignment the development of a war plan for fighting both Germany and Japan, and it produced AWPD-1, which became the basis for air strategy during the war. AWPD-1 defined four tasks for the USAAF: defense of the Western Hemisphere, an initial defensive strategy against Japan, a strategic air offensive against Germany, and a later strategic air offensive against Japan in prelude of invasion. It also planned for an expansion of the USAAF to 60,000 aircraft and 2.1 million men. AWPD-1 called for 24 groups (approximately 750 airplanes) of B-29 very heavy bombers to be based in Northern Ireland and Egypt for use against Nazi Germany.

Even before then he had pushed for aid to Great Britain; with U.S. entry into the war, Arnold, a strong supporter of strategic bombing, closely supervised the creation of the Eighth Air Force in England to limit the diversion of Army bombers to anti-submarine patrol and to the Pacific Theater, and thwart British lobbying to have U.S. bombers sent as individual replacements for the Royal Air Force.

In the wake of U.S. entry in the war, Arnold was promoted to lieutenant general on December 15, 1941. On March 9, 1942, with the issuance of War department Circular 59 the USAAF acquired full autonomy, equal to and entirely separate from the Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply. The office of the Chief of the Air Corps and the Air Forces Combat Command were eliminated entirely, with Arnold becoming Commanding General of the USAAF and a member of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In response to an inquiry from President Franklin Roosevelt, Arnold directed the Air War Plans Division in August 1942, to revise its estimates and AWPD-42 was issued, calling for 75,000 aircraft and 2.7 million men, but also adding a call for 8,000 gliders and the production of 8,000 aircraft for use by other allies. AWPD-42 reaaffirmed earlier strategic priorities, but increased the list of industrial targets from 23 to 177, ranking the German Luftwaffe first and its submarine force second in importance of destruction. It also directed that the B-29 not be employed in Europe because of problems in development, but instead be concentrated in the Far East to destroy Japan.

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor Arnold began to carry out AWPD-1. The primary strategic bombing force against Nazi Germany would be the Eighth Air Force, and he named General Spaatz to command it and General Eaker to head its Bomber Command. Other Arnold protegés eventually filled key positions in the strategic bombing forces, including Colonels Frank A. Armstrong and Newton Longfellow, and Generals Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Lawrence Kuter, Laverne Saunders, Emmitt O'Donnell, and James H. Doolittle.

Despite protecting his strategic bombing force from demands of other services and allies, Arnold was forced to divert resources from the Eighth to support operations in North Africa, crippling the Eighth in its infancy and nearly killing it. Eaker (now Eighth Air Force commander) found that pre-war doctrine stating that heavily-armed bombers could penetrate defenses to reach any target without supporting escort fighters was wrong and early in 1943 began requesting more fighters and disposable fuel tanks to increase their range, in addition to repeated requests to increase the size of his small bombing force. Eaker was resisted not only by opponents of strategic daylight bombing but by his fighter commanders as well, who argued that the use of drop tanks would endanger their aircraft.

Heavy losses in the summer and fall of 1943 on deep penetration missions increased Eaker's requests, but Arnold, under pressure and impatient for results, ignored the findings and placed the blame on a lack of aggressiveness by bomber commanders. This came at a time when General Dwight Eisenhower was putting together his command group for the invasion of Europe, and Arnold approved Eisenhower's request to replace Eaker with his own commanders, Spaatz and Doolittle. Ironically, the very items Eaker requested — more airplanes, drop tanks, and P-51 fighters — accompanied the change of command and made the Eighth Air Force a success.

With the strategic bombing crisis resolved in Europe, Arnold placed full emphasis on completion of the development and deployment of the B-29 to attack Japan. The B-29 program had been plagued with a seemingly unending series of development problems, subjecting it and Arnold to much criticism in the press and from skeptical field commanders. The B-29 was the key component of the AAF's fourth strategic priority, since no other land-based bomber was capable of reaching the Japanese homeland, but by February 1944, the XX Bomber Command, slated to begin Operation Matterhorn on June 1, had virtually no flight time yet above an altitude of 20,000 feet.

With a designated overseas deployment date of April 15, 1944, Arnold intervened in the situation personally by flying to Kansas on March 8. For three days he toured training bases involved in the modification program, distressed at his findings of shortages and work failures, and on the spot made a military procurement officer accompanying him, Maj.Gen. Bennett E. Meyers, coordinator of the program. Meyers (who would after the war be investigated by Congress in a procurement scandal in which Arnold was compelled to testify), despite labor problems and blizzard weather, succeeded in having a complete bomb group ready for deployment by April 9.

The mechanical problems of the B-29, however, had not been resolved, and combat operations identified many new ones. Arnold felt the pressure of not only achieving the goals of AWPD-1, but of justifying by results a very expensive technological project in the B-29, and also the highly-classified knowledge that the B-29 would be called upon to deliver the atomic bomb, if the Manhattan Project succeeded. Operations against Japanese targets in China and Southeast Asia began in June, 1944 and from the outset produced far less positive results than expected.

In many ways the difficulties of the Twentieth Air Force's campaign against Japan mirrored those of the Eighth Air Force's against Germany. With characteristic impatience, Arnold quickly relieved the B-29 commander in China and replaced him with Maj.Gen. Curtis LeMay. LeMay produced results despite a shortage of resources, and a second B-29 bomber command was moved to the Mariana Islands in November. One of the architects of AWPD-1 and AWPD-42, General Hansell, commanded the bombers but after two months of poor results, which could no longer be blamed on defects in the bomber, Arnold decided he too needed replacing. He shut down operations from China, consolidated all the B-29s in the Marianas, and replaced Hansell with LeMay.

Arnold had at its creation made himself commanding general of the Twentieth Air Force, for which he is sometimes criticized for failure to delegate. This unique command arrangement may also have contributed to his health problems (see below), but after the negative experience of building an effective bombing force against Germany, and realizing the consequences of failure against Japan, Arnold may have considered that administrative decisions regarding command could best be handled personally. The Joint Chiefs also desired to place all military forces in the Central Pacific, where the Twentieth Air Force was to be based, under the operational control of Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Arnold was adamantly opposed to diversion of strategic bombers to support tactical operations.

Ira Clarence Eaker (13 April 1896 – 6 August 1987) was a general of the United States Army Air Forces, who commanded the Eighth Air Force during World War II.

Eaker was born in Field Creek, Texas, in 1896, the son of a tenant farmer. He attended Southeastern State Teachers College in Durant, Oklahoma, then joined the US Army in 1917. He was appointed a second lieutenant of Infantry, Officer's Reserve Corps, and assigned to active duty with the US 64th Infantry Regiment at El Paso, Texas. On November 15, 1917, he received a commission in the Regular Army.

U. S. Army Air Corps

Eaker remained with the 64th Infantry at El Paso until March 1918, when he was placed on detached service to receive flying instruction at Austin and Kelly Fields in Texas. Upon graduation the following October, he was rated a pilot and assigned to Rockwell Field, California.

In July 1919, he transferred to the Philippine Islands, where he served with the Second Aero Squadron at Fort Mills until September 1919; with the Third Aero Squadron at Camp Stotsenburg until September 1920, and as executive officer of the Department Air Office, Department and Assistant Department Air Officer, Philippine Department, and in command of the Philippine Air Depot at Manila until September 1921.

Meanwhile, on July 1, 1920, he transferred from the Infantry to the Air Service and returned to the United States in January 1922, for duty at Mitchel Field, N.Y., where he commanded the Fifth Aero Squadron and later was post adjutant.

In June 1924, Eaker was named executive assistant in the Office of Air Service at Washington, D.C., and from December 1926, to May 1927, he served as a pilot of one of the planes of the Pan American Flight which made a goodwill trip around South America. He then became executive officer in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War at Washington, D.C.

In September 1926, he was named operations and line maintenance officer at Bolling Field, Washington, D.C. While on that duty, he participated as chief pilot on the endurance flight of the Army plane, Question Mark, from 1 to 7 January 1929, establishing a new world flight endurance record. The entire crew of five, including Eaker and mission commander Carl Spaatz were also awarded the DFC for this achievement. In 1930, he made the first transcontinental flight entirely with instruments.

In October 1934, Eaker was ordered to duty at March Field, Calif., where he commanded the 34th Pursuit Squadron and later the 17th Pursuit Squadron. In the summer of 1935, he was detached for duty with the Navy and participated aboard the aircraft carrier USS Lexington, on maneuvers in Hawaii and Guam.

Eaker entered the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Ala., in August 1935, and upon graduation the following June entered the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., from which he graduated in June 1937. He then became assistant chief of the Information Division in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps at Washington, D.C., and in November 1940, assumed command of the 20th Pursuit Group at Hamilton Field, Calif.

World War II

Promoted to brigadier general in January 1942, he was assigned to organize the VIII Bomber Command and to understudy the British system of bomber operations; then in December 1942, he assumed command of the Eighth Air Force in England. Eaker drew much of his initial staff, including Captain Frederick W. Castle, Capt. Beirne Lay, Jr., and Lt. Harris Hull, from former civilians rather than career military officers, and the group became known as "Eaker's Amateurs".

Throughout the war, Eaker was an advocate for daylight "precision" bombing of military and industrial targets in German-occupied territory and ultimately Germany -- of striking at the enemy's ability to wage war while minimizing civilian casualties. The British considered daylight bombing too risky, and wanted the Americans to join them in night raids that would target wider areas, but Eaker persuaded a skeptical Winston Churchill that the American and British approaches complemented each other in a one-page memo that concluded, "If the R.A.F. continues night bombing and we bomb by day, we shall bomb them round the clock and the devil shall get no rest." He personally led the first US B-17 Flying Fortress bomber strike against German occupation forces in France, bombing Rouen, 17 August 1942.

Eaker was promoted to lieutenant general in September 1943. However, as American bomber losses mounted from German defensive fighter aircraft attacks on deep penetration missions beyond the range of available fighter cover, Eaker may have lost some of the confidence of USAAF Commanding General Henry Arnold. When General Dwight D. Eisenhower was named Supreme Allied Commander in December, 1943, he proposed to use his existing team of subordinate commanders in key positions, including Lt. Gen. James Doolittle. Doolittle was named Eighth Air Force Commander, and Arnold concurred with the change.

Eaker was re-assigned as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, having under his command the 12th and 15th U.S. Air Forces and the British Desert and Balkan Air Forces. He did not approve of the plan to bomb Monte Cassino in February, 1944, considering it a dubious military target, but ultimately "signed off" and gave in to pressure from ground commanders; historians of the era now generally believe Eaker's skepticism was correct and that the ancient abbey at Monte Cassino could have been preserved without jeopardizing the allied advance through Italy.

On 30 April 1945, General Eaker was named deputy commander of the Army Air Forces and chief of the Air Staff. He retired 31 August 1947, and was promoted to lieutenant general on the retired list 29 June 1948.

Carl Andrew "Tooey" Spaatz (June 28, 1891 – July 14, 1974) was an American general in World War II. Carl Andrew Spatz was born on June 28, 1891, in Boyertown, Pennsylvania. (Spaatz added the second "a" in 1937 at the request of his wife and daughters to clarify the pronunciation of the name, as many pronounced it "spats" or "spots". He added the second "a" to draw it out to sound like "ah", like the "a" in "father". The name is thus correctly pronounced "Spahtz".) He attended West Point, where he received his nickname because of his resemblance to another red headed cadet named F.J. Toohey, and graduated in 1914. He served briefly in the infantry but was assigned to military aviation in October 1915.

World War I

Following America's entry into World War I, Spaatz was sent with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in command of the 31st Aero Squadron. Spaatz spent most of the war commanding the American Aviation School at Issoudun, France but he saw three weeks of action during the final months of the war. In this brief period, Spaatz shot down three enemy planes and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC); during the time he was with the 13th Aero Squadron. See [[1]]. Spaatz was given a temporary promotion to Major in June 1918, but reverted to his permanent rank of Captain in February 1920.

Inter-War Years

Spaatz was permanently promoted to the rank of Major in July 1920. During the inter-war years, Spaatz held a number of commands in the Air Corps. In January 1 to January 7, 1929, Spaatz along with fellow Air Corps officer, Captain Ira Eaker, established an aviation record by keeping the airplane Question Mark in the air over the Los Angeles vicinity for over 150 hours. Spaatz enrolled in the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in August 1935 (graduating in June 1936). He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in September 1935.

World War II

Spaatz was assigned to the office of the Chief of Air Corps when World War II began in Europe. He was promoted to Colonel in November 1939 and sent as a military observer to England during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Spaatz was appointed to the assistant to the Chief of Air Corps in October 1940 with the temporary rank of Brigadier General. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor and America's entry into the war, he was named Chief of the Army Air Forces Combat Command in January 1942 and promoted to the temporary rank of Major General (he was subsequently promoted to the permanent rank of Colonel in September 1942). In May 1942 he was named commander of the Eighth Air Force of the USAAF, and transferred his headquarters to England in July. Spaatz was placed in command of all U.S. Army Air Forces in the European Theater of Operations while retaining his Eighth Air Force command. Spaatz would subsequently be given command of the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa in December 1942, the Allied Northwest African Air Force in February 1943, the Fifteenth Air Force and Royal Air Forces in Italy in November 1943, and the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe in January 1944. Spaatz received a temporary promotion to Lieutenant General in March 1943. As commander of Strategic Air Forces, Spaatz directed the strategic bombing campaign against Germany, directing the Eighth Air Force, which was now commanded by Lt. General Jimmy Doolittle, based in England, and the Fifteenth Air Force, which was now commanded by Lt. General Nathan Twining, based in Italy.

As the commander of Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Spaatz was under the command of Gen. Dwight Eisenhower and the supervision of Gen. Hap Arnold, the USAAF Chief of Staff, and he continued under Gen. Arnold's command in the Pacific.

Carl Spaatz received a temporary promotion to General on March 11, 1945. He was transferred to the Pacific and assumed command of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific as part of the Pacific Theatre of Operations, with headquarters on Guam, in July 1945. From this command, Spaatz directed the strategic bombing of Japan, including the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Spaatz had been present at Reims when the Germans surrendered to the Americans on May 7, 1945; at Berlin when they surrendered to the Russians on May 9; and aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay when the Japanese surrendered on September 2. He was the only man of General rank, or equivalent, present at all three of these surrenders.

Spaatz made several controversial decisions in his leadership of the American strategic bombing campaign. He insisted on daylight missions despite the British maintenance that daylight missions produced unacceptable casualty rates. Spaatz also believed that German oil production should be the primary bombing target despite the official decision that transportation was the primary target. In April 1944, Spaatz ordered bombings of the Ploieşti oilfields in Romania under the subterfuge that the actual targets were the rail lines that supplied the oil production facilities. Despite their great personal friendship, Spaatz sometimes argued with Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower about military issues on occasions. But after the war, Eisenhower said that Spaatz, along with General Omar Bradley, was one of the two American general officers who had contributed the most to the victory in Europe. The USAAF daylight bombing of Germany and Austria, with long-range fighter escort by P-51 "Mustangs", under the command of Gen. Spaatz and his subordinate Doolittle, in 1944-45, broke the back of the Nazi Luftwaffe and gave air supremacy over Europe to the Allied Air Forces of the USA, the UK, and Canada.

SOVIET UNION

Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, GCB (Russian: ???́???? ?????????́????? ??́???) (November 19 [O.S. December 1] 1896–June 18, 1974) was a Soviet military commander who, in the course of World War II, led the Red Army to liberate the Soviet Union from the Nazi occupation, to overrun much of Eastern Europe, and to capture Nazi Germany's capital, Berlin .

The German-Soviet war

On June 22, 1941, Zhukov signed the infamous Directive of Peoples' Commissariat of Defence No. 3, which ordered an all-out counteroffensive by Red Army forces: he commanded the troops “to encircle and destroy enemy grouping near Suwalki and to seize the Suwalki region by the evening of 24.6” and “to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping invading in Vladimir-Volynia and Brody direction” and even “to seize the Lublin region by the evening of 24.6”. This manoeuver failed and unorganized Red Army units were destroyed by the Wehrmacht. Later, Zhukov claimed that he was forced to sign the document by Stalin, despite the reservations that he raised. This document was supposedly written by Aleksandr Vasilevsky, and Zhukov was forced to sign it.There are no known documents confirming that the failed counteroffensive was not Zhukov's own initiative.

On July 29, 1941, according to his own memoirs, Zhukov was sacked from his post of Chief of the General Staff because he suggested abandoning Kiev to avoid an encirclement. Stalin refused, leading to a stinging Soviet defeat. This dialogue between Stalin and Zhukov about the defense of Kiev was later thoroughly analyzed by P.Ya. Mezhiritzky in his book Reading Marshal Zhukov, published in 2000.

In October 1941, when the Germans were closing in on Moscow, Zhukov replaced Semyon Timoshenko in command of the central front and was assigned to direct the defense of Moscow (see Battle of Moscow). He also directed the transfer of troops from the Far East, where a large part of Soviet ground forces had been stationed on the day of Hitler's invasion. The successful Soviet counter-offensive in December 1941 drove the Germans back, out of reach of the Soviet capital. Zhukov's feat of logistics is considered by some to be his greatest achievement.

By now, Zhukov was firmly back in favour and Stalin valued him precisely for his outspokenness. Stalin's (eventual) willingness to submit to criticism and listen to his generals was a key element in Russia's victory; Hitler, on the other hand, usually dismissed any general who disagreed with him.

In 1942 Zhukov was made Deputy Commander-in-Chief and sent to the south-western front to take charge of the defense of Stalingrad. Under the overall command of Vasilievsky, he oversaw the encirclement and capture of the German Sixth Army in 1943 at the cost of perhaps a million dead (see Battle of Stalingrad). During the operation, Zhukov spent most of the time in fruitless attacks in the direction of Rzhev, Sychevka and Vyazma, known as the "Rzhev meat grinder" ("???????? ?????????"). Some historians now question the casualty figures allegedly suffered by the Soviets at Rzhev as being too high. There is also some new evidence which show the Rzhev operation was a diversion in order to prevent the Germans from successfully breaking the encirclement of Stalingrad.

In January 1943, he orchestrated the first breakthrough of the German blockade of Leningrad. He was a STAVKA coordinator at the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, and, according to the memoirs, playing a central role in the planning of the battle and the hugely successful offensive that followed. Kursk was the first major German defeat in summer and has a good claim to be a battle at least as decisive as Stalingrad. Commander of Central Front Konstantin Rokossovsky, however, says that planning and decisions for the Battle of Kursk were made without Zhukov, that he only arrived just before the battle, made no decisions and left soon afterwards, and that Zhukov exaggerated his role.

Zhukov riding a white horse during the Moscow Victory Parade of 1945. There is now an equestrian monument to him nearby.

Following the failure of Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, he lifted the Siege of Leningrad in January 1944. Zhukov then led the Soviet offensive Operation Bagration (named after Pyotr Bagration, a famous Russian-Georgian general during the Napoleonic Wars), which some military historians believe was the greatest military operation of World War II. He launched the final assault on Germany in 1945, capturing Berlin (see Battle of Berlin) in April. Shortly before midnight, 8 May, German officials in Berlin signed an Instrument of Surrender, in his presence.

After the fall of Germany, Zhukov became the first commander of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany. As the most prominent Soviet military commander of the Great Patriotic War, he inspected the Victory Parade in Red Square in Moscow in 1945 while riding a white stallion. General Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander in the West, was a great admirer of Zhukov, and the two toured the Soviet Union together in the immediate aftermath of the victory over Germany.

Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy (Russian: ?????????? ?????????????? ????????????, Polish: Konstanty Rokossowski) (December 21, 1896 – August 3, 1968) was a Soviet military commander and Polish Defence Minister.

Early military career

When World War I broke out in 1914 Rokossovsky joined the Russian Army, serving as a non-commissioned officer in a dragoon regiment. In 1917, he joined the Bolshevik Party and soon thereafter, entered the ranks of the Red Army. During the Russian Civil War he advanced to the rank of commander. In the campaigns against the White Guard armies of Aleksandr Kolchak Rokossovsky received Soviet Russia's highest military decoration, the Order of the Red Banner. In 1922, he participated in the Polish Soviet War.

After the Civil War Rokossovsky studied at the Frunze Military Academy and became a senior cavalry commander in the Red Army. During the 1920s his division was stationed in Mongolia. In 1929 — by agreement with the Chinese government — he took part in defending the Chinese Eastern Railway against warlords.

In the early 1930s, Rokossovsky was among the first to realize the potential of armored assault. He advocated the creation of a strong armored core for the Red Army. His wide promotion of the idea brought him into conflict with many of the Old Guard commanders, especially Semyon Budenny, who still favored cavalry tactics. It was because of this, it would seem, that he was targeted during the purges.

Great Purge

Rokossovsky held senior commands until 1937, when he became caught up in Joseph Stalin's Great Purge and accused of "connections with foreign intelligence". After interrogations that included torture resulting in nine missing teeth and three cracked ribs, as well as three mock shooting ceremonies, he was sent to a labour camp at Norilsk, where he remained until March 1940, when he was released without explanation, apparently due to preparation for World War II.[1] Rokossovsky first revived in the so-called "Villa of ecstasy" in the spa of Sochi on the coast of the Black Sea.[citation needed] After a brief talk with Stalin he was restored to the rank of a Corps Commander in the Kiev Military Region.

World War II

When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 Rokossovsky became commander of the 16th Army stationed near Smolensk. During the bitter fighting in the winter of 1941 - 42 Rokossovsky played a key role in the defence of Moscow under Georgy Zhukov.

In early 1942 Rokossovsky was transferred to the Bryansk Front. He commanded the right flank of the Soviet forces as they fell back before the Germans towards the Don and Stalingrad in the summer of 1942. During the Battle of Stalingrad Rokossovsky, commanding the Don Front, led the northern wing of the Soviet counter-attack that encircled Paulus's Sixth Army and won the decisive victory of the Soviet-German war.

In 1943, after becoming commander of the Central Front, Rokossovsky successfully conducted defensive operations in the Kursk salient, and then led the counterattack west of Kursk which defeated the last major German offensive on the eastern front and allowed the Soviet armies to advance to Kiev. The Red Army then transferred him to the 1st Belorussian Front, which he commanded during the Soviet advance through Byelorussia (Belarus) and into Poland.

In a famous incident during the planning in 1944 of Operation Bagration, Rokossovsky conflicted with Stalin who demanded in accordance with Soviet war practice a single break-through of the German frontline. Rokossovsky held firm in his argument for two break-throughs. Stalin ordered Rokossovsky to "go and think it over" three times, but every time he returned and gave the same answer "Two break-throughs, Comrade Stalin, two break-throughs." After the third time Stalin remained silent, but walked over to Rokossovsky and put a hand on his shoulder. A tense moment followed as the whole room waited for Stalin to rip the epaulette from Rokossovsky's shoulder; instead, Stalin said "Your confidence speaks for your sound judgement," and ordered the attack to go forward according to Rokossovsky's plan.[citation needed] The battle was successful, and Rokossovsky's reputation was assured. After crushing German Army Group Centre in Belarus, Rokossovsky's armies reached the east bank of the Vistula opposite Warsaw by mid-1944. For these victories he gained the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

While Rokossovsky's forces stood stalled on the Vistula, the Warsaw Uprising (August - October, 1944) broke out in the city, led by the Polish Home Army (AK) on the orders of the Polish government in exile in London. Since the AK had the objectives of liberating the city from the Germans before the arrival of the Soviet forces and of preventing the establishment of a Communist government, Stalin ordered Rokossovsky to give the rising no assistance, orders which he obeyed. There has been much speculation about Rokossovsky's personal views on this decision.

After Warsaw was taken by the Soviets in January 1945, Rokossovsky was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front, which advanced into East Prussia and then across northern Poland to the mouth of the Oder at Stettin (now Szczecin). At the end of April he linked up with British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's forces in northern Germany while the forces of Zhukov and Ivan Koniev captured Berlin.

Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevsky (Russian: ??????́??? ????́?????? ??????́?????, September 30, 1895 – December 5, 1977) was a Soviet military commander, promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1943. He was the Soviet Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Minister of Defense during World War II, as well as Minister of Defense from 1949 to 1953. As the Chief of the General Staff, Vasilevsky was responsible for the planning and coordination of almost all decisive Soviet offensives, from the Stalingrad counteroffensive to the assault on East Prussia and Königsberg.

Vasilevsky started his military career during the First World War, earning the rank of captain by 1917. At the beginning of the October Revolution and the Civil War he was conscripted into the Red Army, taking part in the Polish-Soviet War. After the war, he quickly rose through the ranks, becoming a regimental commander by 1930. In this position, he showed great skill in the organization and training of his troops. Vasilevsky's talent did not go unnoticed, and in 1931 he was appointed a member of the Directorate of Military Training. In 1937, following Stalin's Great Purge, he was promoted to General Staff officer.

At the start of the 1943 Soviet counteroffensive of the Second World War, Vasilevsky coordinated and executed the Red Army's offensive on the upper Don, in the Donbass, Crimea, Belarus and Baltic states, ending the war with the capture of Königsberg in April 1945. In July 1945, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East, executing Operation August Storm and subsequently accepting Japan's surrender. After the war, he became the Soviet Defense Minister, a position he held until Stalin's death in 1953. With Khrushchev's rise, Vasilevsky started to lose power and was eventually pensioned off. After his death, he was buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis in recognition of his past service and contributions to his nation.

World War I and Civil war

World War I Russian infantry

After completing his studies in the seminary and spending a few years working as a teacher, Vasilevsky intended to become an agronomist or a surveyor, but the outbreak of the First World War changed his plans. According to his own words, he was "overwhelmed with patriotic feelings"and decided to become a soldier instead. Vasilevsky took his exams in January 1915 and entered the Alexander Military Law Academy in February. As he recalls, "I did not decide to become an officer to start a military career. I still wanted to be an agronomist and work in some remote corner of Russia after the war. I could not suppose that my country would change, and I would."After four months of courses that he later considered to be completely outdated, theoretical, and inappropriate for modern warfare,he was sent to the front with the rank of praporshchik (the highest non-commissioned rank in the Russian infantry) in May 1915.

From June to September, Vasilevsky was assigned to a series of reserve regiments, and finally arrived at the front in September as a half-company commander (polurotny) in the 409th Novokhopersky regiment, 109th division, 9th Army.In the spring of 1916, Vasilevsky took command of a company, which eventually became one of the most recognized in the regiment. In May 1916, he led his men during the Brusilov offensive, becoming a battalion commander after heavy casualties among officers, and gaining the rank of captain by age 22.

In November 1917, just after the Russian Revolution, Vasilevsky decided to end his military career. As he wrote in his memoirs, "There was a time when I led soldiers to battle, thinking I was doing my duty as a Russian patriot. However, I understood that we have been cheated, that people needed peace. . . . Therefore, my military career had to end. With no remorse, I could go back to my favorite occupation, working in the field."He travelled from Romania, where his unit was deployed in 1917, back to his own village.

In December 1917, while back at home, Vasilevsky learned that the men of the 409th regiment, which had been relocated to Ukraine, had elected him as their commander (at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, commanders were elected by their own men). However, the local military authorities recommended that he decline the proposal because of the heavy fighting taking place in Ukraine between pro-Soviet forces and the pro-independence Ukrainian government (the Central Rada). He followed this advice and became a drill instructor in his own Kineshma uezd.He retired in September 1918 and became a school teacher in the Tula Oblast.

In April 1919, Vasilevsky was again conscripted into the Red Army and sent to command a company fighting against peasant uprisings and assisting in the emergency Soviet policy of prodrazvyorstka, which required peasants to surrender agricultural surplus for a fixed price. Later that year, Vasilevsky took command of a new reserve battalion, and, in October 1919, of a regiment. However, his regiment never took part in the battles of the Russian Civil War, as Denikin's troops never got close to Tula. In December 1919, Vasilevsky was sent to the Western front as a deputy regimental commander, participating in the Polish-Soviet War.

As deputy regimental commander of the 427th regiment, 32nd brigade, 11th division, Vasilevsky participated at the battle of Berezina, pulling back as the Polish forces had been slowly but steadily advancing eastward, and in the subsequent counterattack that started on May 14, 1920, breaking through Polish lines before being stopped by cavalry counterattacks.Later, starting from July 4, 1920, he took part at the Soviet offensive towards Wilno, advancing to Neman river despite heavy Polish resistance and German fortifications erected in the region during World War I. Vasilevsky's regiment arrived near Wilno by mid-July and stayed there on a garrison duty until the Treaty of Riga.

The interwar period

After the Treaty of Riga, Vasilevsky fought against remaining white forces and peasant uprisings in Belarus and in the Smolensk Oblast until August 1921.By 1930, he had served as the regimental commander of the 142nd, 143rd, and 144th rifle regiments,where he showed great skill in the organization and training of his troops. In 1928, he graduated from the Vystrel regimental commander's course.During these years, Vasilevsky established friendships with higher commanders and Party members, including Kliment Voroshilov,Vladimir Triandafillov and Boris Shaposhnikov.Shaposhnikov, in particular, would become Vasilevsky's protector until the former's death in 1945. Vasilevsky's connections and good performance earned him an appointment to the Directorate of Military Training in 1931.

While at the Directorate of Military Training, Vasilevsky supervised the Red Army's training and worked on military manuals and field books. He also met several senior military commanders, such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Georgy Zhukov, then the Deputy Cavalry Inspector of the Red Army. Zhukov would later characterize Vasilevsky as "a man who knew his job as he spent a long time commanding a regiment and who earned great respect from everybody." In 1934, Vasilevsky was appointed to be the Senior Military Training Supervisor of the Volga Military District (Privolzhsky voyenny okrug). In 1937, he entered the Academy of the General Staff, where he studied important aspects of military strategy and other topics under experienced generals, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky.

Vasilevsky as Deputy Commander of Operations Directorate of the General Staff in 1940.

By mid-1937, Stalin's Great Purge eliminated a significant number of senior military commanders, vacating a number of positions on the General Staff. To his amazement, Vasilevsky was appointed to the General Staff in October 1937 and held "responsible for operational training of senior officers."In 1938, he was made a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (a sine qua non condition for a successful career in the Soviet Union); in 1939, he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, while holding the rank of divisional commander.While in this position he and Shaposhnikov were responsible for the planning of the Winter War, and after the Moscow peace treaty, for setting the demarcation line with Finland.

As a senior officer, Vasilevsky met frequently with Joseph Stalin. During one of these meetings, Stalin asked Vasilevsky about his family. Since Vasilevsky's father was a priest and thus a potential "enemy of the people," Vasilevsky said that he had ended his relationship with them in 1926. Stalin, surprised, suggested that he reestablish his family ties at once, and help his parents with whatever needs they might have.

World War II

Start and Battle of Moscow

By June 1941, Vasilevsky was working around the clock in his General Staff office.On June 22, 1941, he learned of the German bombing of several important military and civilian objectives, starting the Great Patriotic War. In August 1941, Vasilevsky was appointed Commander of Operations, Directorate of the General Staff and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, making him one of the key figures in the Soviet military leadership. At the end of September 1941, Vasilevsky gave a speech before the General Staff, describing the situation as extremely difficult, but pointing out that the northern part of the front was holding, that Leningrad still offered resistance, and that such a situation would potentially allow some reserves to be gathered in the northern part of the front.

In October 1941, the situation at the front was becoming critical, with German forces advancing towards Moscow during Operation Typhoon. As a representative of the Soviet General Staff (STAVKA), Vasilevsky was sent to the Western Front to coordinate the defense and guarantee a flow of supplies and men towards the region of Mozhaisk, where Soviet forces were attempting to contain the German advance. During heavy fighting near the outskirts of Moscow, Vasilevsky spent all of his available time both in the STAVKA and on the front line trying to coordinate the three fronts committed to Moscow's defense.When most of the General Staff (including its chief Marshal Shaposhnikov) was evacuated from Moscow, Vasilevsky remained in the city as liaison between the Moscow Staff and the evacuated members of the General Staff. In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev described Vasilevsky as an "able specialist" even so early in the war. On October 28, 1941, Vasilevsky was promoted to Lieutenant General.

The Battle of Moscow was a very difficult period in Vasilevsky's life, with the Wehrmacht approaching close enough to the city for German officers to make out some of Moscow's buildings through their field glasses. As he recalls, his workday often ended at four a.m. Moreover, with Marshal Shaposhnikov having fallen ill, Vasilevsky had to make important decisions by himself.On October 29, 1941, a bomb exploded in the courtyard of the General Staff. Vasilevsky was slightly wounded but continued working. The kitchen was damaged by the explosion, and the General Staff was relocated underground without hot food. Nevertheless, the Staff continued to function. In December 1941, Vasilevsky coordinated the Moscow counteroffensive, and by early 1942, the general counteroffensive in the Moscow and Rostov directions, further motivated in his work by the return of his evacuated family to Moscow.In April 1942, he coordinated the unsuccessful elimination of the Demyansk pocket, the encirclement of the German 2nd Army Corps near Leningrad. On April 24, with Shaposhnikov seriously ill again, Vasilevsky was appointed as acting Chief of Staff and promoted to Colonel General on April 26.

Summer and fall 1942

In May 1942 one of the most controversial episodes in Vasilevsky's career occurred: the Second Battle of Kharkov, a failed counteroffensive that led to a stinging Red Army defeat, and ultimately to a successful German offensive (Operation Blue) in the south. After repelling the enemy from Moscow, Soviet morale was high and Stalin was determined to launch another general counteroffensive during the summer. However, Vasilevsky recognized that "the reality was more harsh than that." Following Stalin's orders, the Kharkov offensive was launched on May 12, 1942. When the threat of encirclement became obvious, Vasilevsky and Zhukov asked for permission to withdraw the advancing Soviet forces. Stalin refused, leading to the encirclement of the Red Army forces and a total defeat. In his memoirs, Khrushchev accused Vasilevsky of being too passive and indecisive, as well as being unable to defend his point of view in front of Stalin during that particular operation.As he wrote, "It was my view that the catastrophe. . . . could have been avoided if Vasilevsky had taken the position he should have. He could have taken a different position. . . . but he didn't do that, and as a result, in my view, he had a hand in the destruction of thousands of Red Army fighters in the Kharkov campaign."

In June 1942, Vasilevsky was briefly sent to Leningrad to coordinate an attempt to break the encirclement of the 2nd Shock Army led by General Vlasov. On June 26, 1942 Vasilevsky was appointed Chief of the General Staff, and, in October 1942, Deputy Minister of Defense.He was now one of the few people responsible for the global planning of Soviet offensives. Starting from July 23, 1942, Vasilevsky was a STAVKA representative on the Stalingrad front, which he correctly anticipated as the main axis of attack.

The battle of Stalingrad was another difficult period in Vasilevsky's life. Sent with Zhukov to the Stalingrad Front, he tried to coordinate the defenses of Stalingrad with radio links working intermittently, at best.On September 12, 1942, during a meeting with Stalin, Vasilevsky and Zhukov presented their plan for the Stalingrad counteroffensive after an all-night brainstorming session.Two months later, on November 19, with Stalingrad still unconquered, Operation Uranus was launched. Since Zhukov had been sent to near Rzhev to execute Operation Mars (the Rzhev counteroffensive), Vasilevsky remained near Stalingrad to coordinate the double-pincer attack that ultimately led to the German defeat and annihilation of the armies entrapped in the cauldron, all a result of the plan he had presented to Stalin on December 9.This plan sparked some debate between Vasilevsky and Rokossovsky, who wanted an additional army for clearing Stalingrad, which Rokossovsky continued to mention to Vasilevsky even years after the war. The army in question was Rodion Malinovsky's 2nd Guards' which Vasilievsky committed against a dangerous German counter-attack launched from Kotelnikovo by the 57th Panzer corps and designed to deblockade the Stalingrad pocket. This attack, hitherto, had enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority.

Soviet victory

In January 1943, Vasilevsky coordinated the offensives on the upper Don near Voronezh and Ostrogozhsk, leading to decisive encirclements of several Axis divisions.[39][62] In mid-January, Vasilevsky was promoted to General of the Army and only 29 days later, on February 16, 1943, to Marshal of the Soviet Union.

In March 1943, after the creation of the Kursk salient and the failure of the third battle of Kharkov, Stalin and the STAVKA had to decide whether the offensive should be resumed despite this setback, or whether it was better to adopt a defensive stance. Vasilevsky and Zhukov managed to persuade Stalin that it was necessary to halt the offensive for now, and wait for the initiative from the Wehrmacht. When it became clear that the supposed German offensive was postponed and would no longer take place in May 1943 as expected, Vasilevsky successfully defended continuing to wait for the Wehrmacht to attack, rather than making a preemptive strike as Khrushchev wanted.When the Battle of Kursk finally started on July 4, 1943, Vasilevsky was responsible for the coordination of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts. After the German failure at Kursk and the start of the general counteroffensive on the left bank of the Dnieper, Vasilevsky planned and executed offensive operations in the Donbass region.Later that year, he developed and executed the clearing of Nazi forces from Crimea.

At the beginning of 1944, Vasilevsky coordinated the Soviet offensive on the right bank of the Dnieper, leading to a decisive victory in eastern Ukraine. On April 10, 1944, the day Odessa was retaken, Vasilevsky was presented with the Order of Victory, only the second ever awarded (the first having been awarded to Zhukov).Vasilevsky's car rolled over a mine during an inspection of Sevastopol after the fighting ended on May 10, 1944. He received a head wound, cut by flying glass, and was evacuated to Moscow for recovery.

During Operation Bagration, the general counteroffensive in Belarus, Vasilevsky coordinated the offensives of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. When Soviet forces entered the Baltic states, Vasilevsky assumed complete responsibility for all the Baltic fronts, discarding the 3rd Belorussian.On July 29, 1944, he was made Hero of the Soviet Union for his military successes.In February 1945, Vasilevsky was again appointed commander of 3rd Belorussian Front to lead the East Prussian Operation, leaving the post of General Chief of Staff to Aleksei Antonov. As a front commander, Vasilevsky led the East Prussian operation and organized the assaults on Königsberg and Pillau. He also negotiated the surrender of the Königsberg garrison with its commander, Otto Lasch. After the war, Lasch claimed that Vasilevsky did not respect the guarantees made during the city's capitulation. Indeed, Vasilevsky promised that German soldiers would not be executed, that prisoners, civilians and wounded would be treated decently, and that all prisoners would return to Germany after the end of the war. Instead, Lasch remained in prison for 10 years and returned to Germany only in 1955, as did many of the Wehrmacht soldiers and officers, while all German population was expelled from Eastern Prussia.For the brilliant successes at Königsberg and in Eastern Prussia, Vasilevsky was awarded his second Order of Victory.

Operation August Storm

Vasilevsky in Port Arthur, China, 1945

During the 1944 summer offensive, Stalin announced that he would appoint Vasilevsky Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East once the war against Germany was over. Vasilevsky started drafting the war plan for Japan by late 1944 and began full-time preparation by April 27, 1945. In June 1945, Stalin approved his plan. Vasilevsky then received the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East and flew to Chita to execute the plan.

During the preparation phase, Vasilevsky further rehearsed the offensive with his army commanders and directed its start. In twenty-four days, from August 9 to September 2, 1945, the Japanese armies in Manchukuo were defeated, with just 37,000 casualties out of 1,600,000 troops on the Soviet side. For his success in this operation, Vasilevsky was awarded his second Hero of the Soviet Union decoration on September 8.

Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin (Russian: ??????? ????????? ???????) (December 16, 1901, Voronezh Province (now in Kursk Province), Russian Empire - April 14, 1944, Kiev, Soviet Union (now Ukraine) was a Soviet military commander of World War II.

A talented and inspired but unseasoned general, Vatutin made several mistakes by the time of the German invasion to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he learned from his mistakes and crushed the Wehrmacht in some of the most crucial battles of the war.

In 1939, he planned operations for Soviet partition of Poland with Nazi Germany and served as Chief of Staff of the Red Army Southern Group. Under command of Georgy Zhukov in 1940, this group seized Bessarabia from Romania. As an award for these non combat campaigns, Stalin promoted Vatutin in 1940 to Lieutenant General and appointed him to a the critical position of the Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. Vatutin obviously was not up to his new appointment. While open to innovations and a hard worker, he lacked any combat experience and his knowledge of operational art and strategy were too abstract. Still, his peasant beginning, relative youth, and, most importantly, his party zeal made him one of Stalin's few favorites in the Soviet military. Vatutin, together with the rest of the Red Army high brass, failed to prepare the army for the German attack of June 22, 1941.

On June 30, 1941, he was appointed Chief of Staff of Northwestern Front (see: Soviet Fronts in WWII) and showed his better qualities. What he lacked in generalship, he compensated for by his leadership. He had strong will and was optimistic; his treatment of his subordinates was always positive, and they sincerely admired him. Always modest, Vatutin did not try to claim success for himself in the battles, but was happy to discern and promote others' talent. Another remarkable quality was his audacity. At that stage of war, most of the Soviet generals, shattered by the defeats, were shy to carry out offensive operations. Vatutin thrived on attack.

The Battles in the North

The Northwestern Front was defending approaches to Leningrad against German Army Group North spearheaded by armored corps lead by Erich von Manstein. Vatutin took command of the Soviet forces near Novgorod and rallied them for offense, trying to encircle a large German force. He surprised Manstein, put him on the defensive, and forced the entire German Army Group North to regroup its troops to halt the Soviet offensive. The Wehrmacht lost the precious summer season needed for an effective attack on Leningrad, while the Red Army got additional time to strengthen the fortifications of the city. Thanks to Vatutin's actions, the Germans lost their best shot and never were able to capture Leningrad, one of the key strategic failures of the early war. Vatutin's immediate operational results were far less impressive. Vatutin overestimated the capacities of his troops, and his objectives were too ambitious while his coordination of his forces and control over unfolding of the battle were poor. He also did not take into consideration the difficult terrain which benefited German defenses and slowed his attack. Vatutin's losses of personnel were staggering, reaching in one army nearly 60%. The low quality of his subordinate commanders exacerbated Vatutin's own shortcomings. There was one striking exception: the brilliant actions of Ivan Chernyakhovsky, then an obscure young Colonel in command of 28th tank division. The men had much in common, most prominently their penchant for unorthodox approach to military art; they became close friends.

In January 1942, during the Soviet Winter offense following the Red Army victory in the Battle of Moscow, Vatutin trapped two German corps in Demyansk, and achieved the first large Soviet encirclement of German forces. The German corps was equal in size to the Soviet field army. During the battle, Vatutin employed some innovative tactics and actions, while Germans responded more conventionally. Vatutin was unable to destroy the pocket--mainly because of the weakness of the Soviet air-force. In April 1942 Vatutin finally breached the German defense, just as German relief force reached the pocket. Post-WWII American experts evaluate the result of this operation as a draw. The German command drew self-congratulatory and misleading lessons from their narrow escape, concluding that they could overcome Soviet encirclements with supplies from the air while mounting a relief operation. This thinking contributed to the Wehrmacht disaster in at Stalingrad.

Voronezh and Stalingrad

From early May to July 1942, Vatutin served briefly as deputy of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army until German Army Group South embarked on its huge strategic offense, "Operation Blau." Initially, the German assault focused on Voronezh; they wanted to breach the Soviet front line at the Battle of Voronezh and then to attack the Soviet Southern Front and Southwestern Front from the rear and encircle them. On July 1, 1942, Stalin sent Vatutin, as an all-powerful Stavka representative, to the critical Bryansk Front, which within a few days was renamed the Voronezh Front and placed under Vatutin's command.

During the battle, Vatutin met Cherniakhovsky—-now the newly appointed commander of the 18th Tank Corps of the 60th Army--again. The German massive attack was on the verge of breaching the Soviet front line when Cherniakhovsky's corps arrived by train. Cherniakhovsky unloaded one of his brigades and, without waiting for the rest of his troops, led this brigade against the numerically superior German forces and threw them back. After this action, Vatutin asked Stalin to give command of the 60th army to Cherniakhovsky. At first, Stalin opposed the request. Cherniakhovsky was Jewish, which made Stalin paranoid; Stalin also had professional reservations about appointing such a young General to lead a field army. This opposition did not deter Vatutin, and he convinced Stalin to promote Cherniakhovsky, who would rapidly rise to become one of the major Red Army field commanders.

Although the Germans captured the city, their attempt to breach Vatutin's front line failed. Following this debacle, the Germans abandoned their initial plan, and in one fateful misjudgment, shifted their efforts toward Stalingrad. On October 22, 1942, Vatutin received command of the newly formed Southwestern Front and played an important role in planning the Soviet counteroffensive and following encirclement of the 6th German Army in the Battle of Stalingrad. To secure the Soviet ring around Stalingrad in December 1942, Vatutin encircled and destroyed two thirds of the 130,000-strong Italian VII Army in operation Little Saturn, contributing to the defeat of Manstein's Operation Wintergewitter ("Winter Storm"), the relief effort for the 6th Army.

Kharkov and Kursk

In January 1943, Vatutin relentlessly drove Germans from the Eastern Ukraine. His offense enabled the Voronezh Front under General Filipp Golikov to capture Kharkov, but he overextended his depleted troops and did not pay enough attention to the changing intelligence situation. In February 1943, Manstein mustered a large force, surprised and defeated Vatutin south of Kharkov, encircled Golikov's advance troops in Kharkov, and recaptured the city. Stavka removed Golikov from his command, but did not see Vatutin's debacle as significant, and Stalin rewarded Vatutin for audacity with the rank of Army General.

On March 28, 1943, Vatutin took command over Voronezh Front, preparing for the momentous Battle of Kursk. Starting with this battle, Vatutin achieved marked superiority in generalship over Manstein because of his innovative approaches to operational and tactical techniques. In the battle of Kursk, he rejected conventional echeloning of armies; his innovative deployment allowed him not only to skilfully conduct defense against the technically superior Germans but also to quickly switch from defense to offense. Following the Soviet victory at Kursk, Vatutin surprised Manstein who believed that the Red Army was too weak to go on the offense, and captured Belgorod.

Victories in Ukraine

His next target was Kiev. On October 20, the Voronezh Front was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Front. Vatutin undertook a secret regrouping under an imaginative and deceptive plan. His forces surprised Manstein, attacking the Germans from an unexpected direction, and on November 6, 1943, he liberated Kiev. Vatutin relentlessly exploited his victory in Kiev, and pushed deep into the German defenses. When Vatutin overextended his armies, Manstein thought that he could repeat his February success at Kharkov. His strategy lacked any originality, and Vatutin easily defeated his attempt of encirclement and inflicted a terrible toll on Wehrmacht. Manstein, in frustration, unleashed several offensives against Vatutin's forces, trying to turn his flanks, but failing. On December 19, 1943, Manstein thought he achieved a great success, encircling and destroying what he believed were four Soviet corps along the Korosten-Kiev rail line. His jubilation was short lived because, in fact, he attacked Vatutin's deception force. While Manstein was fighting Vatutin's decoys, Vatutin assembled a powerful striking force on another section of the front and, on Christmas 1943, launched a massive assault on the Germans and drove them further westward.

His offense created the Korsun bulge with a large number of German troops. In January, Vatutin and 2nd Ukrainian Front of Army General Ivan Konev carried out an encirclement of the Korsun salient in Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Once again, Vatutin outclassed Manstein. Although Vatutin started the operation two days after Konev and his striking formation, the 6th tank army, was newly formed and incomplete, he achieved surprise by committing the it to the battle from the first echelon. This allowed the 6th tank army to penetrate deep German defenses and, on February 3, it linked with the advancing armor of Konev's front and trapped, in a pocket, 56,000 Germans troops. By February 17, Vatutin and Konev eliminated the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket.

On February 28, 1944, Vatutin, conducting a complex regrouping for a new operation, was ambushed by Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) insurgents far behind front lines. He died of his wounds in hospital six weeks later. Vatutin's brothers, Afanasy Fyodorovich and Semyon Fyodorovich, were killed in action in February and March of 1944; mother, Vera Yefimovna, buried her three sons in two months. [1] Nikolai Vatutin was given a state funeral in Kiev, command of his Front passed to Georgy Zhukov.

His influence on the Red Army strategic planning, operational, and technical techniques continued after his death. Following the post-Cold War decline in Germanocentric analyses of the Great Patriotic War Eastern Front, Vatutin has won recognition among Western military experts as one of WWII's most creative commanders.

Ivan Stepanovich Konev (Russian ???? ?????????? ?????) (December 28, 1897 – May 21, 1973), Soviet military commander, was born into a peasant family near Podosinovsky in central Russia (now in Kirov Oblast). He had little formal education, and worked as a lumberjack before being conscripted into the Russian Army in 1916.

When the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917 he was demobilised and returned home, but in 1919 he joined the Bolshevik party and the Red Army, serving as an artilleryman. During the Russian Civil War he served with the Red Army in the Russian Far Eastern Republic. His commander at this time was Kliment Voroshilov, later a close colleague of Joseph Stalin and Commissar for Defence. This alliance was the key to Konev's subsequent career.

In 1926 Konev completed advanced officer training courses at the Frunze Military Academy, and between then and 1931 he held a series of progressively more senior commands, becoming head of first the Transbaikal then the North Caucasus Military Districts. In July 1938 he was appointed a corps commander. Promotion at this time was rapid for those officers who survived Stalin's Great Purge of 1937-38. Konev presumably owed his survival and advancement to Voroshilov's patronage. In 1937 he became a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet and in 1939 a candidate member of the Party Central Committee.

When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Konev took command of the 19th Army in the Vitebsk region, and waged a series of defensive battles during the Red Army's retreat, first to Smolensk and then to the approaches to Moscow. He commanded the Kalinin Front from October 1941 to August 1942, playing a key role in the fighting around Moscow and the Soviet counter-offensive during the winter of 1941-42. For his role in the successful defence of the Soviet capital Konev was promoted to Colonel-General.

Konev held high commands for the rest of the war. He commanded the Soviet Western Front until February 1943, the North Western Front February-July 1943, and the Ukrainian Front (later renamed the First Ukrainian Front) from July 1943 until May 1945. During this latter command he participated in the Battle of Kursk, commanding the southern part of the Soviet counter-offensive that successfully enveloped Erich von Manstein's army.

After the victory at Kursk, Konev's armies liberated Belgorod, Odessa, Kharkov and Kiev from the Germans, and advanced to the Romanian border. For his achievements on the Ukrainian Front Konev was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in February 1944.

During 1944 Konev's armies advanced from Ukraine and Byelorussia into Poland and later into Czechoslovakia. By July he had advanced to the Vistula River in central Poland, and was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In September 1944 his forces, now designated the Fourth Ukrainian Front, advanced into Slovakia and helped the Slovak partisans in their rising against German occupation.

In January 1945 Konev, together with Georgy Zhukov, commanded the Soviet forces which launched the massive winter offensive in western Poland, driving the Germans from the Vistula to the Oder river. In southern Poland his forces liberated Kraków. In April his forces, together with the First Byelorussian Front under his competitor, Marshal Georgi Zhukov, forced the line of the Oder and advanced towards Berlin. Konev's forces entered the city, but Stalin gave Zhukov the honor of capturing the Reichstag and hoisting the Soviet flag over Berlin. Konev was ordered to the south-west, where his forces linked up with elements of the United States army at Torgau and also liberated Prague shortly after the official surrender of the German forces.

After the war Konev was appointed head of the Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Germany and also Allied High Commissioner for Austria. In 1946 he became commander of Soviet ground forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, replacing Zhukov. He held these posts until 1950, when he was appointed commander of the Carpathian Military District. This was clearly a demotion, and was in line with Stalin's policy of relegating popular wartime commanders to obscure posts so they would not become threats to his position[citation needed].

After Stalin's death, however, Konev returned to prominence. He became a key ally of the new Party leader, Nikita Khrushchev, being entrusted with the arrest and trial of the Stalinist police chief, Lavrenty Beria in 1953. He was again appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense and commander of Soviet ground forces, posts he held until 1956, when he was named Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. Shortly after his appointment he led the brutal suppression on the Hungarian anti-communist freedom fighters during the Hungarian Revolution. He held this post until 1960, when he retired from active service. In 1961-62, however, he was recalled and was again commander of the Soviet forces in East Germany. He was then appointed to the largely ceremonial post of Inspector-General of the Defense Ministry.

Konev remained one of the Soviet Union's most admired military figures until his death in 1973. He married twice, and his daughter Nataliya is Dean of the Department of Linguistics and Literature at the Russian Military University.

In 1992 his memorial sculpture in Kraków was dismantled. The scuplture was given to Ukraine

Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (Russian: ????? ?????????????? ?????????, Semën Konstantinovič Timošenko,; February 18 [O.S. February 6] 1895 – March 31, 1970) was a Soviet military commander and senior professional officer of the Red Army at the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

Timoshenko was born into a peasant family at Furmanca (Furmanka), in the Southern Bessarabia, Odessa region Ukraine now. In 1915, he was drafted into the army of the Russian Empire and served as a cavalryman on the western front. On the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917, he sided with the revolutionaries, joining the Red Army in 1918 and the Bolshevik Party in 1919.

During the Russian Civil War, Timoshenko fought on various fronts. His most important encounter occurred at Tsaritsyn (later renamed Stalingrad), where he met and befriended Joseph Stalin. This would ensure his rapid advancement after Stalin gained control of the Communist Party by the end of the 1920s. In 1920-1921, Timoshenko served under Semyon Budyonny in the 1st Cavalry Army; he and Budyonny would become the core of the "Cavalry Army clique" which, under Stalin's patronage, would dominate the Red Army for many years.

By the end of the Civil and Polish-Soviet Wars, Timoshenko had become commander of the Red Army cavalry forces. Thereafter, under Stalin, he became Red Army commander in Belarus (1933); in Kiev (1935); in the northern Caucasus and then Kharkov (1937); and Kiev again (1938). In 1939, he was given command of the entire western border region and led the Ukrainian Front during the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland. He also became a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. As a loyal friend, Timoshenko survived Stalin's Great Purge, to be left as the Red Army's senior professional soldier.

In January 1940, Timoshenko took charge of the Soviet armies fighting Finland in the Soviet-Finnish War. This had begun the previous November, under the disastrous command of Kliment Voroshilov. Under Timoshenko's leadership, the Soviets succeeded in breaking through the Finnish Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus, prompting Finland to sue for peace in March. His reputation increased, Timoshenko was made the People's Commissar for Defence and a Marshal of the Soviet Union in May.

Timoshenko was a competent but traditionalist military commander who nonetheless saw the urgent need to modernise the Red Army if, as expected, it was to fight a war against Nazi Germany. Overcoming the opposition of other more conservative leaders, he undertook the mechanisation of the Red Army and the production of more tanks. He also re-introduced much of the traditional harsh discipline of the Tsarist Russian Army.

When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin took over the post of Defence Commissar and sent Timoshenko to the Central Front to conduct a fighting retreat from the border to Smolensk. Huge casualties were suffered, but Timoshenko managed to save the bulk of the army for the defence of Moscow. In September, he was transferred to the Ukraine, where the Red Army had suffered 1.5 million casualties while encircled at Uman and Kiev. Here he succeeded in stabilising the front.

In May 1942, Timoshenko, with 640,000 men, launched a counter-offensive at Kharkov, the first Soviet attempt to gain the initiative in the war. After initial Soviet successes, the Germans struck back at Timoshenko's exposed southern flank, halting the offense. Although Timoshenko's actions slowed the German advance on Stalingrad, he was forced to accept responsibility for failing to drive back the German forces.

General Georgy Zhukov's success in defending Moscow during December 1941 had persuaded Stalin that he was a better commander than Timoshenko. Stalin removed Timoshenko from front-line command, giving him roles as overall commander of the Stalingrad (June 1942), then North-Western (October 1942), Leningrad (June 1943), Caucasus (June 1944) and Baltic (August 1944) fronts.

After the war, Timoshenko was reappointed Soviet Army commander in Belarus (March 1946), then of the southern Urals (June 1946); and then Belarus again (March 1949). In 1960, he was appointed Inspector-General of the Defence Ministry, a largely honorary post. From 1961 he chaired the State Committee for War Veterans. He died in Moscow in 1970.

Timoshenko was twice a Hero of the Soviet Union, in March 1940 and 1965. Amongst his other orders were the highest Order of Victory (1945), five times Order of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, five times Order of the Red Banner and three times Order of Suvorov.

Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov (Russian: ??????? ??????????? ????????) (July 24, 1904–December 6, 1974) was a Soviet naval officer and People's Commissar of the Navy during World War II.

The Second World War

Kuznetsov played a uniquely crucial role during the first hours of the war - at this pivotal moment, his resolve and blatant disregard for orders averted the destruction of the Soviet Navy. By the June 21, 1941, Kuznetzov was convinced of the inevitability of war with Nazi Germany. On the same day Timoshenko and Zhukov issued a directive prohibiting Soviet commanders from responding to "German provocations." The Navy, however, constituted a distinct ministry (narkomat), and thus Kuznetsov held a position which was technically outside of the direct chain of command. The admiral utilized this fact in a very bold move.

Shortly after midnight on the morning of June 22, Kuznetsov ordered all Soviet fleets to battle readiness. At 4.45 that same morning, the Wehrmacht began operation Barbarossa. The Soviet Navy was the only branch of the military prepared to resist the initial German push, meeting the attack with tremendous resistance and losing neither a single ship nor a single plane.

In the following two years, Kuznetsov's primary concern was the protection of the Caucusus from a German invasion. Throughout the war, the Black Sea remained the primary theater of operations for the Soviet navy. During the war years Kuznetsov honed Soviet methods of amphibious assault. In February 1944 he was given the rank of Admiral of the Fleet - a newly created station initially equated to a four-star general. In the same year, Kuznetsov was given the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. His rank was equated to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union with a similar insignia on May 31, 1945.

POLAND

Edward Rydz-Śmigły Coat of arms of Ryc, (March 11, 1886 - December 2, 1941); nom de guerre Śmigły, Tarłowski, Adam Zawisza) was a Polish politician, an officer of the Polish Army, painter and poet. After many successes as an army commander during the Polish-Bolshevik War, Rydz succeeded Józef Piłsudski as the Marshal of Poland (from 11 November 1936) and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish armed forces. He served in that post during the invasion of Poland, which was the first stage of the Second World War.

Military triumphs

During the Polish-Bolshevik War (1919 - 1921), Rydz commanded Polish armies in several offensives. Among victorious engagements, he captured Wilno and Dünaburg. After that he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Latvian armed forces and liberated Livonia from Red Army oppression. Subsequently, he completely annihilated the Red Army's 12th Division and took Kiev. He then commanded the Central Front of Polish forces during the Battle of Warsaw, known as the Miracle on the Vistula. In this decisive battle, Polish commander Piłsudski outwitted the Soviet commander Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Rydz-Śmigły's Central Front held against the Soviet attack and later blocked the escape routes for the defeated Soviet 4th and 15th Armies and the 3rd Cavalry Corps of Soviet General Gay Dimitrievich Gay, which had to fly ungloriously to East Prussia, where they were interned by the Germans.

Second Man in the State

After the 1919-21 war he was appointed the Inspector-General of the Polish Army in the Vilna district and later in Warsaw. In 1926, during Piłsudski's coup d´état (the May Coup), he took the Marshal's side and sent troops from Wilno to reinforce anti-government troops in Warsaw. Piłsudski never forgot this fidelity and in 1929 Rydz was appointed as the Marshal's deputy on all matters concerning the East. On May 13, 1935, in accordance with the last wishes of Józef Piłsudski, Rydz was nominated by the president and the government of Poland to serve in the capacity of the Inspector-General of the Polish Armed Forces and on November 10, 1936 he was elevated to the rank of Marshal of Poland. As such he reversed his name and called himself from now on Śmigły-Rydz.

Rydz-Śmigły promoted to Marshal of Poland.

He was now one of the most powerful people in Poland and was awarded the title of "Second Man in the State after the President", and this image was popularized by the Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego party. The government became increasingly authoritarian and conservative, though Śmigły-Rydz's power was balanced by the more moderate Ignacy Mościcki, who remained President. For a time being Rydz sought an alliance with the liberal Peasants' Party (PSL), but after being rejected by them he turned to the extreme right wing. After 1938 he reconciled himself with the President, but the ruling clique was henceforth divided into the "President's Men" (or "Castle Group") — most of them civilians — and the "Marshal's Men," mostly old comrades of Piłsudski and professional officers.

1939

In March 1939, Hitler occupied Bohemia and Moravia and created the satellite client-state of Slovakia. This encircled Poland with an iron ring on all sides except the east. Rydz was the only member of the government who clearly saw the impending danger of a conflict with Germany. However, time remaining was too short for the creation of completely new Polish operation plans in the west. During negotiations in Moscow during August of 1939, Rydz refused all attempts by the Western Powers to obtain Polish permission for the Red Army to march westward, stating: "there is no guarantee that the Soviets will really take active part in the war; furthermore, once having entered Polish territory, they will never leave it".

On 1 September 1939 when the Germans invaded Poland, Śmigły-Rydz was named Commander-in-Chief of Polish forces. On 7th September, along with most of the government, he evacuated Warsaw as it came under attack. Soon afterwards, Polish coordination began to suffer from communications problems, which impaired Rydz's ability to command the forces. In Brest (Brześć) on 11 September he ordered that the Polish capital be defended at all costs. In his plan, Warsaw and the nearby Modlin Fortress were to become two redoubt citadels in central Poland, fighting on for months, while the bulk of Polish forces were to defend the Romanian bridgehead and await the counterattack promised by Poland's French and British allies. Unknown to Śmigły-Rydz, the Western Allies had no such plans and expected Poland's fall. His plan was further crippled when Soviet forces attacked Poland from the east on 17th September. Realizing that defence against both neighbours was impossible, Śmigły-Rydz issued orders for Polish forces to retreat towards Romania and avoid fighting the Soviet aggressors.

After avoiding capture by Soviet and German troops, on September 18, 1939 Śmigły-Rydz, crossed the Romanian border and was interned. The Polish government’s crossing into Romania saved Poland from surrender and allowed Polish soldiers to carry on fighting against Nazi Germany, though Rydz's crossing sparked some controversy, considering his position as supreme commander of the armed forces. Large numbers of Polish soldiers and airmen crossed southern Europe and regrouped in France, and after her surrender, in Britain.

Władysław Eugeniusz Sikorski (May 20, 1881 – July 4, 1943; was a Polish military and political leader. He was born in the southern Polish town of Tuszów Narodowy, which at the time was part of Austria-Hungary, one of Poland's three partitioners. Before World War I, he became a founder and member of several underground organizations that promoted the cause of Polish independence. He fought with distinction in the Polish Legions during the First World War, then in the newly-created Polish Army during the Polish-Soviet War (1919 to 1921). In the latter war he played a prominent role in the decisive Battle of Warsaw, when Soviet forces, expecting an easy final victory, were surprised and crippled by the Polish counterattack.

During World War II he became Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, and a staunch advocate of the Polish cause on the diplomatic scene. He supported the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, which had been severed after the Soviet alliance with Germany in the 1939 invasion of Poland. In April 1943, however, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin broke off Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations following Sikorski's request that the International Red Cross investigate the Katyń massacre. In July 1943, Sikorski was killed in a plane crash into the sea immediately on takeoff from Gibraltar. The exact circumstances of his death remain in dispute, which has given rise to ongoing conspiracy theories.

When Poland was invaded by Germany in September 1939, Sikorski was refused a military command by the Polish Commander in Chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły. Sikorski escaped through Romania to Paris, where on September 28 he joined Władysław Raczkiewicz and Stanisław Mikołajczyk in a Polish government-in-exile, becoming from September 30 the most successful, credible, and famous of the Polish prime ministers in exile. He preserved the continuity of his country’s government and was respected and recognized by the population of occupied Poland. During his years as prime minister in exile, Sikorski personified the hopes and dreams of millions of Poles, as reflected in the saying, "When the sun is higher, Sikorski is nearer" (Polish: "Gdy słoneczko wyżej, to Sikorski bliżej"). On November 7 he became Commander in Chief and General Inspector of the Armed Forces (Naczelny Wódz i Generalny Inspektor Sił Zbrojnych).

His government was recognized by the western Allies, as Poland, even with its territories occupied, still commanded substantial armed forces: the Polish Navy had sailed to Britain, and many thousands of Polish troops had escaped via Romania and Hungary or across the Baltic Sea. Those routes would be used until the end of the war by both interned soldiers and volunteers from Poland, who jocularly called themselves "Sikorski's tourists" and embarked on their dangerous journeys, braving death or imprisonment in concentration camps if caught by the Germans or their allies. With the steady flow of recruits, the new Polish Army was soon reassembled in France and in French-mandated Syria. In 1940 the Polish Highland Brigade took part in the Battle of Narvik (Norway), and two Polish divisions participated in the defense of France, while a Polish motorized brigade and two infantry divisions were in process of forming. A Polish Independent Carpathian Brigade was created in French-mandated Syria, to which many Polish troops had escaped from Romania. The Polish Air Force in France comprised 86 aircraft in four squadrons. One and a half of the squadrons were fully operational, while the rest were in various stages of training. At that time Poland was the third most powerful Ally, with some 84,000 soldiers in France alone.

Although many Polish personnel had died in the fighting or had been interned in Switzerland following the fall of France, General Sikorski refused French Marshal Philippe Pétains proposal of capitulation to Germany.On June 19, 1940, Sikorski met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and promised that Polish forces would fight alongside the British until final victory.Sikorski and his government moved to London and were able to evacuate many Polish troops to Britain. After the signing of a Polish-British Military Agreement on August 5, 1940, they proceeded to build up and train the Polish Armed Forces.Experienced Polish pilots took part in the Battle of Britain, where the Polish 303 Fighter Squadron achieved the highest number of kills of any Allied squadron. After the creation of the pro-German Vichy government in France and the ensuing split of French forces, the Polish Army in the United Kingdom and the Middle East became the second largest Allied army after that of the United Kingdom.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union ("Operation Barbarossa") in June 1941, General Sikorski was among the first to realize that the complexion of the war had drastically changed. Strongly encouraged by British Foreign Office diplomat Anthony Eden, Sikorski on July 30, 1941, opened negotiations with the Soviet ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky, to re-establish diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, which had been broken off after the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939. Later that year, Sikorski went to Moscow with a diplomatic mission (including the future Polish ambassador to Moscow, Stanisław Kot, and chief of the Polish Military Mission in the Soviet Union, General Zygmunt Szyszko-Bohusz). Sikorski was the architect of the agreement reached by the Polish Government with the Soviet Union (the Sikorski-Maisky Pact of August 17, 1941), confirmed by Joseph Stalin in December of that year. Stalin agreed to invalidate the September 1939 Soviet-German partition of Poland, declare the Russo-German Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 null and void, and release tens of thousands of Polish prisoners-of-war held in Soviet camps. Pursuant to an agreement between the Polish government-in-exile and Stalin, the Soviets granted "amnesty" to many Polish citizens, from whom a 75,000-strong army (the Polish II Corps) was formed under General Władysław Anders and later evacuated to the Middle East, where Britain faced a dire shortage of military forces.The whereabouts of thousands more Polish officers, however, would remain unknown for two more years, and this would weigh heavily on both Polish-Soviet relations and on Sikorski's fate.

Nonetheless, it soon became clear to Sikorski that the Soviet Union still had post-war plans for Polish territories, involving concessions to which he had no mandate from his nation to accede. The Soviets began their diplomatic offensive after their first major military victory in the Battle of Moscow. In January 1942 the Soviets through diplomatic channels revealed their claims to the city of Lvov. On January 26 British diplomat Stafford Cripps informed General Sikorski that, from what he had privately learned in Moscow, Stalin planned to annex Germany’s East Prussia to Poland in the west, but also to considerably push westward Poland’s eastern frontier, along the lines of the Versailles concept of the Curzon Line. Sikorski commented: "In short, to push Poland over from east to west.... But that cannot be done without Polish consent." Sikorski insisted that there could be no question of Poland emerging from the war with territorial losses: "The principles of the Atlantic Charter and the terms of the Treaty of Riga alone may determine the eastern frontiers of Poland." His unyielding stance soon proved to be an increasing hindrance not only in Polish-Soviet relations, but also for the British-American-Soviet alliance. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt were increasingly torn among their commitments to their Polish ally, the uncompromising stance of Sikorski, and the demands — often verging on political extortion — by Stalin and his diplomats. Soviet intentions were made clear in a comment by Ambassador Ivan Maisky to Churchill, that Poland's fate was sealed as "a country of 20 millions next door to a country of 200 millions."

Katyn

In 1943 the fragile relations between the Soviet Union and the Polish government-in-exile finally reached their breaking point when, on April 13, the Germans announced the discovery of the bodies of 4,000 Polish officers who had been murdered by the Soviets and buried in Katyn Forest, near Smolensk, Russia. Stalin claimed that the atrocity had been carried out by the Germans>, while Nazi propaganda orchestrated by Joseph Goebbels successfully exploited the Katyn massacre to drive a wedge between Poland, the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union/Russia did not acknowledge its responsibility for this and similar massacres of Polish officers until the 1990s.

When Sikorski refused to accept the Soviet explanation and requested an investigation by the International Red Cross on April 16, the Soviets accused the government-in-exile of cooperating with Nazi Germany and broke off diplomatic relations on April 26. With the action, the intentions of the Soviet Union had at last become clear: it wanted the Baltic states, which Poland had always considered as lying within her own sphere of interest; and moreoever it wanted to establish the Curzon Line border, which the government-in-exile (and least of all General Sikorski) would never accept, as it would mean the loss of about a third of Poland's territory.

The Soviets were able to sever relations with the Polish government-in-exile by exploiting controversy over an atrocity which they had themselves committed against Polish forces. They were also able to clear the way for a postwar communist-sponsored Polish government (PKWN) which would yield compliantly to Soviet demands. Stalin soon began a campaign for recognition by the Western Allies of a Soviet-backed Polish government led by Wanda Wasilewska, a dedicated communist with a seat in the Supreme Soviet, with General Zygmunt Berling, commander of the 1st Polish Army in Russia, as commander-in-chief of all Polish armed forces.

Death

On July 4, 1943, while Sikorski was returning from an inspection of Polish forces deployed in the Middle East, he was killed, together with his daughter, his Chief of Staff, Tadeusz Klimecki, and seven others, when his plane, the Liberator II, serial AL523, crashed into the sea 16 seconds after takeoff from Gibraltar at 23:07 hours. He was buried in Newark-on-Trent, near Nottingham, England. On September 17, 1993, his remains were transferred to the royal crypts at Wawel Castle in Kraków, Poland.

General Count Tadeusz Komorowski (Korczak Coat of Arms) (June 1, 1895 - August 24, 1966), better known by the name Bór-Komorowski (after one of his wartime code-names: Bór) was a Polish military leader.

Komorowski was born in Lwów, Austria-Hungary (now L'viv, Ukraine). In the First World War he served as an officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army, and after the war became an officer in the Polish Army, rising to command the Grudziadz Cavalry School.

After taking part in the fighting against the German invaders of Poland at the beginning of World War II in 1939, Komorowski functioned as one of the organisers of the Polish underground in the Kraków area, with the code-name Bór. In July 1941 he became deputy commander of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa or AK), and in March 1943 gained appointment as its commander, with the rank of Brigadier-General.

In mid 1944, as Soviet forces advanced into central Poland, the Polish government-in-exile in London instructed Bór-Komorowski to prepare for an armed uprising in Warsaw. The government-in-exile wished to return to a capital city liberated by Poles and not by the Soviets, and to prevent the Communist take-over of Poland which Stalin had clearly set in train.

The Warsaw Rising began on 1 August 1944, and the insurgents of the AK seized control of most of central Warsaw. Elements of the Soviet Army stood only 20 km away but on Stalin's orders gave no assistance: Stalin described the rising as a "criminal adventure." The British managed to drop some supplies by air but could give no direct assistance. The Germans employed large forces of SS and regular troops, plus auxiliary forces made up of Soviet Army deserters, who acted particularly brutal, under the command of Erich von dem Bach.

After two months of fierce fighting Bór-Komorowski surrendered to the Germans on October 2, on condition that Germany treat the AK fighters as prisoners-of-war, which they did. Bór-Komorowski went into internment in Germany (at Oflag IV-C). Liberated at the end of the war, he spent the rest of his life in London, where he played an active rôle in Polish émigré circles. From 1947 to 1949 he served as Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile, which no longer had diplomatic recognition from most Western European countries. He wrote the story of his experiences in The Secret Army (1951). He died in London aged 71.

FRANCE

Charles André Joseph Marie de Gaulle (22 November 1890 – 9 November 1970), in France commonly referred to as Général de Gaulle, was a French military leader and statesman.

Prior to World War II, he was primarily known as an armoured warfare tactician and an advocate of the concentrated use of armoured and aviation forces. During World War II, he reached the rank of Brigade General and then became the leader of the Free French government-in-exile and an anti-Nazi guerrilla leader. Between 1944 and 1946, following the liberation of France from German occupation, he was head of the French provisional government.

Called to form a government in 1958, he inspired a new constitution and was the Fifth Republic's first president, serving from 1958 to 1969. His political ideology is known as Gaullism, and it has been a major influence in subsequent French politics.

1912–40: Military career

Statue of de Gaulle in uniform, near the Champs-Élysées in Paris. A copy of this statue also strides an intersection in downtown Warsaw, Poland, where he served as a military adviser after World War I.

Young Charles de Gaulle chose a military career and spent four years at Saint-Cyr (the French equivalent of the American West Point or the British Sandhurst). Graduating in 1912, he decided to join an infantry regiment rather than an elite corps.

During World War I, then-Captain de Gaulle was severely wounded in March 1916 at the gruesome Battle of Verdun and left for dead on the battlefield. He was, however, found and taken prisoner by the Germans. He made five unsuccessful escape attempts, and was put in solitary confinement at Ingolstadt fortress, a retaliation camp, where he encountered another incorrigible — Russian Lieutenant Mikhail Tukhachevsky.

When World War I ended, de Gaulle remained in the military, serving on the staffs successively of Generals Maxime Weygand and Philippe Pétain. During the Polish-Soviet war (1919-1921), he volunteered to be a member of the French Military Mission to Poland and was an infantry instructor with the Polish Army. He distinguished himself in operations near the River Zbrucz and won the highest Polish military decoration, the Virtuti Militari.

He was promoted to Commandant and offered a further career in Poland, but chose instead to return to France, where he served as a staff officer and also taught at the École Militaire, becoming a protégé of his old commander, Pétain. De Gaulle was heavily influenced by the Polish-Soviet War — by the use of tanks, rapid maneuvers and limited trench warfare. He would also adopt some lessons, for his own military and political career, from Poland's Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who, decades before de Gaulle, sought to create a federation of European states (Międzymorze), retired from active military service and politics, only to return to public service at a time of national crisis, and made no effort to enrich himself through his office.

De Gaulle, based partly on his observations during the war in Poland, so different from the experience of World War I, published books and articles on reorganizing the military, particularly his book, Vers l'Armée de Métier (published in English as The Army of the Future), in which he proposed the formation of a professional mechanized army with specialized armored divisions, in preference to the static theories exemplified by the Maginot Line.

While views similar to de Gaulle's were advanced by Britain's J.F.C. Fuller, Germany's Heinz Guderian, Russia's Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and Poland's General Władysław Sikorski, most of de Gaulle's theories were rejected by other army officers, including his mentor Pétain, and relations between them became strained. French politicians also dismissed de Gaulle's ideas, questioning the political reliability of a professional army — with the notable exception of Paul Reynaud, who would play a major role in de Gaulle's career.

At the outbreak of World War II, de Gaulle was only a colonel, having antagonized the leaders of the military through the 1920s and 1930s with his bold views. After the German breakthrough at Sedan, on 15 May 1940, he was finally given command of the 4th Armoured Division.

On 17 May 1940, de Gaulle attacked the German tank forces at Montcornet. With only 200 French tanks and no air support, the offensive had little impact on the German advance. There was more success on 28 May, when de Gaulle's tanks forced the German infantry to retreat at Caumont. This was one of the few significant French tactical successes against the Germans during the entire military campaign. Prime Minister Paul Reynaud appointed him acting Brigade General (thus his title of général de Gaulle).

On 6 June, Paul Reynaud appointed him undersecretary of state for national defense and war and put him in charge of coordination with the United Kingdom. As a junior member of the French government, he unsuccessfully opposed surrendering, advocating instead that the government remove to North Africa and carry on the war as best it could from France's colonies. He served as a liaison with the British government, and, with Churchill, proposed a political union between France and the United Kingdom on the morning of 16 June in London. The project would have in effect merged France and the United Kingdom into a single country, with a single government and a single army, for the duration of the war. This was a desperate last-minute effort to strengthen the resolve of those members of the French government who were in favor of fighting on.

He took the plane back to Bordeaux (provisional seat of the French government) that same afternoon, but when he arrived in the evening, he learned that Pétain had become premier with the intention of seeking an armistice with Germany.

That day, he made the most important decision in his life and in the modern history of France: he refused to accept French surrender and instead rebelled against the legal (but illegitimate, in his eyes) government of Pétain, calling for the continuation of the war against Hitler's Germany. On the morning of 17 June, with 100,000 gold francs in secret funds given to him the previous night by Paul Reynaud, he fled Bordeaux by plane, narrowly escaping German aircraft, and landed in London that afternoon. De Gaulle rejected French capitulation and set about building a movement which would appeal to overseas French opponents of a separate arrangement with Germany.

1940–45: Free French Forces

General de Gaulle speaking on the BBC during the war.

On 18 June, de Gaulle prepared to speak to the French people, via BBC radio, from London. The British Cabinet attempted to block the speech, but was overruled by Churchill. In France, de Gaulle's Appeal of 18 June could have been heard nationwide in the evening, but in reality very few heard the speech. De Gaulle was not well known even within France at the time, and his speech seemed quixotic, at best. The phrase "France has lost a battle; she has not lost the war," which appeared on posters in Britain at the time, is often incorrectly associated with the BBC broadcast; nevertheless the words aptly capture the spirit of de Gaulle's position.

Only a few people actually heard the speech that night, because the BBC was seldom listened to in France, and millions of French were refugees on the road. However, excerpts of the speech appeared in French newspapers the next day in the (unoccupied) southern part of France, the speech was repeated for several days on the BBC, and de Gaulle spoke again on subsequent nights.

De Gaulle's 22 June speech on the BBC can be heard here in its entirety. Audio excerpts of other speeches, the full texts of the speeches, and reproductions of posters from June 1940 can be found here.

Soon enough, among the chaos and bewilderment in France, the news that a French general was in London, refusing to accept the tide of events and calling for the end of despair and the continuation of war spread by word of mouth. To this day, it remains one of the most famous speeches in French history.

From London, de Gaulle formed and led the Free French movement. Whereas the United States continued to recognise Vichy France, the British government of Winston Churchill supported de Gaulle, initially maintaining relations with the Vichy government, but subsequently recognised the Free French.

On 4 July 1940, a court-martial in Toulouse sentenced de Gaulle in absentia to four years in prison. At a second court-martial on 2 August 1940, de Gaulle was condemned to death for treason against the Vichy regime.

Free French Generals Henri Giraud (left) and Charles de Gaulle sit down after shaking hands in presence of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill (Casablanca Conference, January 14, 1943).

In dealings with his British allies and the United States, de Gaulle insisted at all times on retaining full freedom of action on behalf of France, and he was constantly on the verge of being cut off by the Allies. He harbored a suspicion of the British in particular, believing that they were surreptitiously seeking to steal France's colonial possessions in the Levant. Clementine Churchill, who admired de Gaulle, once cautioned him, "General, you must not hate your friends more than you hate your enemies." De Gaulle himself stated famously, "France has no friends, only interests."

Churchill is often erroneously quoted as having commented, about working with de Gaulle: "Of all the crosses I have had to bear during this war, the heaviest has been the Cross of Lorraine" (in reference to de Gaulle's symbol of Free France). The quip was actually made by Churchill's envoy to France, Major-General Edward Spears.

During one of their tense moments, Churchill is quoted as having addressed de Gaulle, in Franglais: "Si vous ne co-operatez, je vous obliterai!"

Working with the French resistance and supporters in France's colonial African possessions, after the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in November 1942, de Gaulle moved his headquarters to Algiers in May 1943. He became first joint head (with the less resolutely independent Gen. Henri Giraud, the candidate preferred by the USA) and then sole chairman of the Committee of National Liberation.

At the liberation of France following Operation Overlord, he quickly established the authority of the Free French Forces in France, avoiding an Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories. He flew into France from the French colony of Algeria a few days before the liberation of Paris, and drove near the front of the liberating forces into the city alongside Allied officials. De Gaulle made a famous speech emphasizing the role of France's people in her liberation. After his return to Paris, he moved back into his office at the War Ministry, thus proclaiming continuity of the Third Republic and denying the legitimacy of the Vichy regime.

After the war, he served as President of the provisional government from September 1944, but resigned on 20 January 1946, complaining of conflict between the political parties, and disapproving of the draft constitution for the Fourth Republic, which he believed placed too much power in the hands of a parliament with its shifting party alliances.

Maurice Gustave Gamelin (September 20, 1872 - April 18, 1958) was a French general. Gamelin is best remembered for his unsuccessful command of the French military in 1940 and his steadfast defense of republican values.

The generalissimo of the French armed forces in World War II, Gamelin was viewed as a man with significant intellectual ability. He was respected, even in Germany, for his intelligence and "subtle mind". Despite this, and his competent service in World War I, his command of the French armies during the critical days of May 1940 proved to be disastrous. Historian and journalist William L. Shirer presented the view that Gamelin used World War I methods to fight World War II, but with less vigor and slower response.

Maurice Gamelin (left) with General Edward Rydz-Śmigły, future Marshal of Poland; Warsaw, August 1936.

Gamelin served with distinction under Joseph Joffre in World War I. He is often credited with being responsible for devising the outline of the French counter-attack in 1914 which led to victory during the First Battle of the Marne. After the war, he served as a military advisor during the Soviet-Polish War. In 1933, Gamelin rose to command of the French Army and oversaw a modernization and mechanization program, as well as the completion of the Maginot Line defenses. Edouard Daladier supported Gamelin throughout his career due to his refusal to allow politics to play a part in military planning and promotion, and his commitment to the republican model of government.

Gamelin's vision for France's defense was based upon a static defense along the Franco-German border, which was reinforced by the Maginot Line, and an aggressive advance northward into Belgium and the Netherlands to meet the attacking German forces as far removed from French territory as possible. To this advance, known as the Dyle Plan, Gamelin committed much of the motorized forces in the French Army and the entire BEF. The German attack occurred further south than Gamelin had gambled, and the forces he sent into the Low Countries were quickly cut off. This disaster undermined the overall Allied position to such a degree that Britain abandoned the conflict on the continent, the Belgians and Dutch surrendered within weeks, and the French were left with only a rump of their former army to defend their nation. Gamelin was removed from his post on May 18, 1940 by Paul Reynaud, who had replaced Edouard Daladier as Prime Minister earlier in the month.

Gamelin was both preceded and succeeded as generalissimo by Maxime Weygand. During the Vichy regime, Gamelin was arrested and unsuccessfully tried for treason along with other important political and military figures of the Third Republic (Edouard Daladier, Guy La Chambre, Léon Blum and Robert Jacomet) during the Riom Trial. At this trial, Gamelin refused to answer the charges against him, instead maintaining a dignified silence. He was later deported to Germany. After the war he published his memoirs titled Servir ... .

Maxime Weygand (January 21, 1867 - January 28, 1965) was a French military commander in World War I and World War II.

Weygand during World War I

Weygand passed the war of 1914-18 as a Staff Officer. At the outbreak, he satisfied his taste for contact with the troops while spending 26 days with the 5ème Hussards. On 28 August, he became a Lieutenant-Colonel on the staff of Marshall Ferdinand Foch. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1916 and Major General in 1918, serving in the Supreme War Council from 1917. He remained on Foch's staff when the marshall was appointed Supreme Allied Commander. In 1918 he served on the armistice negotiations, and it was Weygand who read out the armistice conditions to the Germans at Compiègne, in the twice infamous railway carriage.

Weygand in World War II

By late May 1940 the military disaster in France after the German invasion was such that the Supreme Commander, Maurice Gamelin, was dismissed, and Weygand recalled from Syria to replace him. Weygand arrived on May 17 and started by cancelling the side counter-offensive ordered by Gamelin, to cut off the enemy armoured columns which had punched through the French front at the Ardennes. Thus he lost 2 crucial days before finally adopting the solution, however obvious, of his predecessor. But it was by then a failed manoeuvre, because during the 48 lost hours, the German infantry had caught up behind their tanks in the breakthrough and had consolidated their gains. Weygand then oversaw the creation of the Weygand line, an early application of the Hedgehog tactic; however, by this point the situation was untenable, with most of the Allied forces trapped in Belgium. After some further vain attempts to contain the enemy offensive he then favoured an armistice with Germany. Like the vast majority of French staff officers and antidreyfusards, Weygand was a monarchist pro-fascist who despised the Third Republic, commonly called by them la gueuse—"the beggar-woman". They were delighted to see her fall.[citation needed]

Under the Vichy Regime

In June, he was appointed to the Bordeaux-Vichy cabinet as Minister for National Defence for three months (June to September 1940), and then Delegate-General to the North African colonies. While there:

He convinced the young officers, tempted to resistance, of the justice of the armistice, by letting them hope for a later resumption of combat.

He deported opponents to terrible concentration camps in Southern Algeria and Morocco. There, he locked up, with the complicity of Admiral Abrial, adversaries of the Vichy regime (Gaullists, Freemasons, communists, etc.), the foreign volunteers of Légion Etrangère, foreign refugees without employment (but legally admitted into France), etc.

He applied Vichy's racist laws against Jews very harshly (see Vichy France). With the complicity of the Recteur (University chancellor) G. Hardy, Weygand instituted, on his own authority, by a mere "note de service n°343QJ" of 30 september 1941, a school "numerus clausus" (quota,) driving out from the colleges and from the primary schools most of the Jewish pupils, including small children aged 5 to 11. Weygand did this without any decree of Marshall Philippe Pétain's, "by analogy," he said, "to the law about Higher Education".

Weygand acquired a reputation as an opponent of collaboration when he protested, in Vichy, against the Protocols of Paris of 28 May 1941 signed by Admiral Darlan, agreements which granted bases to the Axis in Aleppo (Syria), Bizerte and Dakar and envisaged an extensive military collaboration with Axis forces in the event of Allied countermeasures.

Nevertheless the Weygand General Delegation (4th Office) collaborated with Germany by delivering to Rommel's Afrika Korps 1200 French trucks and other French army vehicles (Dankworth contract of 1941), as well as heavy artillery pieces accompanied with 1000 shells per gun.

Weygand was apparently favourable to collaboration with Germany, but with discretion. Additionally, when he opposed German bases in Africa, he did not intend to be neutral or to help the Allied camp. Rather, he only sought to prevent the French from losing prestige with the natives and keep their colonial empire. Nevertheless, since Adolf Hitler wanted full unconditional collaboration, he put pressure on the Vichy government to obtain the dismissal and recall of Weygand in November 1941. One year later, in November 1942, following the Allied invasion of North Africa, Weygand was arrested. He remained in confinement until May 1945, when he fell into the hands of the Americans.

François Darlan (August 7, 1881 – December 24, 1942) was a French naval officer. Darlan rose through the French Navy. He ultimately became Admiral of the Fleet, and was a major figure of the Vichy France regime during World War II.

Darlan was born in Nérac, Lot-et-Garonne, graduating from the École Navale in 1902. During World War I, he commanded an artillery battery. He remained in the French Navy after the war, and was promoted to Rear Admiral in 1929 and Vice Admiral in 1932. Darlan was made an Admiral and Chief of Staff in 1936. In 1939 he was promoted to 'Amiral de la flotte', a rank created only for him, and given command of the entire French Navy.

Vichy government

When Paris was occupied in June 1940, Darlan was one of those who supported the premiere and head of state, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain. Darlan was rewarded by retaining his post as minister of the navy, and he quickly ordered the majority of the fleet to French North Africa. The British feared the French fleet would fall into German hands, so it was destroyed by the Royal Navy at Mers El Kébir on July 3 at the cost of around 1,300 French naval casualties. This act did much to confirm Darlan's Anglophobia,[citation needed] but he still declined to commit the remaining vessels to German control.

In February 1941, Darlan replaced Pierre Laval as Pétain's deputy. He was also named minister for the interior, defence and foreign affairs, making Darlan the de facto head of the Vichy government. In January 1942, Darlan took control of a number of other government posts. Darlan was as much a "collaborator" as Laval was, and Darlan promoted a political alliance between French Vichy Forces and Nazi Germany through Paris Protocols. However, the German government had become suspicious of his opportunism and "malleable loyalties." In April, Darlan was made to surrender the majority of his responsibilities back to Laval, whom the Nazis considered more trustworthy. Darlan retained the post of Commander of the French Armed Forces.

Putsch of November 8

On November 7, just before the beginning of Operation Torch, Darlan went to Algiers to visit his son, who was hospitalised after a severe attack of polio. Darlan did not know that secret agreements had been made in Cherchell on October 23 between Algierian resistance and General Mark Clark of the combined allied command.

Just past noon on November 8, 400 poorly armed French partisans attacked the coastal artillery of Sidi Ferruch and the Vichy XIX Army Corps of Algiers. About 15 hours later, the resistance fighters had neutralized both forces. Under the command of José Aboulker, Henri d'Astier de La Vigerie, and Colonel Jousse, the insurgent force occupied most of the strategic points of Algiers under the cover of darkness (the General Government, Prefecture, Staff headquarters, telephone central, barracks, police headquarters, etc.) and arrested most of the Vichy military and civil officials. One of the civilian groups, cadets of Ben-Aknoun College under the command of a cadet named Pauphilet, succeeded in arresting Darlan and General Juin, chief commandant in North Africa. The attack by French resistance became known as the Putsch of November 8.[citation needed]

After three days of threats and talks, Clark compelled Darlan and Juin to order French forces to cease hostilities on November 10 in Oran and November 11 in Morocco – provided Darlan remained head of a French administration. In return, General Eisenhower acquiesced in Darlan’s self-nomination as High Commissioner of France for North and West Africa on November 14, a move that enraged Charles de Gaulle. On November 27, the remaining French naval vessels were scuttled at Toulon.

For this, Darlan was dismissed from the Vichy government and Vichy Southern France was 'invaded' by the German army in Operation Attila. Most French troops in Africa followed Darlan's lead, but certain elements joined the German forces in Tunisia.

On the afternoon of 24 December 1942, a 20-year-old French monarchist, Fernand Bonnier de La Chapelle, entered Darlan's headquarters in Algiers and shot Darlan twice. Although La Chapelle had been a member of the resistance group led by Henri d'Astier, it is believed he acted alone. Darlan died a few hours later. Darlan was replaced as High Commissioner by another French flag officer, General Henri Giraud. De La Chapelle was executed by firing squad on 26 December.

Darlan was unpopular with the Allies--he was considered pompous, having asked Eisenhower to provide 200 Coldstream Guards and Grenadier Guards as an honor company for the commemoration of Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz--and it was said that "no tears were shed" at his funeral. Unfortunately, his successor Giraud was not very popular either. On 7 November, Giraud asked for Eisenhower's permission to take over command of all Allied forces for Operation Torch. Giraud refused to help the Allies until the operation was successful in Algiers, where Giraud arrived only on 9 November.

Giraud was committed to the Vichy regime. He supported Pétain’s pro-Nazi laws and kept Vichy internees in southern Algeria deportation camps. Giraud later arrested and falsely accused 27 resistance leaders, who had risked their lives in the November 8 putsch, of participation in Darlan's death.

GREECE

Marshal Alexander Papagos (Greek: Αλέξανδρος Παπάγος, December 9, 1883, Athens — October 4, 1955, Athens), was a Greek General who led the Greek Army in the Greco-Italian War and the later stages of the Greek Civil War and became the country's Prime Minister.

Military career

He studied in the Brussels Military Academy and the Cavalry School at Ypres, joining the Hellenic Army in 1906 as a Cavalry 2nd Lieutenant.

In the First Balkan War he served as a junior officer in the General Staff of King Constantine. As a captain, he held successive staff positions as well as taking part in the Siege of Yannina (Ioannina) and fighting in Macedonia from November 1912 until March 1913. He was a confirmed royalist, so in 1917, along with many other officers, he was dismissed from the Army. He was recalled after the return of King Constantine in 1920, when he successfully served as operations officer to the Cavalry Brigade in the Asia Minor Campaign.

In 1923 he was again decommissioned by the Revolution of 1922, but was recalled in 1927 with the grade of Major General. He was promoted to Lieutenant General and later Corps Commander in 1934, Papagos was eventually appointed to higher Army commands. In October 1935, as a Lieutenant General and Chief of the Army, along with the chiefs of the Navy and the Air Force, he helped topple the government of Panagis Tsaldaris and declared the restoration of the monarchy, allowing for the return of King George II. He was appointed Minister of War in the Georgios Kondylis, Konstantinos Demertzis and Ioannis Metaxas governments. From his position, he employed the Army to support[citation needed] Metaxas' declaration of dictatorship in August 4, 1936.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army, General Alexander Papagos was featured on the cover of Time Magazine on December 16th, 1940.

During the next years, as Chief of the General Staff, he actively tried to reorganize and reequip the Army for the oncoming war. With the outbreak of the Greco-Italian War in September 1940, he was named Commander-in-Chief and directed Greek operations against Italy along the Albanian border. After the Italian attack on October 28, his forces managed to halt their advance by November 8 and forced them to withdraw to Albania between November 18 and December 23. The successes of the Greek Army brought him fame and applause, but his conduct of the campaign has recently been criticized[citation needed]. A second Italian offensive during March 9-16 1941 was repulsed. Despite this success, Papagos was forced to maintain the bulk of the Greek Army in Albania, and was unwilling to order a gradual withdrawal to reinforce the north-eastern border as German intervention came closer.

After the German invasion on April 6, 1941, Greek forces in Macedonia fiercely resisted the German offensive, but were outflanked and Papagos endorsed their surrender. Soon after the Army of Epirus capitulated and by April 23 the Greek government was forced to flee to Crete. Papagos remained behind and in July 1943, together with other generals, he was arrested and sent to concentration camps in Germany. In 1945 he was repatriated, rejoined the Army and reached the rank of full General in 1947. On January 29, 1949, he was once again appointed Commander-in-Chief, to defeat the Communists in the Greek Civil War. This he achieved, with extensive American aid, including napalm equipped aircraft[1], and the extensive deployment of Special Forces (LOK), during the Grammos-Vitsi campaign between February to October of that year. As a reward for his services, he was awarded the title of Marshal on October 28, 1949. His is the only one of all Greek career officers, to ever get this title.

He continued to serve in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief until 1951, while Greece was in a state of political instability, with splinter parties and weak politicians unable to provide a firm government.

NETHERLANDS

Henri Gerard Winkelman (August 17, 1876 - December 27, 1952) was a Dutch General best known for his command of the Dutch troops during the German invasion of the Netherlands.

War

Winkelman was appointed as the supreme commander in a period in which the situation wasn't very favourable. Winkelman was convinced that the Dutch defence should be centered on the heart of the country (approximately the area now occupied by the Randstad) and that the focus should be on a defensive war which would last until the Allies were able to repulse the German offensive. The question was if the Dutch should defend along the rivers (Rhine, Meuse, like they had against the French and Spanish in the Napoleonic Wars and Eighty Years' War (and like the Germans did in 1944 against the Allies) or if they should fortify the Veluwe. Because along the rivers there was very few shelter and the Germans would be superior in the air Winkelman choose to fortify the Veluwe.

However when the Germans attacked the Netherlands on May 10th, 1940, they did something Winkelman had not counted on. At first the German Army did what Winkelman expected, apart from the excessive use of paratroopers. They crossed the Dutch border with relative ease, and were stopped near the main Dutch defences. But the German Blitzkrieg tactics, which overwhelmed the Allies proved to be so successful that instead of repulsing the Germans they themselves were repulsed with great speed towards Dunkirk. This, the German bombing of the civilian target Rotterdam and the German threat that the Dutch cities of Amsterdam, the Hague and Utrecht, would suffer the same fate if they did not surrender, caused Winkelman to capitulate.

Karel Willem Frederik Marie Doorman (April 23, 1889, Utrecht – February 28, 1942, Java Sea) was a Schout-bij-nacht (the Dutch equivalent of a Rear Admiral) during World War II.

He was originally a naval aviator in the Royal Netherlands Navy but quickly rose through the ranks to become Schout-bij-nacht in 1940.

In early 1942 he was made commander of the combined American, British, Dutch and Australian (ABDA) fleet in the Dutch East Indies, a force consisting of cruisers and destroyers.

Doorman became a Dutch naval hero because of his supposed last words to the fleet: „Ik val aan, volg mij!” ('I'm attacking, follow me'). In reality, he only issued the command All ships follow me to prevent confusion when the damaged HMS Exeter sailed back to harbour on its own. Doorman just wanted to indicate that his ships should follow him and not the Exeter.

Karel Doorman died when his flagship De Ruyter was struck by a Japanese torpedo and sank during the Battle of the Java Sea. He voluntarily remained with the crippled and wounded who could not abandon ship.

Several ships of the Royal Netherlands Navy have been named Karel Doorman.

YUGOSLAVIA

Josip Broz Tito (Cyrillic: ????? ???? ????, May 7, 1892 (May 25th according to official birth certificate) – May 4, 1980) was the leader of the Second Yugoslavia, which lasted from 1943 until 1991. Tito is best known for organizing the anti-fascist resistance movement known as the Yugoslav Partisans, founding Cominform,[1] along with defying Soviet influence (see Titoism), and founding and promoting the Non-Aligned Movement. He died on May 4, 1980 in Ljubljana.

World War II

On April 6, 1941, German, Italian and Hungarian forces attacked Yugoslavia. The Luftwaffe bombed Belgrade and other major Yugoslav cities. On April 17, representatives of Yugoslavia's various regions signed an armistice with Germany at Belgrade, ending eleven days of resistance against the invading German Wehrmacht.

The Independent State of Croatia was established as a Nazi puppet-state, ruled by the Ustaša, a militant wing of the Croatian Party of Rights, which split off from it in 1929, went into exile in Italy, and was therefore limited in its activities until 1941. German troops occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as part of Serbia and Slovenia, while other parts of the country were occupied by Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy.

Tito did not initially respond to Germany's invasion of Yugoslavia on Stalin's orders because Stalin had signed the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact [source needed]. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941), Tito called (July 4, 1941) a Central committee meeting, was named Military Commander and issued a call to arms and communist revolution. Starting on July 7 in Bela Crkva, Yugoslav partisans began a widespread guerrilla campaign and started liberating chunks of territory. The activities provoked Germans into "retaliation" against civilians that resulted in mass murders (for each killed German soldier, 100 civilians were to be killed and for each wounded, 50). In the liberated territories, the partisans organized people's committees to act as civilian government. Tito was the most prominent leader of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia - AVNOJ, which convened in Bihac on November 26, 1942 and in Jajce on November 29, 1943. In these two sessions, they established the basis for post-war organisation of the country, making it a federation. In Jajce, Tito was named President of the National Committee of Liberation Rebirth in Bosnia, Time Magazine Dec 13, 1943. On December 4, 1943, while most of the country was still occupied by the Axis, Tito proclaimed a provisional democratic Yugoslav government.

Tito's partisans faced competition from the largely Serbian Chetniks, who were long supported by the British and the royal government in exile. After the partisans stood up to intense Axis attacks between January and June 1943, Allied leaders switched their support to them. American President Roosevelt, British Premier Churchill and Soviet leader Stalin officially recognized the partisans at the Tehran Conference. This resulted in Allied aid being parachuted behind Axis lines to assist the partisans. As the leader of the communist resistance, Tito was a target for the Axis forces in occupied Yugoslavia. The Germans came close to capturing or killing Tito on at least three occasions: in the 1943 Fall Weiss offensive; in the subsequent Schwarz offensive, in which he was wounded on June 9, being saved only because his loyal dog sacrificed himself; and on May 25, 1944, when he barely managed to evade the Germans after their Operation Rösselsprung airdrop outside his Drvar headquarters.

The partisans were supported directly by Allied airdrops to their headquarters, with Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean playing a significant role in the liaison missions. The Balkan Air Force was formed in June 1944 to control operations that were mainly aimed at helping his forces. Due to his close ties to Stalin, Tito often quarreled with the British and American staff officers attached to his headquarters.

On April 5, 1945, Tito signed an agreement with the USSR allowing "temporary entry of Soviet troops into Yugoslav territory". Aided by the Red Army, the partisans won the war for liberation in 1945. At the end of the war, all external forces were ordered off Yugoslav soil after the end of hostilities in Europe.

GERMANY

Wilhelm Bodewin Johann Gustav Keitel (September 22, 1882 - October 16, 1946) was a German field marshal (Generalfeldmarschall) and a senior military leader during World War II.

In 1937, Keitel received a promotion to general, and in the following year, in the wake of the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair and the replacement of the Ministry of War (Reichskriegsministerium) with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), he assumed the position of Chief of the OKW. In 1940, following the conclusion of the French campaign, he was promoted to General Field Marshal(Generalfeldmarschall), along with a number of Adolf Hitler's other generals.

During World War II, Keitel proved to be weak and cautious: he advised Hitler against invading France and opposed Operation Barbarossa. Both times he backed down in the face of Hitler and tendered his resignation: the Führer refused to accept it. In 1942 he again stood up to Hitler in defence of the actions of Field Marshal Wilhelm List, whose army was struggling to extricate themselves from inconclusive and bloody fighting in the Caucasus. Keitel's defence of List was his last act of defiance to Hitler, for after that he never again challenged one of Hitler's orders and was referred to by his colleagues as "Lakaitel" ("Lackey-tel" or "Little Lackey"). He signed numerous orders of dubious legality under the laws of war, the most infamous of which being the notorious Commissar Order, and unquestionably allowed Himmler a free hand with his racial controls and ensuing terror in captured Russian territory. Another was the order to have any of the French pilots fighting for the Normandie-Niemen fighter regiment in and on behalf of the USSR to be executed instead of their being treated as prisoners of war. Keitel was also instrumental in foiling the attempted coup of the July 20 Plot in 1944, which attempted to assassinate Hitler. Keitel then sat on the following Army Court of Honour that handed many officers, including Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, over to Roland Freisler's notorious People's Court.

In April and May of 1945, during the Battle for Berlin, Keitel urged various German generals to attack the Soviet forces and relieve Berlin. But, this late in the war, neither Gotthard Heinrici (Army Group Vistula), Felix Steiner (Army Detachment Steiner), Walther Wenck (12th Army), nor Theodor Busse (9th Army) commanded forces capable of saving the German capital.

After the death of German dictator Adolf Hitler on 30 April, Keitel was a member of the short-lived Flensburg government.

On May 8, 1945, German President (Reichspräsident) Karl Dönitz authorized Keitel to sign the second instrument of unconditional surrender in Berlin. On the previous day, Alfred Jodl had signed an instrument of unconditional surrender in Rheims, France.

After World War II

Four days after the surrender, Keitel was arrested. He soon faced the International Military Tribunal, which charged him with a number of offences:

conspiracy to commit crimes against peace;

planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression;

war crimes; and,

crimes against humanity.

The IMT rejected Keitel's defense that he was following orders in conformity to the Führerprinzip or leadership principle and found him guilty on all charges. To underscore the criminal, rather than military, nature of Keitel's acts the Allies denied his request to be shot by firing squad and hanged him instead. His last words were "I call on God Almighty to have mercy on the German people. More than two million German soldiers went to their death for the fatherland before me. I follow now my sons - all for Germany (Alles fur Deutschland)." Due to untidy hanging, he died after 27-minutes of long painful choking at the end of the rope.

Alfred Jodl (May 10, 1890 – October 16, 1946) was a German military commander, attaining the position of Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) during World War II, acting as deputy to Wilhelm Keitel.

Mature career

Jodl became acquainted with Adolf Hitler in 1923. As a vocal Nazi sympathizer, he was rapidly promoted and by 1935 headed the Abteilung Landesverteidigung im Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) (Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command of the Army). In the build-up to the Second World War, Jodl was nominally assigned as a Artilleriekommandeur of the 44th Division from October 1938 to August 1939 during the Anschluss, but from then until the end of the war in May 1945 he was Chef des Wehrmachtsführungsstabes (Chief of Operation Staff). Jodl was therefore a key figure in German military operations from 1939, supplying advice and technical information directly to Hitler. As testament to his closeness to the German Führer, Jodl was injurd in the July Plot against Hitler.

Jodl's wife Irma died on April 18, 1944. During their last years together Alfred and Irma had been very distant and cold to each other. While Wilhelm Keitel called his wife almost every day, Alfred Jodl didn't seem to seek contact with Irma. On April 7, 1945 he married former secretary and mistress Luise Katharina von Benda (born 1905). She had been a close friend of his first wife.

At the end of World War II in Europe Colonel General Jodl signed the instruments of unconditional surrender on May 7, 1945 in Reims as the representative for Karl Dönitz. Jodl was then arrested and transferred to Flensburg POW camp and later put before the International Military Tribunal at the Nuremberg Trials. Jodl was accused of conspiracy to commit crimes against peace; planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression; war-crimes; and crimes against humanity. Among the charges against him was his distribution of the Commando Order and the Commissar Order.

His wife Luise Jodl managed to attach herself to her husband's defence team. Subsequently interviewed by Gitta Sereny, researching her biography of Albert Speer, Luise Jodl revealed that in many instances the Allied prosecution made charges against Jodl based on documents that they refused to share with the defense. Jodl nevertheless managed to prove that some of the charges made against him were completely untrue, such as the charge that he had helped Hitler gain control of Germany in 1933. He was in one instance aided by a GI clerk who chose to give Luise a document showing that the execution of a group of British commandos in Norway had been legitimate. The GI warned Luise that if she didn’t copy it immediately she would never see it again; "…it was being 'filed'."[1]

Colonel General Jodl signs the instruments of unconditional surrender in Reims on May 7, 1945

Jodl pleaded 'not guilty' "before God, before history and my people". Found guilty on all four charges, he was hanged, although he had asked the court to be executed by firing squad.

Jodl's last words were reportedly "My greetings to you, my Germany." Jodl's remains were cremated at Munich, and his ashes were raked out and scattered into the Conwentzbach, a small river flowing into the larger Isar River (effectively an attempt to prevent the establishment of a permanent burial site to those nationalist groups who might seek to congregate there - an example of this being Mussolini's place of rest in Predappio, Italy). Jodl nonetheless possesses a cenotaph in the family plot in the Fraueninsel Cemetery, in Chiemsee Germany.

In 1953 a Munich court re-assessed the Nuremberg legal procedures and concluded Jodl was neither guilty of crimes of war punishable by death under international law, nor of other crimes which would have made him a criminal or abuser of military power. He was completely exonerated, though the Allied powers refused to comment further on the Jodl hanging and Nuremberg trial.

His case has served to many as proof the Nuremberg Trials were at least partly also staged trials of "victors' justice", and Henri Donnedieu - who was removed in Nuremberg as Free French judge - said he was offended by the hanging of the "innocent" Jodl.

Heinrich Alfred Hermann Walther von Brauchitsch (October 4, 1881 – October 18, 1948[1][2]) was an aristocratic German General and the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in the early years of World War II.

Von Brauchitsch was born in Berlin as the fifth son of his cavalry general father. He attended Berlin's best school, the Franzosisches Gymnasium.

Von Brauchitsch was commissioned in the Prussian Guard in 1900. By World War I, he was an officer on the General Staff. When Adolf Hitler came to power and began to expand the military, von Brauchitsch was named Chief of the East Prussian Military District. His specialty was artillery. In 1937, he became commander of the Fourth Army Group. Even though he was personally opposed to Nazism in many ways, he became largely reliant on Hitler, and was forced to borrow 80,000 Reichmarks from him in order to divorce and re-marry. In February, 1938, in the middle of the Munich Crisis, he divorced his fabulously wealthy first wife of 28 years, Elizabeth von Karstedt, who owned 300,000 Pomeranian acres to marry Charlotte Schmidt, the beautiful young daughter of a Silesian judge. Charlotte was an avid admirer of the Nazis and Hitler set aside his usual anti-divorce sentiments and encouraged the marriage. Walther replaced General Werner von Fritsch as Commander-in-Chief of the German Army after the latter's dismissal on false charges of homosexuality in 1938.

Von Brauchitsch resented the growing power of the SS, believing that they were attempting to replace the Wehrmacht as the official German armed forces. He had disagreements with Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia, and Adolf Hitler had to resolve the dispute between the two.

Like General Ludwig Beck, von Brauchitsch opposed Hitler's annexation of Austria (the Anschluss) and Czechoslovakia (see Fall Grün), although he did not resist Hitler's plans for war and took no action when Beck asked him to persuade the whole General Staff to resign, if Hitler proceeded in his invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In September 1938, a group of officers began plotting against Hitler and repeatedly tried to persuade von Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to lead the anticipated coup, but the only assurance he gave them was: "I myself won't do anything, but I won't stop anyone else from acting." After the collapse of the 1938 coup attempt, von Brauchitsch ignored all further appeals from Beck and the other plotters to use the army to overthrow Hitler before Germany was plunged into world war.

In November 1939, prodded by Chief of the Army General Staff Franz Halder and the conspirators, von Brauchitsch sought an audience with Hitler to persuade him that Germany could never win a protracted general European war and to beseech him to abandon his plans for conquest. Hitler flew into a rage and submitted the Commander-in-Chief to a tirade of insults and abuse. Halder was horrified to see von Brauchitsch emerge from the meeting "chalk white with fear." Hitler then called a meeting of the General Staff to declare that he would smash the West within a year. He also vowed to "destroy the spirit of Zossen" - a threat that panicked Halder to such an extent that he forced the conspirators to abort their second planned coup attempt.

Von Brauchitsch was made a field marshal in 1940 and was key in Hitler's "blitzkrieg" war against the West, making modifications to the original plan to overrun France. He failed, however, to take Moscow in the war against the Soviet Union, earning Hitler's enmity. Things went further downhill for von Brauchitsch as he endured a serious heart attack, and Hitler relieved him on December 19, 1941. Hitler's most recent biographer, Ian Kershaw, described von Brauchitsch as "gutless" and "spineless."

After the war, von Brauchitsch was arrested and charged with war crimes, but died in Hamburg in 1948 before he could be prosecuted.

Von Brauchitsch was the uncle of the 1930s Mercedes-Benz "Silver Arrow" Grand Prix driver Manfred von Brauchitsch. Von Brauchitsch was a strong admirer of Field Marshal von Moltke and used to linger in his former office that was made into a museum at a later date.

Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (December 12, 1875 - February 24, 1953) was a Generalfeldmarschall of the German Army during World War II. He held some of the highest field commands in all phases of the war.

World War II

In September 1939 World War II began, and von Rundstedt was recalled to lead Army Group South during the successful invasion of Poland. Turning to the West, he supported Manstein's "armored fist" approach to the invasion of France, and this was eventually selected as Fall Gelb. During the battle he was placed in command of seven panzer divisions, three motorized infantry divisions, and 35 regular infantry divisions.

By May 14, 1940, the armored divisions led by Heinz Guderian had crossed the Meuse and had opened up a huge gap in the Allied front. General von Rundstedt had doubts about the survivability of these units without infantry support, and asked for a pause while the infantry caught up; the halt allowed the British to evacuate their forces to Dunkirk. Later Rundstedt forbade an attack on the Dunkirk beachhead, allowing the British to fully evacuate it. This turn of events has raised eyebrows over the years. von Rundstedt and others subsequently argued that the decision was Hitler's and stemmed from his belief that Britain would more readily accept a peace treaty if he magnanimously spared what remained of her expeditionary force. What was in Hitler's mind cannot be verified, and though his willingness to acquiesce in the halt is puzzling, the final decision on the matter was Rundstedt's, as Hitler delegated power over the matter to him, much to Halder's incomprehending exasperation.

von Rundstedt was promoted to field marshal on July 19, 1940 and took part in the planning of Operation Sealion. When the invasion was called off, von Rundstedt took control of occupation forces and was given responsibility to develop the coastal defences in the Netherlands, Belgium and France.

Operation Barbarossa

In June 1941 von Rundstedt took part in Operation Barbarossa as commander of Army Group South, where he led 52 infantry divisions and five Panzer divisions into the Soviet Union. At first his progress was slow, but in September AG South captured Kiev in a double encirclement operation made possible by Stalin's unreasoning refusal to abandon it, even though the Dnieper had been crossed both north and south of it. The Germans claimed a fantastic haul of 665,000 Russian prisoners based on the encircled divisions' nominal, pre-combat strength as revealed by captured Soviet records. The Soviets reported that owing to previous losses - also exaggerated by the Germans, yet not subtracted by them from their tally of Soviet prisoners - the encircled divisions possessed merely 452,000 men and that, of those, 150,541 made their way out of the pocket before the lumbering German infantry divisions caught up with the armor and the ring of encirclement was consolidated. Thus "only" 300,000 men were permanently trapped, whether captured or killed. After this von Rundstedt moved east to attack Kharkov and Rostov. He strongly opposed continuing the advance into the Soviet Union during the winter and advised Hitler to call a halt, but his views were rejected.

In November, von Rundstedt had a heart attack, but he refused to be hospitalized and continued the advance, reaching Rostov on November 21. A counter-attack forced the Germans back. When von Rundstedt demanded to be allowed to withdraw, Hitler became furious and replaced him with General Walther von Reichenau.

Western Battlefield

Hitler recalled von Rundstedt to duty in March 1942, placing him once again in command of the west. There he proved tardy, so much so that as late as the autumn of 1943, no fortifications worthy of mention existed along the entire Atlantic shore. It was only after Erwin Rommel's appointment as von Rundstedt's ostensible subordinate that fortification work began in earnest. During the debates preceding the landing von Rundstedt insisted that the armoured reserves should be held in the operational rear so that they could all be rushed to whatever sector the Allies happened to land in. Geyr von Schweppenberg, the armoured commander, supported him. Rommel, by contrast, insisted that the armoured forces must be deployed very near the shoreline, just beyond the reach of allied naval artillery, since Allied command of the air would preclude moving them from further than that. Badly affected by his experiences in Africa, Rommel believed that Allied air operations would prohibit movement during the day and even gravely inhibit movement at night. He was likewise convinced that a landing as far west as Normandy was out of the question and that very little armour should be committed there. Inclined to accept the unlikelihood of a Normandy landing, Rundstedt nonetheless felt that this was an insane gamble. Rommel was able to have his way because von Rundstedt's authority had all but evaporated as a result of his inactivity since his appointment. The armoured divisions were dispersed and only two were spared to the northern French shore, west of the Seine, with only one assigned to the Normandy sector, with disastrous consequences once the invasion began. After the D-Day landings in June 1944, von Rundstedt urged Hitler to negotiate a peace settlement with the Allies. Hitler responded by replacing him with General Günther von Kluge.

As a result of the July 20 Plot, which outraged von Rundstedt, he agreed to join Guderian and Wilhelm Keitel on the Army Court of Honour that expelled hundreds of officers suspected of being opposed to Hitler, often on the flimsiest of evidence. This removed them from court martial and turned them over to Roland Freisler. Many were executed.

In mid-August 1944, von Kluge committed suicide and von Rundstedt was once again placed in command in the west. He quickly rallied the troops just in time to fight Operation Market Garden, winning the battle. Although he was Commander of the Western Forces during the offensive to retake Antwerp (which failed against hopeless odds in what would be known as the Battle of the Bulge), he was opposed to that offensive from its inception and essentially washed his hands of it. He was relieved of command once again in March 1945 after telling Wilhelm Keitel that Hitler should make peace with the Allies, rather than continue to fight a hopeless war.

After the War

Rundstedt was captured by the US 36th Infantry Division on May 1, 1945. While being interrogated he suffered another heart attack, and was taken to Britain, where he was held in captivity. He was charged by the British as a war criminal. The charges against him concerned his involvement in mass murders in occupied Soviet territories. On October 10, 1941, his subordinate, Walther von Reichenau the 6th army's commander issued his infamously bloodthirsty "Reichenau Order".[1] Upon receiving a copy Rundstedt, much impressed, immediately reissued the order to his other army commanders, presenting it as a model to orders he expected them to issue to their troops. He was also recorded as very helpful to Einsatzgruppen. When questioned on the matter and presented with damning testimony from an Einsatzgruppe commander, Rundstedt could do no more than say that it was impudence for the SS man to "talk this way about a field marshal" yet proved unable to challenge this and documentary evidence. Ultimately he never faced trial, allegedly because of his poor health, though the American prosecution team suspected that political considerations underlay the British's decision. He was released in July 1948, and lived in Hanover until his death.

Fedor von Bock (December 3, 1880 - May 4, 1945) was a Generalfeldmarschall of the Wehrmacht who served as Army Group Center's commander during the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. von Bock was considered a very "by the book" general and was not heavily involved in politics but also did not sympathize with those who opposed Adolf Hitler.

He was born in Küstrin, Germany. He attended a military academy then joined the German Army in 1897. He served in the First World War and by 1918 he had attained the rank of major. He remained in the army after the end of the war, serving as commander of the Third Army Group.

He was one of the few officers not removed from his position when Hitler reorganized the German military at the onset of World War II in September 1939. At that time, von Bock was assigned to lead Army Group North during the successful invasion of Poland. After his success with the blitzkrieg against France, Belgium, and The Netherlands, von Bock was promoted to field marshal. He was then given his most famous mission; Operation Barbarossa, the capture of Moscow and the defeat of the Soviet Union. In 1941, von Bock invaded Soviet-occupied Poland, destroying the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviets. By December, all of Poland had been subdued, as well as the Ukrainian SSR, Belarus, and most of western Russia.

However, von Bock was unfortunate enough to get caught in the vicious Russian winter, when some of his men were within 30 km of Moscow. Temperatures dropped to an average of -30º C, but his men only had their thin fall jackets (Hitler wouldn't send winter uniforms, in order to assure the soldiers that the war will be won before the winter). Tank engines routinely failed, and their weapons jammed frequently. However, Hitler ordered von Bock to stand his ground. The Russian forces, commanded by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, quickly went on a counteroffensive, driving the Germans back 145 km from Moscow. German casualties were listed in the thousands, and Moscow would not be threatened for the rest of the war.

When von Bock asked for permission to withdraw his exhausted troops in December 1941, he was dismissed from his post as Commander of Army Group Center, to be reassigned to lead Army Group South in January 1942, when field marshal Walter von Reichenau died of a heart attack. Only five months later, in July 1942, Hitler blamed him for the failure of "Operation Braunschweig", the second part of the German offensive in Russia, and retired him definitively.

After Hitler's suicide, von Bock offered his services to Admiral Karl Dönitz, the new leader of Germany. While in Hamburg, von Bock was killed in an Allied bombing raid on May 4, 1945.

While privately opposing the atrocities being committed against Soviet civilians, von Bock never protested directly to Hitler, although at one time, he had a subordinate file a formal complaint ("Meine Herren, ich stelle fest: Der Feldmarschall von Bock hat protestiert!" - "gentlemen, I state: The field marshal von Bock has protested"). His nephew Henning von Tresckow tried in vain to win him for the military resistance against the Hitler regime. Von Bock intervened, when his Staff officers planned the assassination of Hitler during a visit to his Army Group. On the other hand he did not report the conspirators either.

One of the reasons for von Bock's dismissal is believed to have been his expressed interest in supporting the Russian Liberation Movement, which Hitler was categorically against.

Erich von Manstein (November 24, 1887–June 10, 1973) served the German military as a lifelong professional soldier. He became one of the most prominent commanders of Nazi Germany's armed forces (Wehrmacht). During World War II he attained the rank of Field Marshal (Generalfeldmarschall).

He was the initiator and one of the planners of the Ardennes-offensive alternative in the invasion of France in 1940. He received acclaim from the Nazi-German leadership for the victorious battles of Perekop Isthmus, Kerch, Sevastopol and Kharkov. He commanded the failed relief effort at Stalingrad and the Cherkassy pocket evacuation. He was dismissed from service by Adolf Hitler in March 1944, due to his frequent clashes with Hitler over military strategy.

In 1949 he was brought on trial in Hamburg for war crimes, which convicted him of "Neglecting to protect civilian lives" and for using scorched earth tactics denying vital food supplies to the local population. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison, which was later reduced to 12. Although claiming to not know about the Holocaust, von Manstein nevertheless showed a callous disregard for the plights of Jews, equating Partisans and Jews and advocated stern measures against both groups. After release from British prison in 1953, he became a military advisor for the West German Government.

World War II

Poland

On August 18, 1939, in preparation for Operation Fall Weiß, the German invasion of Poland, von Manstein was appointed Chief of Staff to Gerd von Rundstedt’s Army Group South. Here he worked along with von Rundstedt’s Chief of Operations, Colonel Günther Blumentritt in the development of the operational plan. Von Rundstedt accepted von Manstein’s plan calling for the concentration of the majority of the Army Group’s armored units into Walther von Reichenau’s 10th Army with the objective of a decisive breakthrough, which would lead to the encirclement of Polish forces west of the River Vistula. In von Manstein’s plan, two other armies comprising Army Group South, Wilhelm List’s 14th Army and Johannes Blaskowitz’s 8th Army were to provide the flank support for Reichenau’s armored thrust towards Warsaw, the Polish capital. Privately, von Manstein was lukewarm about the Polish campaign, thinking that it would be better to keep Poland as a buffer between Germany and the Soviet Union. He also worried about an Allied attack on the West Wall once the Polish campaign started, thus drawing Germany into a two-front war.

Launched on September 1, 1939, the invasion began successfully. In Army Group South’s area of responsibility, armored units of the 10th Army pursued the retreating Poles, giving them no time to set up a defense. The 8th Army prevented the unconnected Polish troop concentrations in Łódź, Radom and Poznań from merging into a more coherent force. Deviating from the original plan that called for heading straight for the Vistula and then proceeding to Warsaw, von Manstein persuaded von Rundstedt to encircle the Polish units in the Radom area. The plan succeeded, clearing the bulk of Polish resistance from the southern approach to Warsaw.

France

On September 27, 1939, Warsaw formally surrendered, although isolated pockets of resistance remained. That same day, Hitler ordered the Army High Command, led by General Franz Halder, to develop a plan for action in the west against France and the Low Countries. The different plans that the General Staff suggested were given to von Manstein and Gerd von Rundstedt and together they formalised an alternative plan for Fall Gelb (Case Yellow). This plan received Hitler's attention in February 1940 and finally his agreement.

By late October, the bulk of the German Army was redeployed to the west. Von Manstein was made Chief of Staff of von Rundstedt’s Army Group A in western Germany. Like many of the Army's younger officers, von Manstein opposed Fall Gelb, criticizing it for its lack of ability to deliver strategic results and the uninspired utilization of the armored forces, which may have come from OKH's inability to influence Hitler's planning. Von Manstein pointed out that a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan with the attack through Belgium was something the Allies expected, as they were already moving strong forces into the area. Bad weather in the area caused the attack to be cancelled several times and eventually delayed into the spring.

During the autumn Von Manstein, with the informal cooperation of Heinz Guderian, developed his own plan: he suggested that the panzer divisions attack through the wooded hills of the Ardennes where no one would expect them, then establish bridgeheads on the Meuse River and rapidly drive to the English Channel. The Germans would thus cut the French mainland off from the French and Allied Armies in Belgium and Flanders. Von Manstein proposed plan also contained a second thrust, outflanking the Maginot Line, which would have allowed the Germans to force any future defensive line much further south. This second thrust would perhaps have avoided the need for the Fall Rot second stage of the Battle of France [Von Manstein, (2004)]. The plan was after the events nicknamed Sichelschnitt (sickle cut).

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht originally rejected the proposal. Halder had von Manstein removed from von Rundstedt's headquarters and sent von Manstein away to the east to command the 38th Army Corps. But Hitler, looking for more aggressive plans for waging the war, approved a modified version of von Manstein's ideas, which today is known as the Manstein Plan. This modified version, formulated by Halder, did not contain the second thrust. Von Manstein and his Corps played a minor role during the operations in France, serving under Günther von Kluge's 4th Army. However, it was his Corps which helped to achieve the first breakthrough during Fall Rot, east of Amiens, and was the first to reach and cross the River Seine. The invasion was an outstanding military success and von Manstein was promoted to full General and awarded the Knight's Cross for suggesting the plan.

Barbarossa

In February 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of the 56th Panzer Corps. He became involved in Operation Barbarossa, in which he served under General Erich Hoepner. Attacking on June 22, 1941, von Manstein advanced more than 100 miles in only two days and seized two vital bridges over the Dvina River at Dvinsk.

Crimea and the recapture of Kerch

In September 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of 11th Army. Its former commander, Colonel-General Ritter von Schobert, had perished when his plane landed in a Russian minefield. The 11th Army was tasked with invading the Crimea, capturing Sevastopol and pursuing enemy forces on the flank of Army Group South during its advance into Russia, [Von Manstein, (2004)]. Hitler also intended to use the Kerch Peninsula to land forces in the Caucasus. This, however, would turn out to be tougher than anticipated.

The initial objective was to force a crossing over the Isthmus of Perekop, which connects the Crimean peninsula to the mainland. The area was defended by about 50,000 Soviet troops, out of a total of 230,600 Soviet troops on the whole of the Crimea peninsula, while the Germans attacked with six Infantry, one Panzergrenadier and two Mountain Divisions, supported by six Romanian Brigades. The assault began on September 24, 1941 and after five days the initial defenses were broken on 28 October. The rapid fall of the Istmuth was in part due to a Soviet counter attack ordered by Stalin and launched shortly before the German offensive, that both cost the Soviets casualties and interrupted work on fortifications.

After the initial breakthrough, the rest of the Perekop area had to be secured. Von Manstein, deprived of 3 Divisions needed elsewhere, launched the assault on 16 October 1941 against eight rifle and four cavalry divisions, most of whom had been evacuated from Odessa and were thus under-strength. The assault on Perekop was frontal in nature, the axis of advance was on three narrow strips of land, defended by troops with prepared defensive positions. Though numerically inferior, the Soviets had local numerical tank and air superiority. After ten days of bitter fighting the defensive line was overrun on 28 October, with the German forces eagerly pursuing the retreating Soviet forces into Crimea. The Germans quickly seized control over the whole peninsula, and by 17 November only the city of Sevastopol held out. Manstein claimed that these operations resulted in over 100,000 Soviet troops taken prisoner, and many troops killed. Actual Soviet losses of all kind totaled 63,860.

The first attack on Sevastopol was launched on October 30, 1941. von Manstein, overly impressed by its weaker fortifications, attacked the southern flank, only to discover the terrain in this area prohibitvely difficult. On December 4 the local Soviet command reported that the attack had been checked. A renewed attempt was launched from the north on December 17. By then winter had set in the Luftwaffe was fogged out. On December 21, just as the Germans were preparing for their last push, the Soviets launched a spoiling attack forcing them back. Shortly thereafter the Soviet winter offensive began, producing the Wehrmacht's so-called "Winter Crisis."

Just over a week later, on December 26, 1941, the Soviets landed on the Kerch straits, and on December 30 executed another landing near Theodosia, where 41,930 troops were initially committed. These landings were soon reinforced. Only a hurried withdrawal from the Kerch straits, in contravention of Manstein's orders, by 46 Infantry Division under General Hans Graf von Sponecks command prevented a collapse of the eastern part of the Crimea, although the Division lost most of its heavy equipment. This situation forced von Manstein to cancel a resumption of the attack on Sevastopo and send most of his forces east to destroy the Soviet bridgehead. In that sense it may have been a blessing in disguise for the Germans as conditions for a continued attack were impossible. The situation was stabilised by late April 1942.

Operation Trappenjagd, launched on May 8, 1942 aimed at expelling the Russian forces from the Kerch peninsula. Opposing the German forces were 17 rifle (infantry) divisions, along with several independent brigades. The Germans had 7 infantry divisions and a panzer division. Approximately one third of the German forces were Romanian. After feinting against the north, the 11th army attacked in the south, and the Soviets were soon reduced to fleing for the Kerch straits. The operation was completed successfully on 18 May. Manstein claimed that next to no Soviet troops were evacuated across the straits, leading to 170,000 Soviet troops taken prisoners and some 100,000 killed. However, contrary to his claim, some 140,000 were evacuated, though many of these were infirm. Krivosheev puts total Soviet losses at 176,566.

The Battle of Sevastopol

Von Manstein turned his attention once more towards Sevastopol. The Germans committed some of the largest guns ever built. Along with large numbers of regular artillery pieces, super-heavy 600mm mortars and the 800mm "Dora" railway gun were brought in for the assault. The furious barrage began on the morning of June 7, 1942, and all of the resources of the Luftwaffes Luftflotte 4, commanded by Wolfram von Richthofen, descended on their targets, continuing for five days before the main assault began. The barrage however, had a limited effect on the sturdy Soviet defenses, and even the Dora achieved little due to its extreme inaccuracy.

Von Manstein erroneously postulated that the Severnaia Bay ports constituted a logistic lifeline whose severance would topple the Sevastopol enclave without the Germans having to batter down every inch of it. von Manstein therefore decided to commit his main effort there with the 54th Corps, which possessed five divisions beforehand and would receive yet another during the attack. An additional east-to-west holding attack would be delivered by the 30th Corps. Each German corps was supported by a smaller Romanian corps. The plan did not take into account that the Soviets had hoarded large amounts of supplies during the preceding winter, and therefore did not depend on the ports, in contrast to 1941.

The outer defensive rings were breached by June 16, 1942, but from then on the going was slow for the advancing Germans. They were held at the so called "Sapun Line". On the night of June 28, von Manstein launched an amphibious assault aiming to outflank the troublesome Sapun Line. This was an extremely costly operation, opposed by Manstein's subordinates since German artillery and aviation could achieve little against the deep subterranean Soviet coastal fortifications, while the available flotilla was ill-suited to amphibious operations. Much as the Germans attacked ferociously, the Soviet defenders managed to hang on until nightfall, whereupon they were reinforced. Despite the losses, von Manstein continued to feed troops into the beachheads.

Success materialised elsewhere. On the Sapun line's northern end, units of he 30th corps reinforced by the part of the 54th corps landed on he small stretch of the southern shore already captured by the 30h corps breached the Sapun line, while on the Sapun line southern end, acombined German and Romanian element forced the line as well. Worst yet for he Soviets hey had run out of shells. The Soviet commander, General Ivan Petrov, ordered a withdrawal west to Cape Khersones. The exhausted German forces were unable to immediately pursue and frustrate this Soviet reformation. Von Manstein launched a massive bombardment of the city of Sevastopol, in order to suppress the defences in the city, although Petrov had left these defences unmanned in the hope it would spare the city further destruction. After furious fighting, Khersonnes fell to Germans on July 4, 1942. Hitler, delighted at hearing the good news, phoned von Manstein and commended him as "The Conqueror of Sevastopol", informing him that he had ordered von Manstein's promotion to Generalfeldmarschall.

The fighting in the officially conquered enclave was, nevertheless, far from over. There remained a cluster of Soviet pockets that had to be smothered. The ensuing "mopping up" raged on until late autumn, claiming more causalties. Soviet accounts claim that there were very few Soviet troops who survived the German onslaught. von Manstein himself records that the Soviets preferred to blow themselves up along with the German soldiers closing in on their positions rather than surrender. Von Manstein ascribed this behaviour to the ruthlessness of the "commissars" and to the basic "contempt for human life of this Asiatic power". Another explanation for the Soviet unwillingness to surrender, was the fear Soviet servicemen had for their treatment if they were taken prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht.[citation needed]

Von Manstein claimed over 90,000 prisoners taken, as well as causing even more fatalities inflicted. However, the Soviet garrison defending Sevastopol totalled 106,000 men beforehand, and received only 3,000 in reinforcements during the attack, while it is known that 25,157 persons were evacuated, the overwhelming majority being either wounded soldiers or officers evacuated on Stalin's orders and Manstein himself concedes that Soviet troops tended to fight to death rather than surrender. Von Manstein put his own losses at 24,000, a claim that seems low. this figure excludes all Romanian losses, though the Romanians fought well and hard in Sevastopol, rendering an indispensable contribution to the victory. It also excludes all German losses sustained during the "mopping up" fighting after the capture of Cape Khersones, and appears to exclude all so-called "lightly wounded" Germans, whose exclusion is a practice, apparently, avoided by other belligerents.

Leningrad

After the capture of Sevastopol the German high command felt that any city could be taken with a determined enough attack, and von Manstein was seen as the right man to finally break Leningrad, which had been under siege from autumn the previous year. von Manstein, with elements of the 11th Army, transferred to the Leningrad front to lead Operation Nordlicht, which was hoped to be the final capture of the city, set to launch on September 15, 1942. Hitler was confident that with considerable amounts of artillery and the new Tiger tank this operation would finally break the determined Soviet defense; von Manstein, on the other hand, was more pessimistic, arguing that a simultaneous attack in the north by the Finns would be needed for victory.

On August 27, 1942 the Soviets launched a spoiling attack against Georg Lindemann’s 18th Army in the narrow German salient west of Lake Ladoga. Von Manstein was forced to divert his forces in order to avoid catastrophe. A series of bitter battles ensued, in which von Manstein's smaller forces managed to outmaneuver the larger Soviet forces, which lost over 60,000 men over the course of the next few months. This meant, however, that the Germans were not able to execute a decisive assault on Leningrad, and the siege continued into 1943.

Stalingrad

On February 17, 1943, under heavy security, Hitler flew in to Army Group South's headquarters at Zaporozh'ye, Ukraine; just 30 miles away from the front-line. Seen here, Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein is greeting Hitler on the local airfield; on the right is Hans Baur and the Luftwaffe Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram von Richthofen

On November 21, 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad, Adolf Hitler appointed von Manstein commander of the newly created Army Group Don (Heeresgruppe Don), comprised of a hastily assembled group of tired men and machines, and ordered him to lead Operation Wintergewitter (Winter Storm), the rescue effort by Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and auxiliary Romanian troops to relieve the 6th Army of Friedrich Paulus which was trapped inside Stalingrad. Wintergewitter, launched on December 12, achieved some initial success and von Manstein got his three Panzer Divisions and supporting units of the 57th Panzer Corps(comprised of the 23rd Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 6th and 17th Panzer Divisions) to within 30 miles of Stalingrad by December 20. However, the corps was halted at the River Aksay, and strong Russian forces pushed them back.

At this point, von Manstein pleaded for the 6th Army to attempt to break out of the city, but Paulus refused, since Hitler flatly refused to issue such an order, and instead ordered the 6th Army to stay in the besieged city. It is doubtful that the 6th Army had the strength to launch the offensive operations needed to break through the Soviet lines. The 6th Army was short of fuel for its tanks and trucks, and short of food for its soldiers. Some argue the defeat at Stalingrad was due to a mistaken decision by Hitler to refuse the 6th Army permission to break out. However, the Red Army had to devote a number of their own armies in order to contain the 6th Army—forces that otherwise would probably have been used to devastating effect at other points of the weakened German front. It remains debatable whether the fate of 6th Army was more beneficial or detrimental to the Eastern Front on a strategic level.

Operation Saturn, a massive Red Army offensive in the southernmost part of the front, aimed at capturing Rostov and thus cutting off the German Army Group A, which was still withdrawing from the Caucasus, forced von Manstein to divert his forces to help hard-pressed Army Group A, in its retreat to the Ukraine, thus avoiding the collapse of the entire front. The attack also prevented the 48th Panzer Corps (comprising the 336th Infantry Division, the 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division, and the 11th Panzer Division), under the command of General Otto von Knobelsdorff, from joining up with the 57th Panzer Corps as planned. Instead, the 48th Panzer Corps held a line along the River Chir, beating off successive Russian attacks. General Hermann Balck used the 11th Panzer Division to counterattack Russian salients. But the Romanian, Italian, and Hungarian armies on the flanks were overwhelmed, and the 48th Panzer Corps was forced to retreat. As a result, the remnants of the 4th Panzer Army retreated, as its northern flank was exposed by the loss of the Don.

Kharkov Operation

By early February, the German forces began to regroup. Von Manstein's Army Group Don combined with Army Group B and was made into the new Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Süd), which was led by von Manstein. On February 21, 1943, he launched a counteroffensive into the overextended Soviet flank. The assault proved a major success; von Manstein's troops advanced rapidly, isolating Soviet forward units and forcing the Red Army to halt most of its offensive operations. By March 2, tank spearheads from Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf met, cutting off large portions of the Soviet Southwest Front, and by March 9, the Wehrmacht had inflicted a heavy defeat on the Soviets at Krasnograd and Barvenkovo. An estimated 23,000 Soviet soldiers were killed and a further 9,000 were captured. Additionally, 615 Soviet tanks and 354 guns were captured.[citation needed]

Von Manstein then pushed forward, his effort spearheaded by Paul Hausser's 2nd SS Panzer Corps, recapturing Kharkov on March 14, after bloody street-fighting in what is known as the Third Battle of Kharkov. In recognition for this accomplishment, von Manstein received the Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps then captured Belgorod on March 21. Von Manstein proposed a daring action for the summer nicknamed the "backhand blow", which was intended to outflank the Red Army into the Sea of Azov at Rostov, but Hitler instead chose the more conventional Operation Citadel aimed at crushing the Kursk salient.

Citadel

During Operation Citadel, von Manstein led the southern pincer, and despite losses, he managed to achieve most of his initial goals, inflicting far more casualties than he sustained. In his memoirs, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who led the Soviet defense at Kursk, praised von Manstein. But due to the almost complete failure of the northern sector's pincer led by Günther von Kluge and Walther Model, chronic lack of infantry support and an operational reserve, as well as Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Italy, Hitler called off the offensive. Von Manstein protested, asserting that the victory was almost at hand as he felt he had achieved local superiority, and that with a little more effort, he could crack the Soviet defenses before they could bring up their reserves. After the failure of Citadel, the Soviets launched a massive counterattack against the exhausted German forces.

A German victory in the sense of annihilating the surrounded Soviet forces required both the completion of the encirclement (that is the linking of the northern and southern German pincers) and holding the encirclement long enough to overcome the encircled Soviet forces. Even if the first had been accomplished it does not follow that the second would automatically follow. The German forces post-Stalingrad were never able to force the Soviets into significant retreats, except for temporary reversals like Kharkov. After halting the German offensive at Kursk, the Soviets had enough strength to launch immediate counterattacks.

Dnieper Campaign

Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein discussing the eastern front situation with Hitler on September 15, 1943, at Wolf's Lair in East Prussia. Also present are von Manstein's Chief of Staff Generalleutnant Busse, Generalfeldmarschall von Kleist, Generalobersts Zeitzler and Ruoff, as well as General der Panzertruppe Kempf

In September 1943, von Manstein withdrew to the west bank of the river Dnieper, inflicting heavy casualties on the Red Army[citation needed]. From October to mid-January of 1944, von Manstein stabilized the situation on the South Front. However, The Soviets established a salient from Kiev, and were within reach of the crucial town of Zhitomir. The Germans launched a successful counteroffensive, in which 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and 2nd SS Division Das Reich, together with 1st, 7th, 19th, and 25th Panzer Divisions and 68th Infantry Division (part of 4th Panzer Army), wheeled around the flank of the Russians in front of Zhitomir. Several notable victories were won, at Brussilov, Radomyshl, and Meleni, under the guidance of General Hermann Balck; but due to the lackluster judgment of Colonel General Rauss,[citation needed] the new commander of 4th Panzer Army, the Kiev salient could not be eliminated. In late January 1944, von Manstein was forced to retreat further westwards by the Soviet offensive. In mid-February 1944, he disobeyed Hitler's order and ordered 11th and 42nd Corps (consisting of 56,000 men in six divisions) of Army Group South to break out from the "Korsun Pocket", which occurred on February 16–February 17, 1944. Eventually, Hitler accepted this action and ordered the breakout after it had already taken place.

Dismissal

Von Manstein continued to argue with Hitler about overall strategy on the Eastern Front. Von Manstein advocated an elastic, mobile defense. He was prepared to cede territory, attempting to make the Soviet forces either stretch out too thinly or to make them advance too fast so that they could be attacked on the flanks with the goal of encircling them. Hitler ignored Manstein's advice and continued to insist on static warfare. Because of these frequent disagreements, von Manstein publicly advocated that Hitler relinquish control and leave the management of the war to professionals, starting with the establishment of the position of comander-in-chief in the East (Oberbefehlshaber Ost). Hitler, however, rejected this idea numerous times, fearing that it would weaken his hold on power.

This argument also alarmed some of Hitler's closest henchmen, such as Göring and the SS chief Himmler, who were not prepared to give up any of their powers. Himmler started to question von Manstein's loyalty openly and insinuated that he was a defeatist unsuitable to command troops. Von Manstein's frequent arguing combined with these allegations resulted in Hitler relieving von Manstein of his command in March 1944. Instead, on April 2, 1944, Hitler appointed Walther Model, a firm supporter, as commander of Army Group South. Nevertheless, von Manstein received the Swords for his Knight's Cross, the second highest German military honour.

After his dismissal, Von Manstein entered an eye clinic in Breslau, recuperated near Dresden and then retired. Although he did not take part in the attempt to kill Hitler in July 1944, he had been contacted by Henning von Tresckow and others in 1943 about the plot. While von Manstein did agree that change was necessary, he refused to join them as he still considered himself bound by duty. (He rejected the approaches with the statement "Preussische Feldmarschälle meutern nicht"—"Prussian Field Marshals do not mutiny.") He also feared that a civil war would ensue. Though he didn't join the plotters, he did not betray them either. In late January of 1945, he collected his family from their homes in Liegnitz and evacuated them to western Germany. He surrendered to British Field Marshal Montgomery and was arrested by British troops on August 23, 1945.

Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel (15 November 1891 – 14 October 1944) was one of the most distinguished German field marshals of World War II. He was the commander of the Deutsches Afrika Korps and also became known by the nickname “The Desert Fox” (Wüstenfuchs, listen (help·info)) for the skillful military campaigns he waged on behalf of the German Army in North Africa. He was later in command of the German forces opposing the Allied cross-channel invasion at Normandy.

Rommel's military successes earned the respect not only of his troops and Hitler, but also that of his enemy Commonwealth troops in the North African Campaign. Following the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa, and whilst commanding the defence of Occupied France, his fortunes changed when he was suspected (correctly or incorrectly) of involvement in a failed plot to kill Hitler in 1944.

World War II

Poland 1939

Rommel continued as Führerbegleitbataillon commander during the Polish campaign, often moving up close to the front in the Führersonderzug, and seeing much of Hitler. After the Polish defeat, Rommel returned to Berlin to organize the Führer's victory parade, taking part himself as a member of Hitler's entourage. During the Polish campaign Rommel was asked to intervene on behalf of one of his wife's relatives, a Polish Priest who had been arrested. He has been criticised[citation needed] for not doing enough on the man's behalf, though he did apply to the Gestapo for information, only to be, inevitably, brushed off with the reply that no information on the man existed.

France 1940

Panzer commander

Rommel asked Hitler for command of a panzer division and, on 6 February 1940 only three months before the invasion, Rommel was given command of the 7.Panzer-Division for Fall Gelb ("Case Yellow"), the invasion of France and the Low Countries. This string-pulling provoked resentment among fellow officers. The Chief of Army Personnel had rejected Rommel's request on the grounds of him having no experience with armor, instead suggesting Rommel was more suitable for commanding a mountain division lacking a commander.[2] Rommel had, however, emphasised the mobile use of infantry, and had come to recognise the great usefulness of armoured forces in Poland. He set about adapting himself and learning the techniques of armored warfare rapidly and with great enthusiasm.[3]

The invasion of France

On 10 May 1940 the 7th Panzer Division, a part of 15th Corps under General Hoth, advanced into Belgium to proceed to the Meuse river near Dinant. At the Meuse 7th Panzer was held up, due to the bridge having been destroyed and determined sniper and artillery fire from the French defenders. The Germans lacked smoke grenades, so Rommel, having assumed personal command of the crossing, ordered a few nearby houses to be torched to conceal the attack. The German Panzer Grenadiers crossed the rivers in rubber boats, with Rommel leading the second wave across the river.[4] The Division dashed further inland, always spurred on by Rommel, and far in front of any friendly forces.

Rommel's technique of pushing forward boldly, ignoring risks to his flanks and rear and relying on the shock to enemy morale to hinder attacks on his vulnerable flanks, paid large dividends during his rapid march across France.[5] When encountering resistance, Rommel would simply order his tanks forward, all guns blazing, relying on the shock of the sudden assault to force the enemy to surrender. This method offset the disadvantage the German panzers had in terms of armour and low calibre guns, often causing large formations of enemy heavy tanks to simply give up a fight they would otherwise have had a good chance of winning.[6] This approach, although it saved lives on both sides by avoiding prolonged engagements, did cause mishaps. On one occasion his tanks, following this tactic, closed with a convoy of French trucks and fired into them, only to realise that the trucks acted as ambulances ferrying wounded from the front.[7]

Battle of Arras

Matilda I tanks. These tanks proved too well armoured for German tank and antitank guns.

By 18 May the Division had captured Cambrai, but here Rommel's advance was checked briefly, as his Chief of Staff, still with the unmotorised part of the Division in Belgium and not having received radio reports from Rommel, had written Rommel and his combat group off as lost and had not arranged for fuel to be sent up.[8] There was a degree of controversy over this issue, with Rommel furious with what he perceived as a negligent attitude on the part of his supply officers, whereas his Chief of Staff was critical of Rommel's failure to keep his Staff officers up to speed on his actions.

On 20 May Rommel's panzers reached Arras. Here he wanted to cut off the British Expeditionary Force's path to the coast, and Hans von Luck, commanding the reconnaissance battalion of the Division, was tasked with forcing a crossing over the La Bassée canals near the city. Supported by Stuka dive bombers the unit managed to force a crossing. The British launched a counterattack (the Battle of Arras) on 21 May with Matilda tanks, and the Germans found their 3.7 cm antitank and tank guns useless against its heavy armour. A battery of 88 mm guns had to be brought up to deal with the threat, with Rommel personally directing the fire.

After Arras, Hitler ordered his Panzers to hold their positions, while the British evacuated the troops at Dunkirk and the 7th Panzer Division was given a few days of much needed rest. On 26 May 7th Panzer continued its advance and it reached Lille on 27 May. For the assault on the town Hoth placed his other tank division, 5th Panzer Division under Rommel's command, to the chagrin of its commander, General Max von Hartlieb.[9] The same day Rommel received news that he had been awarded the Knight's Cross, as the first Divisional Commander during the campaign. This award, which had been secured for Rommel on Hitler's bequest, caused some animosity among fellow officers, who were critical of Rommel's close relationship with Hitler as it seemed to give him preferential treatment.[9]

On 28 May, while making the final push into Lille and far in front of friendly forces, 7th Panzer came under heavy fire from French artillery due to the rapidity of the advance. Eagerly Rommel drove his forces on, capturing Lille and trapping half of the French First Army, preventing them from retreating to Dunkirk. After this coup, Rommel's forces were again given time to rest.

To the channel coast

Rommel resumed his advance on 5 June, in a drive for the Seine river to secure the bridges near Rouen. Advancing 100 km in two days, the Division reached Rouen, only to find the bridges destroyed. On 10 June Rommel reached the coast near Dieppe, sending his "Am at coast" signal to the German HQ.

On 15 June 7th Panzer started advancing on Cherbourg. On 17 June the division advanced 350 km, and on 18 June the town was captured. The Division then proceeded towards Bordeaux, but stopped when the armistice was signed on 21 June. In July the Division was sent to the Paris area to start preparations for Operation Seelöwe. The preparations were half-hearted however, as it became clearer and clearer that the Luftwaffe would not be able to secure air auperiority over the British coast.

The Ghost Division

7.Panzer-Division was later nicknamed Gespenster-Divisionen (the "Ghost Division"), due to the speed and surprise it was consistently able to achieve, to the point that even the German High Command lost track of where it was. He also set the record for the longest thrust in one day by Panzers up to that point, covering nearly 200 miles.

Rommel received both applause and criticism for his tactics during the French campaign. Many, like General George Stumme, who had previously commanded 7th Panzer Division, were impressed with the speed and success of Rommel's drive, others were more reserved, some out of envy, others because they felt Rommel took needless risks. Hermann Hoth publicly expressed praise for Rommel's achievements, but he did have private reservations saying, in a confidential report, that Rommel should not be given command over a corps unless he gained "greater experience and a better sense of judgment."[10] Hoth also accused Rommel of an unwillingness to acknowledge the contributions of others to his victories.

The Fourth Army's commander, General Günther von Kluge, also criticised Rommel for falsely claiming all the glory for his achievements. Rommel did not, Kluge felt, acknowledge the contribution of the Luftwaffe, and Rommel's manuscript describing his campaign in France misrepresented the advances of neighbouring units to elevate the achievements of his own dazzling advances. Kluge also cited the complaint by General Hartlieb that Rommel had misappropriated the 5th Panzer's bridging tackle on 14 May after his own supplies had run out in order to cross the Meuse, delaying 5th Panzer Division for several hours.[11] Rommel had repeated this procedure on 27 May at the Scarpe River crossing.

Rommel's reward for his success was to be promoted and appointed commander of the 5th Light Division (later reorganized and redesignated 21.Panzer-Division) and of the 15.Panzer-Division, which were sent to Libya in early 1941 to aid the hapless and demoralized Italian troops, forming the Deutsches Afrika Korps (listen (help·info)) in February 1941. It was in Africa where Rommel achieved his greatest fame as a commander.

Africa 1941-43

The first Axis offensive

His campaign in Africa earned Rommel the nickname "The Desert Fox". On 6 February 1941 Rommel was ordered to lead the Afrika Korps, sent to Libya to help shore up the Italian forces who had been driven back during Operation Compass launched by British Commonwealth forces under Major-General Richard O'Connor during December 1940. Initially ordered to assume a defensive posture and hold the frontline, the German High Command had slated a limited offensive towards Agedabia and Benghazi in May, and hold the line between those cities. Rommel argued that such a limited offensive would be ineffective, as the whole of Cyrenaica would have to be captured if the frontlines where to be held.[12] The task of even holding the remaining Italian possessions seemed daunting, as the Italians had only 7,000 troops remaining in the area, after O'Connor's successful capture of 130,000 prisoners and almost 400 tanks during the previous three months of advance.[13]

On 24 March 1941 Rommel launched a limited offensive with only the 5th Light Division supported by two Italian divisions. This thrust was to be minor, in anticipation of Rommel receiving the 15th Panzer Division in May. The British, who weakened themselves by troops being withdrawn to fight in the Greece operation, fell back to Mersa el Brega and started constructing defensive works. Rommel decided to continue the attack against these positions, to prevent the British from building up the fortifications.[14] After a day of fierce fighting the Germans prevailed, and the advance was continued, as Rommel disregarded holding off the attack on Agedabia until May. The British Commander-in-Chief, General Archibald Wavell, overestimating the strength of the Axis forces and, already apprehensive about the extent of his advances during the previous winter, ordered a withdrawal from Benghazi in early April to avoid being cut off by Rommel's thrust.

Rommel, seeing the British reluctance to fight a decisive action, decided on a bold move, the seizure of the whole of Cyrenaica, despite having only light forces. He ordered the Italian Ariete armoured division to pursue the retreating British, while the 5th Light Division was to move on Benghazi. Generalmajor Johannes Streich, the 5th Light Division's commander, protested this order on the grounds of the state of his vehicles, but Rommel brushed the objections aside because, in his words, "One cannot permit unique opportunities to slip by for the sake of trifles."[15] The Italian Commander-in-Chief, General Italo Gariboldi, tried repeatedly to halt Rommels advance, but was unable to contact him.[16]

After Benghazi had been secured following the British withdrawal, Cyrenaica as far as Gazala had been captured by 8 April, despite fervent protests from Italian HQ, who felt Rommel were going beyond his orders, especially since he was nominally under Italian command. Rommel had received orders from the German High Command that he was not to advance past Maradah, but he turned a blind eye to this as well as protests from some of his staff and divisional commanders, grasping what he perceived to be a great possibility of largely destroying the Allied presence in North Africa and capturing Egypt. Rommel decided to keep up the pressure on the retreating British, and launched an outflanking offensive on the important port of Tobruk,[17] during which he managed to capture the Western Desert Force commander O'Connor as well as Commander of the troops in Egypt, General Philip Neame, on 9 April. With Italian forces attacking along the coast, Rommel decided to sweep around to the south and attack the harbour from the south-east with the 5th Light Division, hoping to trap the bulk of the enemy force there. This outflanking could not be carried out as rapidly as was necessary due to logistical problems from lengthening supply lines and spoiling flank attacks from Tobruk, so Rommel's plan of trapping large forces at Tobruk failed. By 11 April the envelopment of Tobruk was complete, and the first attack was launched. Other forces continued pushing east, reaching Bardia and securing the whole of Libya by 15 April.

The siege of Tobruk

The following Siege of Tobruk lasted 240 days, with the garrison consisting of the Australian 9th Division under General Leslie Morshead and reinforced by all the British troops who had withdrawn to the port city, bringing the defenders to a total of 25,000. Impatient to secure success, Rommel launched repeated, small-scale attacks. These were easily defeated by the Australian defenders. The Italian's failure to provide Rommel with the blueprints of the port's fortifications, for which Rommel would later criticise them, was due to his surprising advance so far beyond the agreed point, hardly allowing them to produce the plans in time. Reflecting on this period, General Kircheim, the then commander of the 5th Light Division, said: "I do not like to be reminded of that time because so much blood was needlessly shed." Kirchheim had been reluctant to launch further attacks on Tobruk, as the cost of earlier assaults was very high.

Rommel remained wishfully positive that success was imminent. In his memoirs he would claim that he immediately realised that the enemy was determined to cling to Tobruk, however this seems to be in doubt. In a letter to his wife dated April 16,[18] he wrote that the enemy was already abandoning the town, and he remained confident that the enemy were not going to defend the town until well into April.[19] In reality the ships arriving at the port were not evacuating the defenders but unloading supplies, something a letter of his refers, starting to indicate doubts on 21 April.[20] His relations with his subordinate commanders were at their nadir at this point, especially with Streich who was openly critical of Rommel's decisions and refused to assume any responsibility for the attacks, and he began courtmartialing many of them, though ultimately signed almost none of the verdicts. This state of affairs led Army Chief Walther von Brauchitsch to write to him that instead of making threats and requesting the replacement of officers who "hitherto had excelled in battle... a calm and constructive debate might bring better results". Rommel remained unmoved.

At this point Rommel requested reinforcements for a renewed attack but the High Command, then completing preparations for Operation Barbarossa, could not spare any. Chief of Staff General Franz Halder had also told Rommel, before the latter left for Africa, that a larger force could not be logistically sustained, only to be told "that's your pigeon". Now Halder sarcastically commented: "now at last he is constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently strong to allow him to take full advantage of the 'unique opportunities' offered by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for quite some time over here."[21] Angry that his order not to advance beyond Maradah had been disobeyed, and alarmed at mounting losses, Halder, never an admirer of Rommel, dispatched Friedrich Paulus to "head off this soldier gone stark mad" in Halder's words.[22]

Upon arrival Paulus on 27 April was initially convinced to authorise yet another attack on Tobruk. Back in Berlin Halder wrote "in my view it is a mistake", but deferred to Paulus. When the attack, launched on 4 May, seemed to turn into a disaster he intervened and ordered it halted. In addition he now forbade Rommel from committing the forces into any new attack on Tobruk, and further ordered that the attacks were to halt until the regrouping was completed and even then no new assault was to take place without OKH's specific approval.

Furious with what he perceived as the lack of fighting spirit in his commanders and Italian allies, Rommel, on the insistence of Paulus and Halder, held off further attacks until the detailed plans of the Tobruk defences could be obtained, the 15th Panzer Division could be brought up to support the attack, and more training of his troops in positional warfare could be conducted,[23] after the last attack launched on 4 May.[24] For Streich however it was too late. He was transferred from command of 15th Panzer Division. When he met Rommel for the last time as he was taking his leave, Rommel told him that he had been "too concerned for the well-being of your troops"; Streich shot back: "I can recognise no greater words of praise", and a new quarrel ensued. After the decision was made to hold off attacks on Tobruk for an indefinite period, Rommel set about creating defensive positions, with Italian infantry forces holding Bardia, the Sollum-Sidi Omar line and investing Tobruk, and mobile German and Italian forces held in reserve to fight any British attacks from Egypt. To this end, Halfaya Pass was secured, the high water mark of Rommel's offensive. A elaborately prepared great assault was scheduled for 21 November 1941, but this attack never took place.

Whereas the defenders could be supplied by sea, the logistical problems of the Afrika Korps greatly hampered its operations, and a concentrated counterattack by the besieged Allies might have succeeded in reaching el adam and severing the Axis forces' communications. General Morshead, however, was misled by intelligence overestimates of the German forces investing Tobruk, thus no major action was attempted.

General Wavell made two unsuccessful attempts to relieve Tobruk (Operation Brevity (launched on 15 May) and Operation Battleaxe) (launched on 15 June). Both operations were easily defeated as they were hastily prepared, partly due to Churchill's impatience for speedy action. During Brevity the important Halfaya Pass was briefly recaptured by the British, but lost again on 27 May. Battleaxe resulted in the loss of 87 British for 25 German tanks, in a three day battle raging on the flanks of the Sollum and Halfaya Passes, with the British being unable to take these, by now, well fortified positions.[25]

In August Rommel was appointed commander of the newly created Panzer Group Africa. His previous command, the Afrika Korps compromising the 15th Panzer Division and the 5th Light Division, which by then had been redesignated 21st Panzer Division, was put under command of Generalleutnant Ludwig Crüwell, with Fritz Bayerlein as chief of staff. In addition to the Afrika Korps, Rommel's Panzer Group had the 90th Light Division and six Italian divisions, the Ariete and Trieste Divisions forming the XX Motorised Corps, three infantry divisions investing Tobruk and one holding Bardia.

The Allied counter offensive - Operation Crusader

Following the costly failure of Battleaxe, Wavell was replaced by Commander-in-Chief India, General Claude Auchinleck. The Allied forces were reorganized and strengthened to two corps, XXX and XIII, as the British Eighth Army under the command of Alan Cunningham. Auchinleck, having 770 tanks and 1,000 aircraft to support him, launched a major offensive to relieve Tobruk (Operation Crusader) on 18 November 1941. Rommel had two armoured divisions, the 15th and 21st with 260 tanks, the 90th Light Infantry division, and three Italian corps, five infantry and one armoured division with 154 tanks, with which to oppose him.

The Eighth Army deeply outflanked the German defences along the Egyptian frontier with a left hook through the desert, and reached a position from which they could strike at both Tobruk and the coastal road, the "Via Balbia". Auchinleck planned to engage the Afrika Korps with his armoured division, while XXX Corps assaulted the Italian positions at Bardia, encircling the troops there. The British operational plan had one major flaw. When XXX corps reached the area of Qabr Salih, it was assumed that the Afrika Korps would move eastward and accept battle, allowing the British to surround them with the southerly armour thrust. Rommel, however, did not find it necessary to do as the British planned, instead attacking the southern armoured thrust at Sidi Rezegh.[26]

Rommel was faced with the decision of whether to go through with the attack on Tobruk, trusting his screening forces to hold off the advancing British, or to reorient his forces to hit the British columns approaching. He considered the risks too great if he chose to attack Tobruk, and so called off this attack.[27]

The British armoured thrusts were largely defeated by fierce resistance from antitank positions and German and Italian tanks. The Italian Ariete Armoured Division was forced to give ground while inflicting losses on the advancing British at Bir el Gobi, whereas the 21st Panzer Division checked the attack launched against them and counterattacked on Gabr Saleh.[28] Over the next two days the British continued pressing the attack, sending their armoured brigades into the battle in a piecemeal fashion,[29] while Rommel, aware of his numerical inferiority, launched a concentrated attack on 23 November with all his armour. 21st Panzer Division held defensively at Sidi Rezegh, while 15th Panzer Division and the Italian Ariete Division attacked the flanks and enveloped the British armour. During this battle, among the biggest armoured battles of the North Africa campaign, the British tanks were surrounded, with about two-thirds destroyed and the survivors having to fight themselves out of the trap and head south to Gabr Saleh.[30]

Rommel counterattacks

On 24 November Rommel, wanting to exploit the halt of the British offensive, counterattacked deep into the British rear areas in Egypt with the intention of exploiting the disorganisation and confusion in the enemy's bases and cutting their supply lines. Rommel considered the other, more conservative, course of action of destroying the British forces halted before Tobruk and Bardia too time consuming.[31] Rommel knew his forces were incapable of driving such an effort home, but believed that the British, traumatised by their recent debacle, would abandon their defences along the border at the appearance of a German threat to their rear.[32]

General Cunningham did, as Rommel had hoped, decide to withdraw the Eighth Army to Egypt, but Auchinleck arrived from Cairo just in time to cancel the withdrawal orders.[33] The German attack, which began with only 100 operational tanks remaining,[34] stalled as it outran its supplies and met stiffening resistance. The counterattack was criticised by the German High Command and some of his staff officers as too dangerous with Commonwealth forces still operating along the coast east of Tobruk, and a wasteful attack as it bled his forces, in particular his remaining tank force. Among the Staff officers who were critical was Friedrich von Mellenthin, who said that "Unfortunately, Rommel overestimated his success and believed the moment had come to launch a general pursuit.".[35] In Rommel's favour, the attack very nearly succeeded, with the British Eighth Army commander ordering a withdrawal, and only Auchinleck's timely intevention prevented this.[36]

While Rommel drove into Egypt, the remaining Commonwealth forces east of Tobruk threatened the weak Axis lines there. Unable to reach Rommel for several days,[37] Rommel's Chief of Staff, Oberstleutnant Westphal, ordered the 21st Panzer Division withdrawn to support the defense of Tobruk. On 27 November the British attack on Tobruk linked up with the defenders, and Rommel, having suffered losses that could not easily be replaced, had to concentrate on relieving the 90th Light Divisions that had attacked into Egypt. By 6 December the Afrika Korps had averted the danger, and on 7 December Rommel fell back to a defensive line at Gazala, all the while under heavy attacks from the RAF. The Italian forces at Bardia were now cut off from the retreating Axis. The Allies, briefly held up at Gazala, kept up the pressure to some degree, although they were almost as exhausted and disorganised as Rommel's force,[38] and Rommel was forced to retreat all the way back to the starting positions he had held in March, reaching El Agheila on 30 December. His main concern during his withdrawal was being flanked to the south, so the Afrika Korps held the south flank during the retreat. The Allies followed, but never attempted a southern flanking move to cut off the retreating troops as they had done in 1940. The German-Italian garrison at Bardia surrendered on 2 January 1942.

On 5 January 1942 the Afrika Korps received 55 tanks and new supplies, and Rommel started planning a counterattack. On 20 January the attack was launched, which mauled the Allied forces, costing them some 110 tanks and other heavy equipment. The Afrika Korps retook Benghazi on 29 January and the Allies pulled back to the Tobruk area and commenced building defensive positions at Gazala.

During the confusion caused by the Crusader operation, Rommel and his staff found themselves behind Allied lines several times. On one occasion, he visited a New Zealand Army field hospital that was still under Allied control. "[Rommel] inquired if anything was needed, promised the British [sic] medical supplies and drove off unhindered."[39]

The second German offensive - The battle of Gazala

Following General Kesselrings's successes in creating local air superiority and suppressing the Malta defenders in April 1942, an increased flow of vital supplies reached the Afrika Korps, after it had been receiving about a third of its needed supplies for several months. With his forces thus strengthened, Rommel began planning a major push for the summer. Rommel felt the very strong British positions around Gazala could be outflanked, and he could then drive up behind them and destroy them.[40] The British were planning a summer offensive on their own, and their dispositions were more suited for an attack rather than a defense.

The British had 900 tanks in the area, 200 of which were new Grant tanks, whereas Rommel's Panzer Army Africa commanded a mere 320 German, 50 of which were the obsolete Panzer II model, and 240 Italian tanks, which were no better than the Panzer IIs.[41] Therefore Rommel had to rely predominantly on 88 mm guns to destroy the British heavy tanks, but even these were in short supply. In infantry and artillery Rommel found himself vastly outnumbered also, with many of his units under-strength following the campaigns of 1941. In contrast to the previous year the Axis had more-or-less air parity though.

On 26 May 1942 Rommel's army attacked in a classic outflanking Blitzkrieg operation in the Battle of Gazala. His Italian infantry assaulted the Gazala fortifications head on, with some armour attached to give the impressions that this was the main assault, while all his motorised and armoured forces outflanked the positions to the south. On the following morning Rommel cut through the flank and attacked north, but throughout the day a running armour battle occurred, where both sides took heavy losses. The attempted encirclement of the Gazala position had failed, and the Germans had lost a third of their heavy tanks. Renewing the attack on the morning of 28 May, Rommel concentrated on encircling and destroying separate units of the British armour. Heavy British counterattacks forced Rommel to assume a defensive posture, and not pursue his original plan of a dash north for the coast. On 2 June 90th Light Division and the Trieste Division surrounded and reduced the strongpoint at Bir Hakeim, capturing it on 11 June. With the southern strongpoint of the British line thus secured, Rommel attacked north again, forcing the British back, relying on the minefields of the Gazala lines to protect his left flank.[42] On 14 June the British began a headlong retreat east, the so-called "Gazala Gallop", to avoid being completely cut off.

On 15 June Axis forces reached the coast, eliminating any escape for the Commonwealth forces still occupying the Gazala positions. With this task completed, Rommel set off in pursuit of the fleeing Allied formations, aiming to capture Tobruk while the enemy was confused and disorganised.[43] Tobruk, isolated and alone, was now all that stood between the Afrika Korps and Egypt. On 21 June, after a swift, coordinated and fierce combined arms assault, the city surrendered along with its 33,000 defenders. Only at the fall of Singapore, earlier that year, had more British Commonwealth troops been captured. Part of the reason why Rommel could capture the fortress so quickly, was because the able troops who had defended Tobruk in 1941 had been dispatched to the Pacific at the insistence of the Australian Government, and the defenders were mostly troops who were disorganised after the Gazala battle. Hitler made Rommel a field marshal for this victory. (Rommel later told his confidante, Hans von Luck, that he would have preferred the Führer gave him another division.)

The drive for Egypt

Determined to ensure his supply lines, Rommel determined to press the attack on Mersa Matruh, despite the heavy losses he had suffered at Gazala and Tobruk. He also wanted to prevent the British from establishing a new frontline, and felt the weakness of the reeling British formations had to be exploited by a thrust into Egypt.[44] This decision met with some criticism, as an advance into Egypt meant a significant lenghthening of the supply lines.[45] It also meant that a proposed attack on Malta would have to wait, as the Luftwaffe would be required to support Rommel's drive east. Kesselring strongly disagreed with Rommel's decision, and went as far as threatening to withdraw his aircraft to Sicily.[46] Hitler agreed to Rommel's plan, despite protest from Italian HQ and some of his staff officers, seeing the potential for a complete victory in Africa.[47] Rommel, apparently aware of his growing reputation as a gambler, defended his decision by claiming that to merely hold the lines at Sollum would confer upon the British a distinct advantage, in that they could more easily outflank the positions at Sollum, and the overseas supply lines would still have to be routed via Tripoli unless he secured a front further east.[48]

On 22 June Rommel continued his offensive east, and initially little resistance was encountered. Apart from fuel shortages, the advance continued, until Mersa Matruh was encircled on 26 June, surrounding four infantry divisions, the bulk of the Eighth Army. One of the divisions managed to break out during the night, and over the next two days some elements of the remaining three divisions also slipped away. The fortress fell on 29 June, yielding enormous amounts of supplies and equipment, in addition to 6,000 POWs.[49]

Rommel continued his march east, but with the supply situation steadily worsening and his men exhausted after five weeks of constant warfare, the offensive on El Alamein seemed in doubt. On 1 July the First Battle of El Alamein started, but after almost a month of inconclusive fighting both sides, completely exhausted, dug in, halting Rommel's drive east. This was a serious blow to Rommel, who had hoped to drive his advance into the open desert beyond El Alamein where he could conduct a mobile defense.[50] Although the Eighth Army suffered higher causalties in the fighting around El Alamein, some 13,000, Rommel lost 7,000 men, 1,000 of which were Germans, and he could afford the losses to a much lesser degree.

The Allies attack again - Second Battle of El Alamein

The summer standoff

After the stalemate at El Alamein, Rommel hoped to go on the offensive again before massive amounts of men and materiel could reach the British Eighth Army. With Allied forces from Malta interdicting his supplies at sea, and the Desert Air Force keeping up a relentless campaign against Axis supply vessels in Tobruk, Bardia and Mersa Matruh, most of what supplies reaching the Afrika Korps still had to be landed at Benghazi and Tripoli, and the enormous distances supplies had to travel to reach his forward troops, meant that a rapid reorganisation of the Afrika Korps could not be done. Further hampering Rommel's plans was the fact that the Italian divisions received priority on supplies, with the Italian authorities shipping materiel for the Italian formations at a much higher rate then for those of German formations.[51] It seems the Italian HQ was uneasy with Rommel's ambitions, and wanted their own forces, whom they at least had some control over, resupplied first.[52]

The British, preparing for a renewed drive, replaced C-in-C Auchinleck with General Harold Alexander. The Eighth Army also got a new commander, Bernard Montgomery. They received a steady stream of supplies, and were able to reorganise their forces. In late August they received a large convoy, carrying over 100,000 tons of supplies, and Rommel, learning of this, felt that time was running out. Rommel decided to launch an attack, with the 15th and 21st Panzer Division, 90th Light Division and the Italian XX Motorised Corps in a drive through the southern flank of the Alamein lines. The terrain here was without any easily defendable features and so open to attack. Montgomery, having realised this threat, had set up his main defenses behind the Alamein line, along the Alam el Halfa ridge, where he could meet any outflanking trust.

The battle of Alam el Halfa

The Battle of Alam el Halfa was launched on 30 August, with Rommel's forces driving through the south flank. After passing the Alamein line to the south, Rommel drove north at the Alam el Halfa ridge, just as Montgomery had anticipated. Under heavy fire from British artillery and aircraft, and in the face of well prepared positions that Rommel could not hope to outflank due to lack of petrol, the attack stalled, and by 2 September Rommel decided the battle unwinnable, and decided to withdraw.[53]

Montgomery, seeing that the enemy withdrew, ordered his 2nd New Zealand Division and 7th Armoured Division to attack on 3 September, but the attack was stalled by a fierce rearguard action by the 90th Light Division, and Montgomery called off further pursuits.[54] On 5 September Rommel was back where he had started, with only heavy losses to show for it. Rommel had 2,940 causalties, lost 50 tanks, a similar number of guns and perhaps worst of all 400 trucks, vital for supplies and movement. The British losses, except tank losses of 68, were much less, furher adding to the numerical inferiority of Panzer Armee Afrika. The Desert Air Force had inflicted the highest proportions of damage to Rommel's forces, and he now realised the war in Africa was unwinnable without more air support, which was an impossibility with the Luftwaffe already stretched to breaking point on other fronts.[55]

Second battle of El Alamein

In September the British launched a series of raids on important logistical harbours and supply points, collectively known as Operation Agreement. Added to this, the level of supplies successfully ferried across the Mediterranean had fallen to a dismal level. In addition, Rommel's health was failing and he took sick leave in Italy and Germany from late September, thus being away from the front when the Second Battle of El Alamein was launched on 23 October 1942. Although he immediately set out for the front it took him two vital days to reach his HQ in Africa. The defensive plan at El Alamein was more static in nature than Rommel had wished, but with the shortness of motorised units and fuel supply he had left it was the only course left open to him.[56] The defensive line had strong fortifications and was protected with a large minefield, which in turn was covered with machine guns and artillery. This, Rommel hoped, would allow his infantry to hold the line at any point until motorised and armour units in reserve behind the front could advance to the points of engagement and counterattack any British breaches.[57]

During the initial fighting the commander in charge of Panzer Army Africa in Rommel's absence, General Georg Stumme, died of a heart attack while en route between two command posts. This delayed the German command staff in reaching vital decisions in the battle's early hours, until General Ritter von Thoma took command. After having returned to the Alamein front, Rommel learnt that the fuel supply situation, critical when he left in September, was now disastrous, with his army scarcely having any fuel left, hampering any mobile defense Rommel might undertake.[58] Counterattacks by the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions on 24 October and 25 October had caused heavy tank losses, due to the intensity of the British artillery and aircraft bombardments. Rommel's main concern was to counterattack in full force and throw the British out of the defensive lines, in his view the only chance the Germans had of avoiding defeat.[59] The counterattack was launched early on 26 October, but the British units that had penetrated the defensive line held fast on Kidney ridge. The British continued pushing hard with armoured units to force the breakthrough, but the defenders' fire destroyed many tanks, leading to doubts among the officers in the British armored brigades about the chances of clearing a breach.[60]

Montgomery, seeing his armoured brigades losing tanks at an alarming rate, stopped major attacks until 1 November, when he achieved a 4 km penetration of the line. Rommel immediately counterattacked with what tanks he had available in an attempt to encircle the pocket during 2 November, but the heavy British fire stopped the attempt. By this time Panzer Army Africa had only one-third of its initial strength remaining, with only 35 tanks left operational, virtually no fuel or ammunition and with the British in complete command of the air,[61] yet the British had been fought to a standstill, having taken murderous losses with some armour brigades reporting losses of 75% of their strength.

Rommel's retreat

On 3 November Montgomery found it impossible to renew his attack, and he had to wait for more reinforcements to be brought up. This lull was what Rommel needed for his withdrawal, which had been planned since 29 October, when Rommel determined the situation hopeless.[62] At midday, however, Rommel received a message from Hitler, forbidding a retreat with his infamous "victory or death" stand fast order. Although this order demanded the impossible and virtually ensured the destruction of Panzer Army Africa, Rommel could not bring himself to disobey a direct order from der Führer and the Axis forces clung desperately on.[63]

On 4 November Montgomery renewed the attack, with fresh forces brought up from the rear, and with almost 500 tanks against the 20 or so remaining to Rommel. By midday the Italian XX Motorised Corps had been surrounded, and after some hours of desperate resistance the Corps was completely destroyed. This left a 20 km gap in Rommel's line, with powerful armour and motorised British units pouring through the lines, threatening the entire Panzer Army Africa with encirclement. At this point Rommel could no longer uphold the no retreat order, and ordered a general retreat. Early on 5 November he received authorisation by Hitler to withdraw, 12 hours after his decision to do so - but it was far too late, with only remnants of his Army streaming West, while most of his unmotorised forces (the bulk of his army) unable to reach safety.[64]

After the defeat at El Alamein, Rommel's forces managed to escape, but took heavy losses from constant air attacks. Despite urgings from Hitler and Mussolini, Rommel's forces did not stop to engage the pursuing Allies until they had entered Tunisia, except for brief holding engagements, due to the numerical superiority and air supremacy of the Allied and most of Rommel's remaining divisions reduced to combat groups.[65]

The end in Africa

In Tunisia Rommel launched an offensive against the U.S. II Corps, rather than the British Eighth Army, in part due to his reluctance to hold the British east of Tunisia with his depleted forces and seeing this as a way of redeploying some forces west.[66] Rommel inflicted a sharp defeat on the American forces at the Kasserine Pass in February.

Turning once again to face the British Commonwealth forces in the old French border defences of the Mareth Line, Rommel could only delay the inevitable. At the end of January 1943, the Italian General Giovanni Messe was appointed the new commander of Rommel’s Panzer Army Africa, which was now renamed the 1st Italo-German Panzer Army (in recognition of the fact that it consisted of one German and three Italian corps). Though Messe was to replace Rommel, he diplomatically deferred to the German, and the two coexisted in what was theoretically the same command until 9 March, when Rommel finally departed Africa. Rommel's departure was kept secret on Hitler's explicit orders, so that the morale of the Axis troops could be maintained and respectful fear by their enemies retained. The last Rommel offensive in North Africa occurred on 6 March 1943, when he attacked Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army at the Battle of Medenine with three Panzer divisions (10, 15, and 21). Decoded Ultra intercepts allowed Montgomery to deploy large numbers of anti-tank guns in the path of the offensive. After losing 52 tanks, Rommel was forced to call off the assault. On 9 March he handed over command of Armeegruppe Afrika to General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim and left Africa, because of health reasons, never to return. On 13 May 1943, after the collapse of the German 5th Army, the fall of Tunis and the surrounding of the Italian 1st Army, still holding the line at Enfidaville, General Messe formally surrendered the remnants of Armeegruppe Afrika to the Allies. On 12 May, one day before the surrender, Messe was promoted to the rank of field marshal.

Some historians contrast Rommel's withdrawal to Tunisia against Hitler's wishes with Friedrich Paulus's obedience of orders to have the German Sixth Army stand its ground at the Battle of Stalingrad, which resulted in its annihilation. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, appointed overall Axis commander in North Africa, saw things differently. He believed the withdrawals, some of which were carried out against his orders, unnecessary and ruinous since they brought forward British airfields ever closer to the port of Tunis. As far as he was concerned Rommel was an insubordinate defeatist and string-puller. The increasingly acrimonious relations between the two did nothing to enhance performance.

According to papers left by Lieutenant-Colonel G.C.T Keyes there was a failed Allied attempt to capture Rommel from his headquarters, 250 miles behind enemy lines during February 1943.[1]

France 1943-1944

The inglorious end of the North African campaign meshed poorly with the Nazi propaganda machine's relentless portrayal of Rommel as an unbeatable military genius. This opened in Berlin the awkward question of precisely what use now to make of the erstwhile Desert Fox. Back in Germany, he was for some time virtually "unemployed". On 23 July 1943 he moved to Greece as commander of Army Group E, to defend the Greek coast against a possible allied landing that never happened, only to return to Germany two days later, upon the overthrow of Mussolini. On 17 August 1943, Rommel moved his headquarters from Munich to Lake Garda, as commander of a new Army Group B, created to defend the north of Italy.

After Hitler gave General Albert Kesselring sole Italian command, on 21 November, Rommel moved Army Group B to Normandy, France, with responsibility for defending the French coast against the long anticipated Allied invasion. Dismayed by the situation he found, the slow building pace, and fearing he had just months before an invasion, Rommel reinvigorated the whole fortification effort along the Atlantic coast. While Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief West, believed strongly in a landing at Pas-de-Calais because it offered a great strategical springboard for a thrust against Germany, Führer HQ, although agreeing with this assessment, considered a landing at Normandy as a possibility.[67] Rommel, believing that Normandy was indeed a likely landing ground, argued that it did not matter to the Allies where they landed, just that the landing was successful.[68] He therefore toured the Normandy defenses extensively during January and February 1944, ordering millions of mines laid, and thousands of tank traps and obstacles set up on beaches and throughout the countryside, including in fields suitable for glider aircraft landings, the so-called Rommel's Asparaguses.[69]

After his battles in Africa, Rommel concluded that any offensive movement would be nearly impossible due to overwhelming Allied air superiority. He argued that the tank forces should be dispersed in small units and kept in heavily fortified positions as close to the front as possible, so they would not have to move far and en masse when the invasion started.[70] He wanted the invasion stopped right on the beaches. However, his commander, von Rundstedt, felt that there was no way to stop the invasion near the beaches due to the equally overwhelming firepower of the Royal Navy. He felt the tanks should be formed into large units well inland near Paris, where they could allow the Allies to extend into France and then cut off the Allied troops. Other renowned Panzer commanders agreed with von Rundstedt, with Heinz Guderian among his supporters. The commander of Panzer Group West, General Geyr von Schweppenburg strongly disagreed with Rommel, wanting the armour placed far inland. When asked to pick a plan, Hitler vacillated and placed them in the middle, far enough to be useless to Rommel, not far enough to watch the fight for von Rundstedt, in an order in late April.[71] Rommel did order some of the armoured formations under his command to take up positions as far forward as possible, ordering General Erich Marcks, commanding the 84th Corps defending the Normandy section, to move his reserves into the frontline.

In April the Allies started their Operation Fortitude, a plan to mislead the Germans as to the actual landing place for D-Day. Although Hitler himself firmly believed in a Normandy invasion as late as early May, the information his belief was based on, intercepted allied plans, analysis of enemy mine laying and bombing operations and air reconnaissance over southern England, was not revealed to the commanders in France, and Rommel, along with most Wehrmacht commanders in France, also started believing in a Pas-de-Calais landing.[72] With this, his focus on building obstacles shifted to the Somme River estuary, lagging the work in Normandy. By D-Day on 6 June 1944, virtually all German officers, including those in the Führer's HQ, firmly believed that Pas-De-Calais was going to be the invasion site, and, when it occurred, many thought that the Normandy landing was a mere diversion. There was still some doubt though, with Jodl's staff still warning of the favourable landing opportunities in Normandy on 2 June, indeed this was confirmed by intelligence intercepts of British messages to the French resistance movement in Normandy. However, this information was not heeded by the commanders in France.[73]

During the confusing opening hours of D-Day, the German command structure in France was in disarray. Rommel, along with several other important officers, was on leave, despite the clear signs of an imminent invasion.[74] Several tank units, notably the 12th SS Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr, were close enough to the beaches to create serious havoc. The absence of Rommel, along with the still reigning confusion among the Staff officers, led to a hesitation and unwillingness to release the panzer reserves, fearing the second part of the invasion which was imagined to land further north. Facing only small-scale German attacks, the Allies quickly secured a beachhead. Rommel personally oversaw the bitter fighting around Caen, where only the determined defence of Kampfgruppe von Luck hindered a British breakout on the first day. Here, again, the necessary liberty of the on-site commanders were withheld, and the German commanders did not launch a concentrated counterattack before midday on the 6 June.

The plot against Hitler

May 1944, Rommel (right) with his closest staff members: (L to R), his personal aide Captain Hellmuth Lang, his chief naval aide Admiral Friedrich Ruge, and his chief of staff General Hans Speidel. Speidel was heavily involved in the anti-Nazi conspiracy within the Wehrmacht.

On 17 July 1944, Rommel's staff car was strafed by an RCAF Spitfire piloted by Charley Fox; he was hospitalized with major head injuries. (Although the Americans claimed to have hit the vehicle as well, many German reports specifically mentioned a Canadian Spitfire as the sole attacker). In the meantime, after the unsuccessful July 20 Plot against Adolf Hitler, a widespread investigation was conducted to identify possible participants in the plot. Rommel was identified in some of the coup ringleaders’ documentation as a potential supporter and an acceptable military leader to be placed in a position of responsibility should their coup succeed.

A memorial at the site of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's suicide outside of the town of Herrlingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany (west of Ulm).

No evidence was found that directly linked Rommel to the plot, nor that he had been contacted by any of the plot ringleaders. At the same time, local Nazi party officials reported on Rommel's extensive and scornful criticism of Nazi incompetent leadership during the time he was hospitalized. Bormann was certain of Rommel's involvement, Goebbels was not. The only serious evidence against him was provided by his chief of staff Hans Speidel who scapegoated Rommel for his own actions, claiming that the rebellious orders were issued by Rommel, not him, and that he, Speidel, tried to report these criminal acts to Berlin, but was prevented from so doing (See Reuth 2006). Another piece of evidence against Rommel was that his name was found on a list drawn up by Dr Carl Goerdeler on which he was earmarked as a possible future President of Germany. Rommel himself had no knowledge of this. (See Young 1950). Unfortunately for Rommel, the 'Court of Military Honour' that was to decide whether or not to hand him over to Roland Freisler's People's Court included two men with whom Rommel had crossed swords before, Heinz Guderian and Gerd von Rundstedt. The Court decided that Rommel should be handed over to the People's Court

The true extent of Rommel's knowledge of or involvement with the plot is still unclear. After the war, however, his wife maintained that Rommel had been against the plot. It has been stated that Rommel wanted to avoid giving future generations of Germans the perception that the war was lost because of backstabbing, the infamous Dolchstoßlegende, as was commonly believed by some Germans of World War I. Even if he'd been against it, his knowledge of the plot, even if he hadn't been directly involved, without telling the Nazi hierarchy was tantamount to being complicit with it in the eyes of the Nazis, which in turn was enough to bring about his execution.

Because of Rommel's popularity with the German people, and possibly because he'd been one of Hitler's favorites and one of Germany's most successful battlefield commanders, he was given the option of committing suicide with cyanide or facing a trial before Roland Freisler's "People's Court" and the murder (or internment into the concentration camps) of his family and staff. Rommel ended his own life on 14 October 1944. After the war, an edited version of his diary was published as The Rommel Papers. He is the only member of the Third Reich establishment to have a museum dedicated to him. His grave can be found in Herrlingen, a short distance west of Ulm.

The Nazi elite, naturally gave a different 'official' story as to the reason for Rommel's death, to the general public. It was convenient that Rommel had been recently wounded in his encounter with a spitfire on 17th July. This enabled them to craft the reason for his death as being that he had died heroically from his wounds. To further strengthen the lie, Hitler even ordered an official day of mourning to commemorate the event and Rommel was buried with full military honours. Hitler took a leading role in the highly publicized funeral.

Otto Moritz Walter Model (January 24, 1891 – April 21, 1945) was a German general and later field marshal during World War II. He was noted for his defensive skills and was nicknamed "Hitler's fireman". Model was known in the German General Staff as a loyal follower of Hitler but also one of the most skilled tacticians during the war.

During the Polish and French campaigns in 1939 and 1940 he served as a corps and army chief of staff. In the Russian campaigns from 1941 until 1944 he served as a division, corps, army and finally army group commander.

As commanding general of the XXXXI Panzer Corps, Model spearheaded Operation Typhoon, the leg of Operation Barbarossa intended to take Moscow. During the assault, Model's forces captured important bridgeheads leading to Moscow and came within 20 km (12 mi) of the city before the Red Army stopped his advance.

In January 1942 Model was appointed commanding general of the 9th Army and, shortly thereafter, awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross. During the Battles of Rzhev, Model's army was trapped and still managed to destroy large numbers of Russian troops and successfully defend the area until 1943 when Hitler ordered a withdrawal. For his defensive skills he was awarded the Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross following the withdrawal from Rhzev.

In 1943 Model led the northern assault on Kursk during Operation Citadel. Model was opposed to the operation as well as to Hitler's orders to stand fast under all circumstances. Hitler later allowed Model to withdraw, and he managed to break out of the Oryol, which the Russians were about to retake.

In January 1944 Model was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North on the Eastern Front. In March he was promoted to Field Marshal, "Generalfeldmarschall". He then commanded Army Group Narva, created out of Army Group North to prevent a Soviet breakthrough to the Baltic Sea in what became the Battle of Narva.

In mid-August Model was transferred to the west as Commander-in-Chief West and concurrently as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B. Upon Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt's return as Commander-in-Chief West in early September, Model retained command of Army Group B, a post he kept until the Group's final dissolution in April 1945. As Commander of Army Group B, Model helped stem the Allied advance during Operation Market Garden.

When Hitler ordered the ardennes offensive to be launched Model again protested against the plan and argued with him, but he still obeyed and along with Rundstedt he commanded the assault along the Ardennes lines also known as the Battle of the Bulge. Although he did whatever he could to transform the offensive into a new miracle for Hitler, he simply didn't have the manpower or fuel to continue the initial progress that the attack made.

Believing that a field marshal should not surrender, Model committed suicide by shooting himself in the head in a wooded area between Duisburg and the village Lintorf, which today is part of Ratingen, on 21 April 1945, before he could be captured. He is buried in the Soldatenfriedhof Vossenack, a German military cemetery located near the town of Vossenack.

Model was recognized as one of the most capable of Hitler's Marshals and a brilliant defensive tactician. Although he tended to be disliked by his immediate subordinates for a harsh and overbearing manner, he enjoyed widespread popularity among the enlisted troops on the front, whom he visited almost constantly. During the defensive battles around Rzhev in the winter of 1942, he once took personal command of an infantry battalion and leading a charge against a Soviet position with his pistol in hand. Although he was not a Nazi, he enjoyed the almost complete trust of Hitler, and was thus able to stand up to him to a degree that few others would even have contemplated, sometimes openly disobeying orders from the Fuehrer without facing any reprisals. He is once said to have quarreled with Hitler over the placement of reinforcements to the 9th army before Moscow. When Hitler refused to accept his advice, he looked at him coldly and asked "Who commands the 9th army my Fuehrer, you or I?" He then told Hitler that he knew the situation at the front far better than he did, because he had seen conditions personally rather than having to rely entirely upon maps. Although he pursued a ruthless, scorched earth policy during his retreats on the Eastern Front and showed no objections to the treatment of civilians by the SS in the areas under his command, he refused to dispatch troops from Army Group Centre (which he commanded in the Summer of 1944) to put down the Warsaw rebellion, stating bluntly that the revolt was the product of the corrupt and incompetent Nazi administration in Poland, with which the regular army should have nothing to do. Hitler did not punish him for his actions, and assigned the task to Heinrich Himmler instead.

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (17 June 1888 – 14 May 1954) was a military theorist and innovative General of the German Army during the Second World War. Germany's panzer forces were raised and fought according to his works, best-known among them Achtung - Panzer! He held posts as Panzer Corps commander, Panzer Army commander, Inspector-General of Armored Troops, and chief of staff of the army (Chef des Generalstabs des Heeres). He rose to the rank of full general (Generaloberst) or Colonel General in July 1940. Although he never became a Field Marshal, Guderian is recognized as one of the most prominent generals of WWII.

World War II

In the Second World War Guderian first served as the commander of the XIX Army Corps in the invasion of Poland and the invasion of France. He personally led the attack that traversed the Ardennes Forest, crossed the Meuse River and broke through the French lines at Sedan. Guderian's panzer group led the "race to the sea" that split the Allied armies in two, depriving the French armies and the BEF in Northern France and Belgium of their fuel, food, spare parts and ammunition.

In 1941 he commanded Panzergruppe Guderian in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, receiving the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves in July of that year. From October 5, 1941 he led the redesignated Second Panzer Army. During the Barbarossa campaign he led his panzer forces in rapid Blitzkrieg style advances and earned the nickname "Schneller Heinz" (Fast Heinz) among his troops. His armored spearhead captured Smolensk in a remarkably short time and was poised to launch the final assault on Moscow when he was ordered to turn South towards Kiev (see Lötzen decision). He was relieved of command on 25 December 1941 after Gunther von Kluge claimed that he had ordered a withdrawal in contradiction of Hitler's "standfast" order and transferred to the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) reserve pool. Guderian would forever deny that he did anything of the sort, and it seems that, indeed, he did not[citation needed]. Ironically this apparently mythical insubordination is still cited by his admirers as proof of his independence of spirit before Hitler. Guderian's own view on the matter was that he had been victimised by Kluge and at some point so abused Kluge with accusations related to his dismissal that he provoked Kluge into challenging him to a duel, which Hitler naturally forbade.

After the German defeat at Stalingrad, Guderian was recalled to active service and on 1 March 1943 became the Inspector-General of the Armoured Troops. Here his responsibilities were to determine armoured doctrine, oversee tank design and production, and the training of Germany's panzer forces.

On 21 July 1944, after the failure of the July 20 Plot, he became chief of staff of the army (Chef des Generalstabs des Heeres) as a successor to Kurt Zeitzler, who had departed July 1st with a nervous breakdown. During his tenure as Chief of Staff he had a long series of violent rows with Hitler over the way in which Germany should handle the war on both fronts. Hitler finally dismissed Guderian on 28 March 1945 after an argument over the failed counterattack of General Theodor Busse at Küstrin; Hitler told Guderian that his health problems demanded him taking 6 weeks of convalescent leave. He was replaced as Chief of Staff by General Hans Krebs.

Life after the war

Despite Soviet and Polish government protests, Guderian was not charged with any war crimes during the Nuremberg Trials, as his actions and behavior were ruled to be consistent with those of a professional soldier.

Poland argued that at the Battle of Wizna, Guderian had threatened the Polish commander Władysław Raginis with shooting prisoners of war if he did not order the remaining Polish forces to surrender. Some military historians view this as a masterful bluff; however Poles generally do not regard it as such. Guderian also accepted an estate in the newly annexed Warthegau region in German territory annexed from Poland after the invasion. The previous Polish owners of the estate were evicted. The Warthegau comprised roughly the formerly Imperial German Province of Posen (1871–1918). Guderian also received and accepted a state gift of money from Hitler after his retirement in 1942.[1]

Guderian surrendered to American troops on May 10, 1945, and remained in U.S. custody as a prisoner of war until his release on June 17, 1948. He died on May 14, 1954, in Southern Bavaria and is buried at the Friedhof Hildesheimerstrasse in Goslar.

Guderian's son, Heinz Günther Guderian, became a prominent General in the post-war German Bundeswehr and NATO.

Hermann Wilhelm Göring (also Goering in English) (January 12, 1893 – October 15, 1946) was a German politician and military leader, a leading member of the Nazi Party, second in command of the Third Reich, and commander of the Luftwaffe. He was tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg Trials in 1945-1946 and sentenced to death by hanging, however, he escaped the hangman's noose around two hours before his scheduled execution by way of potassium cyanide. Last commander of Manfred von Richthofen's famous air squadron, Göring was a war hero of World War I and for continuous courage in action was awarded the coveted Pour le Mérite.

Göring was skeptical and averse to the path of war. He believed Germany was not prepared to embark on a new conflict and, in particular, he believed that Germany's air force, the Luftwaffe, whose leadership was entrusted to his own hands, wasn't yet prepared to beat the RAF. However, once World War II started, Göring was determined to win at any cost.

Initially, decisive German victories followed quickly one after the other, Göring's modern Luftwaffe destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days and after the invasion of France, Hitler awarded Göring the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross for his successful leadership. Göring's political and military careers were at their peak.

Propaganda leaflet dropped by RAF Bomber Command over Germany in 1942. The leaflet comically shows Göring and his supposed reaction to the successes of the Luftwaffe under his leadership and its later failure to defend Germany against retaliatory RAF bombing of German cities

The Luftwaffe's failure to gain control of the skies during the Battle of Britain marked Hitler's first defeat and put a stain on Göring's reputation. After that campaign he lost much of his influence in the Nazi hierarchy and faded briefly from the military scene, enjoying the pleasures of life as a wealthy and powerful man. His reputation for extravagance made him particularly unpopular as ordinary Germans began to suffer deprivation.

If Göring was skeptical about war on the western front, he was absolutely certain that a new campaign against Russia was doomed to be disastrous. After trying, completely in vain, to convince Hitler to give up operation Barbarossa, he embraced the campaign against Russia as a chance to redeem credit from the disastrous British attack. As he had foreseen, the war against the Soviet Union turned out to be Germany's most ignominious defeat. Göring's contribution, as the head of the Luftwaffe, did not match his outlandish promises, and, as a result, negatively affected his relationship with Hitler.

Göring also sponsored a ground combat unit, the eponymous Hermann Göring Division, an elite unit which fought on various fronts with success. His other units on the eastern front were not so successful. At the Oder front, he had 2 Fallschirmjäger (airborne) divisions, which were partially composed of Luftwaffe's officers without any ground combat experience. He's known to have said in one of the Hassleben's planning meetings: "When my both airborne divisions attack, the entire Red Army can be thrown to hell". When the Red Army attacked, Göring's 9th Parachute Division (Germany) collapsed first.

He was also Commander-in-Chief of Forschungsamt ("FA"), the Nazi underground monitoring services for telephone and radio communications. This was connected to SS, SD and Abwehr intelligence services.

Göring was also placed in charge of exploiting the vast industrial resources captured during the war, particularly in the Soviet Union. This proved to be an almost total disaster and little of the available potential was effectively harnessed for the service of the German military machine. However, Göring was notorious for his role as one of the Nazi plunderers of art and other valuables from occupied Europe.

Göring was the highest figure in the Nazi Hierarchy who had authorized on paper[19] the "final solution of the Jewish Question", when he issued a memo to SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich to organize the practical details, (which culminated in the Wannsee Conference). He wrote, "submit to me as soon as possible a general plan of the administrative material and financial measures necessary for carrying out the desired final solution of the Jewish question." It is almost certain however that Hitler issued a verbal order to Göring in late 1941 to this effect.[citation needed]

Near the end of the war, as the Red Army closed in around the German capital on April 23, 1945, Göring sent a telegram from Berchtesgaden to Berlin in which he proposed to assume leadership of the Reich as Hitler's designated successor. Hitler considered this disloyalty and high treason, especially because Göring mentioned a time limit after which he would consider Hitler incapacitated. Hitler had Göring placed under arrest by Bernhard Frank on April 25 and in his political testament Hitler dismissed Göring from all his sundry offices and expelled him from the party Two days before ending his own life Hitler sent orders to Frank to execute Göring, his wife and their young daughter (Hitler's own goddaughter). A combination of Göring's considerable charm, Frank's confusion and terror at the last days of the war and perhaps common decency where the death of an innocent German child was concerned led to Frank's rejection of the order. Instead the Görings and their captors moved together, with little formality and no semblance of a captives and captors relationship, to the same Schloß Mauterndorf where Göring had spent much of his childhood and which he had inherited (along with Burg Veldenstein) from his godfather's widow upon her death in 1937. (Göring had arranged for preferential treatment for the woman after his rise to power, a consideration that guaranteed her immunity from the confiscation and arrest that may have been her fate as the widow of a wealthy Jew.)

Ironically, during World War II, Herman Göring's nephew, Capt. Werner G. Goering, piloted B-17 Flying Fortresses on 48 bombing missions against occupied Europe. Born and raised in Salt Lake City, the young Göring spoke fluent German. After an extensive background check, he was assigned to the 303rd Bombardment Group -- Hell's Angeles -- of the 8th Air Force, based at Molesworth, England. This fact was kept secret by the Army Air Force during the time that young Göring flew missions against Nazi Germany. However, the AAF still assigned him a "uniquely qualified" co-pilot -- First Lt. Jack P. Rencher. Rencher was given orders to shoot him if he ever tried to land in Germany. According to Rencher, however, the only time young Göring wasn't eager to rain destruction on Nazi Germany was when he had to bomb Cologne, where his grandmother lived. "He was neat, clean, a sharp dresser and in every sense military minded," Rencher said. "While I served with him he and I got along well together and I believe made an excellent team. I know of no one I would rather serve as copilot with."

Equally ironically, his younger brother Albert Göring was notable for helping Jews and dissidents survive in Germany during the war.

Capture, trial and death

Göring surrendered on May 9, 1945 in Bavaria. He was the second highest ranking Nazi official brought before the Nuremberg Trials, behind Reich President (former Admiral) Karl Dönitz. Göring's last days were spent with Gustave Gilbert, a Jewish German-speaking intelligence officer and psychologist who was granted free access by the Allies to all the prisoners held in the Nuremberg jail. Gilbert classified Göring as having an IQ of 138, the same as he ascribed to Karl Dönitz. He kept a journal of his observations of the proceedings and his conversations with the prisoners, which he later published in the book Nuremberg Diary. The following quotation was a part of a conversation Gilbert held with a dejected Göring in his cell on the evening of 18 April 1946, as the trials were halted for a three-day Easter recess.

"Sweating in his cell in the evening, Göring was defensive and deflated and not very happy over the turn the trial was taking. He said that he had no control over the actions or the defense of the others, and that he had never been anti-Semitic himself, had not believed these atrocities, and that several Jews had offered to testify in his behalf."

Despite claims that he was not anti-Semitic, while in the prison yard at Nuremberg, after hearing a remark about Jewish survivors in Hungary, Albert Speer reported overhearing Göring say, "So, there are still some there? I thought we had knocked off all of them. Somebody slipped up again."[20]

Göring dressed for display, along with the other war criminals, after committing suicide by cyanide.

Though he defended himself vigorously, he was sentenced to death by hanging. The judgment stated that:

"There is nothing to be said in mitigation. For Goering was often, indeed almost always, the moving force, second only to his leader. He was the leading war aggressor, both as political and as military leader; he was the director of the slave labour programme and the creator of the oppressive programme against the Jews and other races, at home and abroad. All of these crimes he has frankly admitted. On some specific cases there may be conflict of testimony, but in terms of the broad outline, his own admissions are more than sufficiently wide to be conclusive of his guilt. His guilt is unique in its enormity. The record discloses no excuses for this man."

Göring dispatched an appeal in which he said he would accept the court's death penalty if they allowed him to be shot as a soldier instead of hanged as a common criminal, but the court members refused to allow him this honor. Defying the sentence imposed by his captors, he committed suicide with a potassium cyanide capsule the night before he was supposed to be hanged. Where Göring obtained the cyanide, and how he had managed to hide it during his entire imprisonment at Nuremberg, remains unknown. In the 1950s, Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski claimed that he had given Göring the cyanide shortly before Göring's death. However, this claim is usually dismissed. Later theories speculate that Göring befriended U.S. Army Lieutenant Jack G. "Tex" Wheelis, who was stationed at the Nuremberg Trials and helped Göring obtain cyanide which had likely been hidden among Göring's personal effects when they were confiscated by the Army.[22] In 2005, former Army private Herbert Lee Stivers claimed he gave Göring "medicine" hidden inside a gift fountain pen from a German woman the private had met and flirted with. Stivers served in the U.S. 1st Infantry Division's 26th Regiment, who formed the honour guard for the Nuremberg Trials. Stivers claims to have been unaware of what the "medicine" he delivered actually was until after Göring's death. After his suicide, Hermann Göring was cremated and his ashes were scattered in the Conwentzbach in Munich, which runs into the Isar river.

Albrecht von Kesselring (August 8, 1881 - July 16, 1960) was a Generalfeldmarschall during World War II. One of the most respected and skillful generals of Nazi Germany, he was nicknamed "Smiling Albert" or "Smiling Kesselring".

In the Polish campaign, Kesselring commanded 1st Air Fleet and later in 1940 2nd Air Fleet in France. During the Battle of Britain he almost succeeded in defeating the RAF. In December 1941, Kesselring was appointed Commander-in-Chief South with command of all Luftwaffe units in the Mediterranean and North African theaters. In late 1943 he was redesignated as Commander-in-Chief Southwest with nominal command of all German armed forces in Italy, where he led a brilliant twenty-month-long campaign of defence up the peninsula. Kesselring succeeded in keeping Rome an open city, avoiding the destruction of many artistically important Italian cities, including Rome, Florence, Siena and Orvieto. He also tried to save Monte Cassino, but was unsuccesful. On 29 April,General Heinrich von Vietinghoff-Scheel, Commander of Army Group Southwest, signed an unconditional surrender of all German troops in Italy at the Royal Palace in Caserta. The surrender was to take effect on 2 May.

Kesselring was transferred to Germany as Commander-in-Chief West in March 1945. On 30 April, Hitler committed suicide in Berlin. On 1 May, Karl Dönitz was designated German President (Reichspräsident) and the Flensburg government was created. One of new President's first acts was the appointment of Kesselring as Commander-in-Chief of Southern Germany. He was taken prisoner at Saalfelden on 6 May 1945.

In 1947, the Allies tried him for the shootings of civilians by troops under his command, as reprisal for attacks by italian partisans, during the italian campaign. He was charged in particular with the shooting of 335 italian citizens, partly partisans, mostly civilians, in reprisal of the attack of Via Rasella in Rome (Ardeatine massacre). He was found guilty and sentenced to death. In his memoirs Kesselring claims that many of these shootings were carried out by communist partisans in German uniforms, while others were carried out by the SS, over which he had no authority.

The sentence was changed to life imprisonment. Kesselring was released from prison in 1952 in consideration of his ill health.

He died at Bad Nauheim, West Germany, in 1960 at the age of 79.

Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen (10 October 1895 - 12 July 1945) was a German fighter ace during World War I and a general and field marshal of the Luftwaffe during World War II.

Von Richthofen was a distant cousin of the German World War I flying ace Manfred von Richthofen, popularly known as the "Red Baron" (who had shot down 80 enemy aircraft before being killed in action in 1918), and the baron's younger brother Lothar von Richthofen, who himself shot down 40 enemy aircraft.

World War II

At the outbreak of World War II on 1 September 1939 von Richthofen commanded Fliegerkorps VIII during the Invasion of Poland.[1] He directed the attempt to destroy Warsaw from the air. During the Battle of France from 10 May 1940 the Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers of Fliegerkorps VIII supported Walther von Reichenau and his Sixth Army in Belgium and Paul von Kleist' Panzergruppe von Kleist in France. During the Battle of Britain von Richthofen's unit took part in the unsuccessful attempt to subdue the Royal Air Force.

In April Fliegerkorps VIII were tasked with supporting the Battle of Greece and the Battle of Crete. Following the successful conclusion of this campaign von Richthofen, now a General, became the 26th recipient of the Knight's Cross with Oakleaves (Ritterkreuz mit Eichenlaub) on July 17, 1941. Following the Balkans campaign, von Richthofen were appointed commander of Luftflotte 2,[1] based in Italy.

On 22 June 1941 Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. von Richthofen was appointed commander of Luftflotte 4, which supported Heeresgruppe Süd under Erich von Manstein in their advances towards the Stalingrad and Caucasus regions. In the winter of 1942 the Sixth Army under Friedrich Paulus were surrounded by a Russian counter-attack during the Battle of Stalingrad. Hitler was assured by Field Marshal Hermann Göring that the Luftwaffe could supply the Sixth Army by air, and as a result, Hitler denied the request of Paulus to retreat from the city. Wolfram von Richthofen tried in vain to overturn this decision to try to supply the entire German Sixth Army by air, without success. Although the air bridge did manage to deliver over 8,300 tons of supplies during a 72 day period, this was much too little for the besieged army. The operation also cost Luftflotte 4 nearly 500 aircraft and 1,000 crewmen.

After the failure of the air-bridge, and the failed Operation Wintergewitter to relieve the city, Hitler promoted Paulus to field marshal in his besieged Stalingrad headquarters in an effort to convince his commander to commit suicide rather than surrender. When Paulus surrendered anyway on 31 January 1943, Hitler declared, "That is the last field marshal I make in this war!"[citation needed]

However on 16 February 1943, only two weeks later, Hitler promoted von Richtofen to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall, he became one of only six officers in the Luftwaffe in the history of the Third Reich to be promoted to this rank (The others were Hermann Göring, who had held the rank from 1938 until his promotion to Reichsmarschall in July 1940, Albert Kesselring, Erhard Milch, Hugo Sperrle, and when the Third Reich was within days of falling, Robert Ritter von Greim). 47 at the time, von Richthofen was the second youngest person promoted to rank of field marshal in Nazi Germany, after Hermann Göring (promoted when he was 45). Von Richthofen was retired on medical grounds in late 1944. He subsequently died of a brain tumor whilst being held in American captivity at Bad Ischl on July 12, 1945.

Erich Johann Albert Raeder (April 24, 1876 - November 6, 1960) was a naval leader in Germany before and during World War II. Raeder attained the highest possible naval rank – that of Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) – in 1939, becoming the first person to hold that rank since Alfred von Tirpitz. Raeder led the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) for the first half of World War II, but resigned in 1943 and was replaced by Karl Dönitz. He was sentenced to life in prison at the Nuremberg Trials, but was later released and wrote his autobiography.

Raeder was not a supporter of the Operation Sealion, the planned German invasion of the British Isles. He felt that the war at sea could be conducted far more successfully via an indirect strategic approach, by increasing the numbers of U-boats and small surface vessels in service. This, in addition to a strategic focus on the Mediterranean theater including a strong German presence in North Africa, plus an invasion of Malta and the Middle East.

He argued strongly against Operation Sealion because of his doubts about a decisive German air superiority over the English Channel and the lack of regional German naval superiority. Air superiority was prerequisite to counter the expected catastrophic harassment of the German invasion force by the Royal Air Force.

Since such requirements were not met, the invasion was postponed indefinitely due to the Luftwaffe's failure to obtain air superiority during the Battle of Britain. Instead the German war machine was diverted to Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Soviet Union, which he vigorously opposed.

A series of failed operations after that point, particularly the Battle of the Barents Sea in which a pair of German cruisers were beaten off by the destroyers of a British convoy, combined with the outstanding success of the U-boat fleets under the command of Karl Dönitz, led to his eventual demotion to the rank of Admiral Inspector of the Kriegsmarine in January of 1943. Hitler afterwards ordered the scrapping of all German surface units, so Raeder resigned and retired in protest on May of 1943. Karl Dönitz succeeded him in the post of the Commander in Chief of the Navy on 30 January 1943.

After the war Raeder was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Nuremberg Trials, for waging a "war of aggression," a charge arising from his planning of the German invasion of Norway. Britain and France had already prepared for their own occupation of the Narvik area (troops and materiel had been loaded on ships), but they were forestalled by the German actions. This much criticized sentence was later reduced and, due to ill health, he was released on 26 September 1955. He later wrote an autobiography, Mein Leben, in 1957. Erich Raeder died in Kiel, on 6 November 1960.

Karl Dönitz. (September 16, 1891–December 24, 1980) was a German naval leader, who was in command of the Kriegsmarine during World War II and was President of Germany for 23 days after Adolf Hitler's suicide.

Dönitz was born in Grünau near Berlin. He entered the Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial German Navy) in 1911. During World War I, he served on surface ships before transferring to submarines. He ended the war a prisoner-of-war of the British. He remained in the navy after the war's conclusion and rose in the ranks of the Reichsmarine and Kriegsmarine, becoming a Grand Admiral (Großadmiral) and serving as Commander of Submarines (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, B.d.U.) and later Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine) despite never joining the Nazi Party. Under his command, the U-boat fleet fought the famous Battle of the Atlantic. He also served as Reichspräsident for 20 days following Adolf Hitler's suicide.

After the war he was charged and convicted of "crimes against peace" and "war crimes" and served ten years. By ordering the unrestricted submarine warfare conducted by Germany in the North Atlantic, he caused Germany to be in breach of the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936. However as evidence of similar conduct by the Allies was presented at his trial, his sentence was not assessed on the grounds of this breach of the international law.On his repatriation he moved to a small village near Hamburg. During his later years, he wrote two autobiographies covering different periods in his life. He died of a heart attack on Christmas Eve, 1980.

When the war started in 1939, Dönitz had recently been promoted to Commodore (Kommodore) on 28 January 1939, and leader of submarines (Führer der Unterseeboote). The German Navy was unprepared for war, having anticipated the war to begin in 1945, as anticipated by previously established war plans which the Plan Z was tailored for. The "Z" Plan called for a balanced fleet with a greatly increased number of surface capital ships, including several aircraft carriers. At the time war did start, Dönitz's U-boat force included only 57 boats, many of them short-range. He made do with what he had, while being harassed by Raeder and with Hitler calling on him to dedicate boats to military actions against the British fleet directly. These operations were generally unsuccessful, while the other boats continued to do well against Dönitz's primary targets of merchant shipping.

On 1 October 1939, Dönitz became a Rear Admiral (Konteradmiral) and commander of submarines (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote); on 1 September the following year, he was made a Vice Admiral (Vizeadmiral).

By 1941, the delivery of new Type VII U-boats had improved to the point where operations were having a real effect on the British wartime economy. Although production of merchant ships shot up in response, improved torpedoes, better U-boats, and much better operational planning led to increasing numbers of "kills". On 11 December 1941, following Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, Dönitz immediately planned for Operation Paukenschlag (commonly Drumbeat, with connotations of "tattoo" or "thunderbolt" in German), against United States east coast shipping. Carried out the next month, with only nine U-boats, it had dramatic and far-reaching results. The U.S. Navy was entirely unprepared for antisubmarine warfare, despite having had two years of British experience to learn from, and committed every imaginable mistake. Shipping losses which appeared to be coming under control as the British Navy gradually adapted to the new challenge instantly skyrocketed.

On at least two occasions, Allied success against U-boat operations led Dönitz to investigate possible reasons. Among those considered were espionage and Allied interception and decoding of German Navy communications (the Naval version of Enigma). Both investigations into communications security came to the conclusion that espionage was more likely, if Allied success had not been accidental. Nevertheless, Dönitz ordered his U-boat fleet to use an improved version of the Enigma machine (intended to be even more secure) — the M4 — for communications within the Fleet, on 1 February 1942. The Navy was the only branch to use the improved version; the rest of the German military continued to use their then current versions of Enigma. The new network was termed Triton (Shark to the Allies). For a time, this change in encryption between submarines caused considerable difficulty for Allied codebreakers; it took ten months before Shark traffic could again be read (see also Ultra and Cryptanalysis of the Enigma).

By the end of 1942, the production of Type VII U-boats had increased to the point where Dönitz was finally able to conduct mass attacks by groups of submarines, a tactic he called Rudel and became known as "Wolf pack" (wolfrudel) in English. Allied shipping losses shot up tremendously, and there was serious concern for a while about the state of British fuel supplies.

During 1943, the war in the Atlantic turned against the Germans, but Dönitz continued to push for more U-boat construction and technological development. At the end of the war the German submarine fleet was by far the most advanced in the world, and late war examples such as the Type XXI U-boat served as models for Soviet and American construction after the war. These, the schnorchel boats, and the Type IX U-boat, appeared very late because of Dönitz's indifference, even hostility, to new technology."(His opposition to the larger Type IX was not unique; Admiral Thomas Hart, who commanded the United States Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines at the outbreak of the Pacific War, opposed fleet boats as "too luxurious".

Dönitz was very personally involved in operations, often contacting his boats up to seventy times a day with questions such as their position, fuel supply, and other “minutiae.” This helped compromise his cyphers, by giving the Allies more messages to work from. The replies also enabled the Allies to use direction finding (HF/DF, called "Huff-Duff") to locate a U-boat using its radio, track it, and attack it (often with aircraft able to sink it with impunity).

Dönitz replaced Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine) on 30 January 1943. It was Dönitz who was able to convince Hitler not to scrap the remaining ships of the surface fleet. Despite hoping to continue to use them as a fleet in being, the Kriegsmarine continued losing what few capital ships it had. In September, the battleship Tirpitz was put out of action for months by a British midget submarine. In December, he ordered the then-sole remaining operational capital ship (the battlecruiser Scharnhorst) under Konteradmiral Erich Bey to attack Soviet-bound convoys, but she was sunk in the resulting encounter with superior British forces led by the battleship HMS Duke of York.

Both of Dönitz's sons died during World War II. His younger son, Peter, was a watch officer on U-954 and was killed on 19 May 1943, when his boat was sunk in the North Atlantic with the loss of its entire crew. After this loss, the older brother, Klaus, was allowed to leave combat duty and began studying to be a naval doctor. Klaus would be killed on 13 May 1944. Klaus convinced his friends to let him go on the fast torpedo attack boat S-141 for a raid on HMS Selsey off the coast of England on his twenty-fourth birthday. The boat was destroyed and Klaus died, even though six others were rescued.

Hitler's successor

On 30 April 1945, Hitler committed suicide and Göbbels followed suit a day later. In his last testament, Hitler surprisingly designated Dönitz his successor as Head of State (Staatsoberhaupt), expelling both Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler from the Nazi Party. Significantly, Dönitz was not to become Führer, but rather President (Reichspräsident), a post Hitler had abolished years earlier. Propaganda Minister Joseph Göbbels was to become Head of Government and Chancellor of Germany (Reichskanzler).

On 1 May, following Göbbels' death, Dönitz became the sole representative of the crumbling Reich. He appointed Count Ludwig Schwerin von Krosigk as Reichskanzler and they attempted to form a government. During his brief period in office, Dönitz devoted most of his efforts to ensuring the loyalty of the German armed forces and trying to ensure German troops would surrender to the British or Americans and not the Soviets. He correctly feared vengeful Soviet reprisals. However, the Dönitz government was not recognized by the Allies and was for some days more or less ignored.

The rapidly advancing Allied forces limited the Dönitz government's jurisdiction to an area around Flensburg near the Danish border, where Dönitz's headquarters were located, along with Mürwik. Accordingly his administration was referred to as the Flensburg government. The following is Dönitz description of his new government:

"These considerations (the bare survival of the German people) which all pointed to the need for the creation of some sort of central government, took shape and form when I was joined by Graf Schwerin-Krosigk. In addition to dicharging his duties as Foreign Minister and Minister of Finance, he formed the temporary government we needed and presided over the activities of its cabinet. Although he was restricted in his choice to those men who were in northern Germany, he nevertheless succeeded in forming a workmanlike cabinet of experts."

"The picture of the military situation as a whole showed clearly that the war was lost. As there was also no possibility of effecting any improvement in Germany's overall position by political means, the only conclusion to which I, as Head of the State, could come was that the war must be brought to an end as quickly as possible, in order to prevent further bloodshed."

Late on 1 May, Heinrich Himmler attempted to make a place for himself in the Flensburg government. The following is Dönitz description of his dismissal of Himmler:

"At about midnight he arrived, accompanied by six armed SS officers, and was received by my aide-de-camp, Luedde-Neurath. I offered Himmler a chair and I myself sat down behind my writing desk, upon which lay, hidden by some papers, a pistol with the safety catch off. I had never done anything of the is sort in my life before, but I did not know what the outcome of this meeting might be."

"I handed Himmler the telegram containing my appointment. 'Please read this,' I said. I watched him closely. As he read, an expression of astonishment, indeed of consternation, spread over his face. All hope seemed to collapse within him. He went very pale. Finally he stood up and bowed. 'Allow me,' he said, 'to become the second man in your state.' I replied that that was out of the question and that there was no way in which I could make any use of his services."

"Thus advised, he left me at about one o'clock in the morning. The showdown had taken place without force, and I felt relieved."

On 7 May, Dönitz authorized the Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces, General-Colonel Alfred Jodl, to sign the instrument of unconditional surrender of all German forces to the Allies. Jodl signed this surrender documents in Rheims, France. The surrender documents included the phrase, "All forces under German control to cease active operations at 23:01 hours Central European Time on 8 May 1945." The next day, shortly before midnight, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel repeated the signing in Berlin at Marshal Zhukov’s headquarters, and at the time specified, the end of World War II in Europe occurred.

On 23 May, the Dönitz government dissolved when its members were captured and arrested by British forces at Flensburg. Dönitz was the highest ranking German captured.

War crimes trial

Following the war, Dönitz was held as a prisoner of war by the victors, who accused him of war crimes. He was indicted as a major war criminal at the Nuremberg trials on three counts: "conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity", "Planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression", and "crimes against the laws of war". Among the war crimes charges, he was accused of waging unrestricted submarine warfare for issuing War Order No. 154 in 1939, and another similar order after the Laconia incident in 1942, not to rescue survivors from ships attacked by submarine. By issuing these two orders he was found guilty of causing Germany to be in breach of the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936.

Dönitz was found not guilty on count of the Indictment, but guilty on counts and and was sentenced to ten years in prison. However, in view of all the facts proven, and in particular of an order of the British Admiralty announced on 8 May 1940, according to which all vessels should be sunk on sight in the Skagerrak, and the answers to interrogatories by Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, wartime commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, stating that unrestricted submarine warfare had been carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the first day that nation entered the war, Dönitz's order to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare was not officially included in his sentence, but was still the main reason why most judges wanted him convicted. He was imprisoned for ten years in Spandau Prison in West Berlin.

ITALY

Pietro Badoglio, 1st Duke of Addis Abeba (September 28, 1871 – November 1, 1956) was an Italian soldier and politician.

Marshal Badoglio led the Italian troops into Addis Ababa on May 5, and Mussolini declared King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy Emperor of Ethiopia and Ethiopia an Italian province. On this occasion Badoglio was declared the first Viceroy of Ethiopia and received the title of "Duke of Addis Ababa". He was not in favour of the Italian-German Pact of Steel and was pessimistic about the chances of Italian success in any war. He resigned in December 1940 following the Italian army's poor display in the invasion of Greece.

Following the Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943, there was a meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on July 24 and the following day in a technical coup d'etat King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy dismissed Mussolini and appointed Badoglio to head the government. Martial law was declared, Mussolini was arrested and negotiations were opened with the Allies. When the German army responded, the new Italian government was forced to flee to Pescara and Brindisi and accept Allied protection.

Badoglio signed the Italian armistice with the Allies on September 3 in Cassibile; the document was published by the Allies on September 8, when Badoglio had not yet communicated the decision to the Italian forces, which were surprised by the switch. The longer version of the armistice was signed on September 23 in Malta and the Badoglio government officially declared war on Germany on October 13. Badoglio did not head the government for long: following the rescue of Mussolini, the liberation of Rome and increasingly strong opposition he was replaced by Ivanoe Bonomi and other committed anti-Fascists.

Ugo Cavallero (September 20, 1880 – September 13, 1943) was an Italian military commander before and during World War II.

Cavallero rejoined the army for the third and final time in 1937. Promoted to lieutenant general, he became Commander of the Combined Italian Forces in East Africa in 1938 and was made a full general in 1940. After Italy entered World War II in 1940, Cavallero was made Chief of the Italian Supreme Command, commander of the Italian forces fighting in Greece, and Commander in Chief of the Italian Army Group in Albania. As Chief of the Italian Supreme Command, Cavallero worked closely with German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring and often asked for Kesselring’s advice on military matters. Cavallero also opposed Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s invasion of Egypt and campaigned for Rommel’s dismissal in 1942, but he was ignored by both Hitler and Mussolini. Under Cavallero’s leadership, Italy’s military forces performed poorly during the war, but he was nonetheless promoted to Marshal of Italy (field marshal) in 1942. After several serious Italian setbacks in 1943, however, (such as the Allies’ capture of Libya) Cavallero was dismissed as Chief of the Supreme Command. After Mussolini’s government was toppled in 1943, Cavallero was arrested by Prime Minister Pietro Badoglio for his Fascist and pro-German views. Cavallero wrote a letter to Badoglio falsely claiming he despised Mussolini and Fascism, but the prime minister did not believe him. When Badoglio’s government surrendered to the Allies in September 1943, the Germans invaded Rome and rescued Cavallero. Planning to make him a commander of Italian military forces still loyal to fascist ideals, they found his anti-fascist letter in Badoglio’s office and believed him to be a traitor. Now hated by both the Germans and the forces loyal to Badoglio, Cavallero committed suicide, by a gunshot wound to the head, on September 13, 1943, although whether he did so willingly is still a matter of debate.

JAPAN

Hajime Sugiyama (1 January 1880 - 12 September 1945) was a Field Marshal and Minister of War in the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II. He was also known as Gen Sugiyama.

Military Career

Born to a former samurai family from Kokura City, Fukuoka Prefecture, he served as a lieutenant in the infantry in the Russo-Japanese War. After graduating from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1910 and serving on the Army General Staff, he was posted as military attaché to the Philippines and Singapore in 1912. Promoted to major in 1913, he was posted again as military attaché to British India in 1915. During this time, he also visited Germany, and became acquainted with the use of aircraft in combat. On his return, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and commander of the 2nd Air Battalion in December 1918. He was a strong proponent of military aviation, and after his promotion to colonel in 1921, became the first head of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service in 1922.

In May 1925, he became a major general and acting Vice War Minister in June 1930. In August, he became Vice War Minister and a lieutenant general. He returned to command the expanded Imperial Japanese Army Air Service in March 1933. He became a full general in November 1936.

Shortly after the February 26 Incident, he became Minister of War. Under his tenure, the situation between Japanese forces in Manchukuo and China became more severe, cumulating with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the invasion of Shanxi Province. Sugiyama briefly accepted a field command as commanding general of North China Area Army and the Mongolia Garrison Army in December 1938.

On his return to Japan, Sugiyama was briefly appointed head of Yasukuni Shrine in 1939. From 1940 to February 1944 he served as Chief of the Army General Staff. On 5 September 1941, on the verge of the war against the Occident, he was blamed by Emperor Hirohito for having confidently told in 1937 that Japanese invasion of China would be completed within three months. He was awarded the rank of field marshal in 1943.

In 1944 he was replaced as Chief of the Army General Staff by General Hideki Tojo and assigned to the Inspector-General of Military Training. In July 1945, he was asked to take command of the First Theatre Army, which directed defenses of the Japanese mainland against the anticipated Allied invasion.

Shortly after the end of the war, after finishing preparations for the final dissolution of the Imperial Japanese Army, Sugiyama committed suicide by shooting himself four times in the chest with his revolver while seated at his desk in his office. At home, his wife also killed herself.

General Tomoyuki Yamashita (November 8, 1885 – February 23, 1946) was a general of the Japanese Imperial Army during the World War II era. He was most famous for conquering the British colonies of Malaya and Singapore, earning the nickname The Tiger of Malaya.

Malaya and Singapore

On November 6, 1941, Yamashita was put in command of the Twenty-Fifth Army. On December 8, he launched an invasion of Malaya, from bases in French Indochina. In the campaign, which concluded with the Fall of Singapore on February 15, 1942, Yamashita's 30,000 front-line soldiers captured 130,000 British, Indian and Australian troops, the largest surrender of British-led personnel in history. He became known as the "Tiger of Malaya". The campaign and the subsequent Japanese occupation of Singapore included war crimes committed against Allied personnel and civilians, such as the Alexandra Hospital and Sook Ching Massacres. Yamashita's culpability for these events remains a matter of controversy.

On July 17, 1942, Yamashita was sent from Singapore to far-away Manchuria, again having been given a post in commanding the Japanese First Army, and was effectively sidelined for a major part of the Pacific war. It is thought that Prime Minister Tojo was responsible for his banishment, taking advantage of Yamashita's gaffe during a speech made to Singaporean civilian leaders in early 1942, when he referred to the local populace as "citizens of the Empire of Japan". This was considered embarrassing for the Japanese government, who officially did not consider the residents of occupied territories to have the rights or privileges of Japanese citizenship.

The Philippines

General Tomoyuki Yamashita (left) with MP-Major Kenworthy (right) in Manila, 1945, after his surrender.

In 1944, when the war situation was critical for Japan, General Yamashita assumed the command of the Fourteenth Area Army to defend the Philippines. The U.S. Army landed on Leyte on October 20, only ten days after Yamashita's arrival at Manila. On January 6, 1945 the American Sixth Army landed at Lingayen Bay in Luzon.

Yamashita commanded around 262,000 troops in three defensive groups. He tried to rebuild his army but was forced to retreat from Manila to the mountains of northern Luzon. Yamashita ordered all troops except those tasked with security out of the city.

Almost immediately, Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi re-occupied Manila with 16,000 sailors, with the intent of destroying all port facilities and naval storehouses. Once there, Iwabuchi took command of the 3,750 Army security troops, and against Yamashita's specific order, turned the city into a battlefield.[1] The actions of the Japanese garrison resulted in deaths of more than 100,000 Filipino civilians, in what would be later known as the Manila Massacre, during the fierce street fighting for the capital which raged from February 4 to March 3.

Yamashita used delaying tactics to maintain his army in Kiangan, part of the Ifugao Province of the Philippines, until 2 September 1945, after the surrender of Japan. His forces, numbering less than 50,000 troops, surrendered to Allied Generals Arthur Percival and Jonathan Wainwright. Although he might have been expected to commit suicide prior to this surrender, he reportedly explained his decision not to kill himself by saying that if he did "someone else will have to take the blame."